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KNOWLEDGE : WHOSE IS IT, WHAT IS IT, AND WHY HAS IT TO BE 'TRUE' ?

DAYA KRISHNA

So much has been thought and written about the subject, yet even the simplest questions do not seem to have been asked by the profoundest of thinkers who have thought about it. To think of 'Knowledge' is immediately to think of the 'senses', and yet it is not man alone who possesses the senses. 'Living beings' all around us possess them too, and if to possess 'senses' is 'to know', then certainly they also would have to be granted 'knowledge' in that sense of the term. And, senses are not just five; they may be more or less. That many animals do not possess all the senses which man has is well known, but that they may possess 'senses' which we do not have, is not so well recognised. Migratory birds are said to fly thousands of miles every year from wintery homes that have freezing temperatures to warmer places, and in case they do this they must have some type of 'sensory knowledge' which man does not have. The range even of the normal senses enormously varies amongst animals; they 'see' what we do not see, they 'hear' what we do not hear and their sense of smell far outstrips anything that man can boast of.

As for what has been called 'inner sense', almost all 'living beings' feel pleasure and pain and seek the one and avoid the other. They display 'intelligence' in this regard as they would not have survived without it and, as experiments on 'learning' demonstrate, modify their behaviour in the light of their experience.

Who shall, then, deny them 'knowledge', at least of the kind that is based on 'sense-experience' and is determined by 'success in seeking 'pleasure' and avoiding 'pain' ? But the term 'living being' is not confined to 'animals' alone and, if so, the challenge that this poses to the idea of

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'knowing' has to be posed and faced even if it cannot be decisively answered.

The extension, however, creates problems for the very idea of 'knowing' as what we call 'senses' not only grow less and less, as the Jains noted, but it becomes increasingly doubtful if there is any such thing as a 'sense' at all in such border-line cases as amoral or virus or other micro organisms. Even the semblance of a 'sense' disappears in the case of plants, and if they are regarded as 'living' in some sense of the term, and if 'living' is necessarily associated with some sort of 'knowledge', then one would have to accept, however reluctantly, that there can be such a thing as 'non-sensuous' knowledge, that is, knowledge which is not based on the senses, or derived from them in any way whatsoever.

The problem can perhaps be solved by enlarging the notion of 'sense' and redefining it in such a way as to render its paradigmatic exemplification in the human race purely accidental and treat it more in functional rather than structural terms. This would be in line with the 'behavioural', 'objectively observable' approach of science but, then, it would raise the problem of distinguishing between this behaviour and the one found in that which is 'non-living', even if the term 'behavour' may seem ill-suited in the case of the latter.

This may appear a *reductio ad absurdum* of the approach we have adopted as to talk of 'knowledge' in the case of non-living matter is a manifest absurdity but, unfortunately, the recent achievements in 'Robotion, Artificial Intelligence and Information technology seem to be proving that the 'absurdity' is no absurdity and if some thinkers still feel it to be so, it is only because of old habits of thought which one finds difficult to give up. Yet, if one accepts the 'absurdity' in its most literal sense in which alone it is truly absurd, one faces the dilemma raised by the question : how far is consciousness a necessary pre-condition for knowledge.

The relation of consciousness to knowledge seems self-evident, and all thinking about it till very recent times rests on it as, without it, it will make on sense. No one believes that if something consists of matter and matter alone, it can be said to have consciousness, as the two are supposed to be radically apart by the very definitions we have given to them. There are, of course, those who subscribe to some sort of 'pan-psychism', but even they will display in their behaviour and attitude *all* the difference that

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the denial of such a position usually entails. And, as for those who believe it to be an 'emergent' property of matter under certain conditions even they would have to admit that those conditions are not fulfilled in 'machines' which are said to behaviourally display what is usually called 'knowledge'. In fact, the 'conditions' under which 'consciousness' is said to emerge, as far as we know, have not yet been specified.

On the other hand, even if one admits that 'matter' and 'consciousness' do not go together, can one accept that consciousness qua consciousness 'knows' anything without its relation to the body and the senses and the mind and the intellect, and everything else at the human level ? As for other 'living beings', there has to be a 'body' there, a ' living body' which is *not* matter in the usual sense as it 'dies' and when 'dead', ceases to be that very soon.

The term 'consciousness', strangely, has no referent; nothing that we can point to. All that we have is 'external', 'indirect', 'behavioural', 'verbal', 'communicative' evidence and this is what is sought to be replicated by those who deny it altogether. The direct, 'introspective' evidence on which every one relies and which seems incontestable, does not seem to give much ' Knowledge' as questions of 'truth' and 'falsity' generally do not arise in respect of it, and perhaps cannot arise in most cases. What 'knowledge' can the so-called 'inner sense' give us and even if it does, it has to be accepted as 'self validated' by the fact that the inner sense is supposed to function only with respect to that which is purely 'inner' and hence not 'knowable' to anyone other than the one to whom it belongs. The concept or the idea of there being such a sense may itself be denied on varied grounds, the most important of which center around language which is supposed to be 'public' and hence incapable of being restricted to anything that is strictly 'private' in character. The argument, ascribed to Wittgenstein, rests on such obvious mistakes that it is surprising how it could be taken seriously by anybody. One is not born speaking a language and if it is so, that is, if one has to learn a language, then one will have to accept a pre-linguistic situation and the argument from language will not prove anything. But even if one takes the language-centric predicament as seriously as some would like us to take, even then we will have to accept that most languages do make a distinction between 'private' and 'public', and if language has to be accepted as a guide to what is 'correct' or

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'incorrect', the distinctions it makes will have to be taken as pointing to something that is considered as 'real' within the linguistic community that makes them.

The radical distinction between first person and the second and third persons is central to all languages, just as is the distinction between second and third person. Strangely, the 'you' to whom 'I' talk, talks of himself or herself as 'I' and addresses me as 'you'. It is this that makes me realise that it is as much an 'I' as I think myself to be. The 'Thou' of Bubu is certainly an 'I', but not *identical* with me, or the 'I' that is 'Me' as Ramchandra Gandhi seems to have suggested in his "I am Thou". The well known advaitic move to assert absolute identity by denying all difference as *upādhi* is of little avail as all those who say or utter the word 'I' have to have *upādhis* to say or utter it.

But the word 'I' announces a radical distinction between all that can be objectified and that which eludes and transcends objectification. It is a function of self-consciousness and concretises it to oneself and others and yet it is content-less, an empty phrase that casts, through its reflexivity, an ever-lengthening shadow creating the illusion that something is there to be 'known' when there is noting to know. Philosophy at least in one of its forms arose from this illusion and "know Thyself" was the slogan it coined for itself which the Greeks and the Westerners in their philosophical tradition did not get stuck in as much as the Indians who also said, "*ātmānam viddhi*".

Consciousness, even when self-conscious, hardly 'knows' anything, except perhaps that something 'is', or that 'nothing' is not. This may sound perplexing, but a little reflection on the phenomenon of dream or sleep, so dear to the *advaitin*, would reveal the problem. What do we 'know' in dreams and can we be really said to 'know' anything ? It is not that there is 'nothing' there; we do 'recognise', 'name' and even get mentally and physically affected, but that also happens when we 'imagine' or read a novel or 'see' a play, but do we 'know' anything in these situations ?

The case of 'sleeping' is even worse. So also is that of becoming unconscious, being put under anesthesia, falling in a coma, or even dozing or becoming absent-minded, or just forgetting, not 'knowing' where one is in one's own house, or a hundred other such things which happen to everyone. The adviatins have made too much of someone's saying that he slept well and that the 'waking experience' sublates 'dream experience'.

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But one may not sleep well and the 'dreaming' may be sublated by sleep or, conversely, 'sleep' by 'dreaming' as happens every night. But where is 'knowledge' in all this ? Consciousness, it seems, has little to do with knowledge and, in any case, does not seem much interested in it as whatever it is aware of, if it is aware of, it considers as 'real'. And, if everything is 'real' for it, how can the question of knowledge ever arise ?

But, even 'awareness' which seems at least *prima facie* a necessary precondition for knowledge, does not seem to be a necessary condition for consciousness if its 'desire' for sleep and 'intending' to do so, is taken seriously. Nothing can be worse for consciousness than sleeplessness, and 'to sleep' is not to be aware, not even to dream as what one wants is 'dreamless' sleep or 'deep' sleep as the advaitin likes to call it. One, of course, wants to wake up from that sleep, though even this may not happen when one wants 'really to die', that is, to wake up no more. But, then, what we understand as consciousness would be an adventitious quality, and knowledge its accidental property that arises only under certain conditions when they happen to obtain.

The problem of consciousness is insoluble as it has both a subjective and an objective aspect and varies in intensity and quality, besides appearing both as a dispositional and an actual property. At another level, it affects and is affected by almost everything, including itself. Its close association with body, mind and intellect at the human level and its interrelationship with those in causal terms as both effect and cause in some sort of circular causality as commonly evidenced in bio-feedback phenomena renders any meaningful discussion of it practically impossible. But the real problem in respect of it is its relation to 'life', which continues in dreaming and sleeping, but seems to snap or lapse or cease when death occurs, that is, life ceases to be. Till life exists, the possibility of consciousness exists and if 'to live' is to 'know' in another sense, and to be 'self-conscious' is to 'know' in another sense, and to be 'self-conscious' is to 'know' in still another sense, then we have to distinguish and de-segregate these senses that are confusedly intermixed in our cognitive discourse about knowledge. Not only this, we have to realise that one is a precondition for the other and that the successive levels are not only levels of knowledge, but also of consciousness and reality in a sense which, if becomes aware of them in self-consciousness, would affect both consciousness and reality in significant

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way.

Neither consciousness nor reality, nor knowledge remain the same as they continuously create and recreate one another. Self-consciousness when it emerges, as in man, plays havoc with it all as human history attests in plenty. As for 'meditative consciousness', it is not only not yet accepted without reservations, but its relation to others is scarcely understood at all as it is tangential to them and even negates them in an important sense by trying to abolish them altogether.

But if consciousness is such a tricky, chamelon-like, diverse, many-leveled and many-layered 'thing', how can it even be thought of as some sort of a property belonging to something. We do talk of 'we' and 'I', but that is only a manner of speaking and not much should be made of it. After all, one does use such expressions as "I have consciousness" without anyone thinking that consciousness is a property which one may have or not have and yet 'be' what one is, for if one were to do so, one would find it difficult to distinguish between that which is inconcient and oneself. The idea that one could still make the distinction in terms of the possibility of one's being conscious would not only render the possibility 'inessential' to one's being, but also render it difficult to deny that possibility to anything else.

The question of 'ownership', whether of properties or of anything else, applies not only to consciousness but to 'knowledge' as well. In fact, in the case of knowledge it appears even more problematic as knowledge is just not the sort of thing that can be 'owned'. Whatever it be, it cannot be 'private', confined to one alone or 'unshareable' by others because of its nature. If anything, it is just the opposite, not only because it presupposes, pre-existing knowledge without which it could not have come into being, but because in order to be considered as 'knowledge' even by oneself it will have to be placed before others for their judgement and, in any case, should be so presentable in principle.

One is, of course, held responsible, and holds oneself responsible, for what one claims to 'know', but responsibility does not always mean 'ownership' and in the case of knowledge, it is meant to be accepted and used by others as if it was their own. One uses knowledge that was discovered by others all the time and never feels that one does not have the moral right to do so. The association of some names with some kinds of knowledge is mostly accidental as priority disputes between persons

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and civilisations attest and even when it is not so the so-called 'discovery' is meant to be a public property, that is, the property of whole mankind.

Knowledge, thus does not belong to anybody, even though one says, 'I know' and philosophers make a distinction between 'knower', 'known' and 'knowledge' or, as they say in Sanskrit, *jñātā, jñeya* and *jñāna.* Those who made the distinction forgot that knowledge was a collective, cumulative affair of mankind, and if it had to be regarded as 'belonging' to anybody, it had to belong to mankind as such and not to this or that 'I'. But mankind includes not only those who lived in the past, but those who will live in the future also. But once this is seen, 'knowledge' will assume a strange character and lose the mystique associated with it, and acquire the character of an ongoing human enterprise, a collective *puruṣārtha* of mankind.

But if it is so, it throws a light on the other *puruṣārthas,* the number of which is indefinitely large and not just four as is usually enumerated in the Indian tradition, for if it were so 'knowledge' could not be a *puruṣārtha* as it has not been mentioned amongst them. A *puruṣārtha,* however, is a matter of 'seeking', perennial seeking, as perennial as time itself, and hence not something that can be possessed, or meant to be possessed.

But man does not seek just one thing; nor does he know what the seeks. Had he known this, he would not have been almost always dissatisfied, or even disappointed with the success that his 'seeking' temporarily results in. But, what is the relation between his different seekings, and are they necessarily in harmony with one another ? This crucial question has hardly been raised, let alone attended to. As for the role of the seeking for 'knowledge', the fact that it has not been given independent status as a *puruṣārtha,* or a 'seeking' may be taken as a sufficient evidence for its being seen as only subsidiary or instrumental for the realisation of something else which alone is supposed to have intrinsic value for man.

Yet, 'truth' has always been held to be one of the highest values, if not the only one, and 'truth' is supposed to be a characteristic of knowledge, and if so, how could 'knowledge' not be an ultimate value, a *parama puruṣārtha* for man. But, are knowledge and truth so indissolubly related that one cannot be conceived without the other. First, even on the usual understanding of these terms, nondeclarative statements are not supposed to be true or false though, as they are 'understood', they must be said to convey some knowledge. On the other hand, declarative statements when

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they happen to be 'truly' universal, that is, consisting of an indefinitely extensible conjunction of singular statements, cannot be 'true' by definition as even if one of the conjunct is false, the whole conjunct shall be false. This is the well-known problem of Induction presented in a logical garb, but then one sees the logical necessity behind it. The converse problem with a particular statement or what these days is called an 'existentially quantified statement' is that it cannot be proved false, again by definition, as it is an indefinitely extensible disjunction of singular statements. One may, of course, save the situation by requiring declarative statements to be either true or false, but not necessarily both. Yet, whatever the option, the fact remains that it is *only* a singular statement which is true or false, and no one considers a singular statement as an example of knowledge.

But statements need not have a 'subject' term at all and hence the question of their being 'singualr' or 'non-singualr', that is, particular or universal, need not arise. Imperative or injunctive statements are an example of this and moral and legal contexts, which happen to be the most important for understanding the human situation, are determined and defined by them. 'Truth', in the usual sense, is inapplicable to them and if they are considered as 'subjects' for study and discussion and regarded as 'knowledge' in some sense of the term, that knowledge cannot be considered as 'true' or 'false'.

The problem with the predicates 'true and false' is that one just does not know what they exactly mean, and whether they can even be meaningfully applied to all domains and discourses without exception. A little change in the nature or type of 'object' to be 'known' radically affects not only what is to be meant by 'truth' in respect of it, but also of the method to be used to ascertain it. The dispute about 'knowledge' in the social sciences or the humanities is well know, as also the question whether 'knowledge' in these fields is strictly to be accorded the status of 'knowledge' as the process of establishing a 'knowledge claim' is generally not clear, or even agreed upon. There are, as everybody knows, 'schools' or *sampradāyas*, each with its own 'orthodoxy' and methodology, self-enclosed in its own certitude, oblivious to the criticisms offered by others. Psychology is the clearest example of this and the rival journals published by them, an evidence of this. The so-called 'schism in Physics' and the Intuitionist revolt in Mathematics may be cited by some as an evidence

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that even these hard-core knowledgefields are not immune from the problem. But if this is accepted then the problem will be seen to lie deeper still, and not just be confined to certain kinds of knowledge only.

The problem relates to the notion of 'knowledge' itself. Does it form a 'unified whole' covering everything that is known, or consists of disparate 'atomic sentences' each 'mirroring' a 'fact' or displaying or showing it, as Wittgenstein is supposed to have at one time held. There can be 'in-between' positions, loosely organised 'unities' relating to certain fields only, along with the hope that some day it will all be tied up so neatly as not to be disturbed ever again. But this will be a utopian absurdity as it can only be achieved by a 'suicide' of the knowledge-enterprise itself even while humanity is living' and has not become extinct.

Knowledge, it is forgotten has an 'openended' character and subject to continuous revision, modification, extension, emendation and, what is more, itself 'requiring' to be known or understood, an 'understanding' that is always subject to dispute and alternative interpretation.

Knowledge thus cannot be true in the sense in which 'truth' is usually understood, nor can it be 'owned' by anyone as the 'claim' to know is bound to be spurious, if not a deliberate deception, an immoral act of a different order as it deceives regarding the source of truth itself. But all this is bound to be, unless we become clear about what 'knowledge' is, and whether it is the sort of 'thing' about which philosophers, whether in the east or in the west, have disputed and discussed up till now. The discussion has to take a new turn as the discussion up till now rests on the assumption that reality is there, finished and completed, to be known, and that human action has nothing to do with it. But as action is real and the ideas of the good and the beautiful tell us it is so, the idea of knowledge has also to be different, and shall be different unless man wants to deny his own reality which perhaps he is 'free' to do. But, then, the idea of 'knowledge' would have to accommodate in it this idea of 'freedom' also. And, if he does, what shall happen to the truth which he thought he was seeking through knowledge. Perhaps, he was seeking something else and only deluding himself by thinking that he was seeking 'truth'.

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Important Notice

We had published in **Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, Nos. 1-2** pp. 147-158, a Discussion Note by Dr. S. V. Bokil on "The Argument From Illusion" but inadvertently failed to print Notes to that discussion given by him. We request our readers and subscribers to read them as follows as addendum to the Discussion Note. Inconvenience caused to them is deeply regretted.

Chief Editor, I P Q.

NOTES

1. All page references given in parenthesis hereafter are to K. Srinivas: 'Argument from Illusion', *IPQ* Vol. XXX, No. 2, April 2003.
2. Lewis, C. I. : *"Mind and the World Order"*, New York, Dover, 1956, p. 39.
3. Sir Russell Brain : *op.cit.* pp. 10-22.
4. *Ibid :* p. 10.
5. These arguments can be seen in the anthology known as *Readings in the Theory of Knowledge* edited by Canfield and Donell and published by Appleton Century Crafts, New York, 1964.
6. Ayer A. J. *Language, Truth and Logic,* Dover Pubns, 1936, pp. 140f.
7. Beck, L. W. & Holmes R. : *Philosophic Inquiry,* Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall, 1969. p. 164.
8. Austin, J. L. *Sense and Sensibilia,* Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1962, p. 19.
9. *Ibid,* p. 29.
10. *Ibid,* p. 124.
11. Richard Schlagel : *"The Review of Metaphysics"* Vol. LVII, No. 1, September 2003, pp. 105-33.

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RUSSELL ON IDEAL LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF EXTERANAL WORLD

K. S. SANGEETHA

I. Introduction

This paper will be critically analyzing Bertrand Russell's (1872-1970) claim that analysis of the structure of language helps us to understand the structure of the world. Efforts are also made to critically evaluate Russell's concept of 'ideal language' and its various aspects. No philosopher other than Bertrand Russell has undertaken the difficult task of constructing a 'parallel' language to facilitate the understanding of the external world. It is, therefore, important to find out what are the characteristics of such a language and more importantly the question whether the new language could achieve its purpose or not.

Bertrand Russell belongs to the group of linguistic philosophers who appear in the beginning of the twentieth century. Linguistic philosophers are mainly concerned with language, because for them, the task of philosophy is to deal with the structure and meaning of language. But we find that Russell, in addition to his concern for language, has advocated epistemology also. Russell had four different phases in his philosophical career. A neo-Hegelian phase (till 1899), a Platonist phase (1899-1913), an empiricist phase (1914-1918) and a modified empiricist phase (1919 onwards)[1]. This paper concentrates on the empiricist phase of Russell. During this phase he constructed the ideal language and also advocated phenomenalism epistemologically.

This paper conceives Russell's empiricist phase as a result of his attempt to correct his earlier inconsistencies and also his ambition to make use of the method of science in philosophy. Being a mathematician and

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logician Russell felt that applying scientific method to philosophy will cure philosophy of its traditional systems and methods and will assign philosophy with a new task; the task of studying the logic of language. Russell claimed that philosophy does not deal with reality any more. He asserted, ".....every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical".[2]

Russell's position that essence of philosophy is logical analysis of language and /or all philosophical problems are the problems of logic of language is unsatisfactory; there is some sort of incompleteness or inadequacy about this view. More, if this is the only business of philosophy, who will address the problems of the world and find solutions ? Language undoubtedly is very much an aspect of philosophy, sine all knowledge is assimilated, recorded, reflected and communicated through language. But, certainly this is not the only function of philosophy.[3]

In Platonist phase Russell treated sense data and material objects as irreducible existents, but his empiricist phase considered sense data as logical atoms out of which the (material) world is constructed. Russell attempted to cling to logical atoms for the explanation of reality through his analysis of language. The question is 'how the analysis of facts of the material world rests on the analysis of language ?' Reasons are offered wherever it is applicable throughout the paper and also in the concluding remarks.

II.

In order to prove his assertion, Russell formulated epistemology of this stage to be concerned with the study of the logic of language. He attempted to construct an ideal, logical, nonnatural language, the terms of which are precisely defined and the sentences of which unambiguously revealed the logical form of the facts to which they refer. Such a perfect language, according to Russell, must rest upon atomic propositions. So the fundamental philosophical problem is to describe the nature and structure of these atomic propositions through his method of analysis.

Russell's view that analysis is the appropriate method for philosophy is inspired by the role that analysis plays in mathematics.[4] His method starts form things which are indubitable, but which cannot be expressed

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with any precision. Russell compared devotion to the method of analysis to observing something first through naked eye and then through a microscope, which reveals the fine complexities involved.[5]

Here in this context Russell holds that his analytical method aims not only at exhibiting logical forms of propositions, but also indicating the structural similarity between propositions and facts that propositions assert or deny. The concept of 'structure' is fundamental to his method of analysis. The philosophical purpose of his analysis is the discovery of logical forms of propositions leading to the discernment of the basic structure of reality. Russell's ideal language is constituted out of propositions that can be analyzed ultimately into atomic propositions. Corresponding to atomic propositions there are atomic facts outside. Facts are not particular existing things such as John, or the rain or the sun. Because these words by themselves do not render any statement, true or false, "I mean" Russell elaborates. "The kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false. If I say 'it is raining', what I say is true in certain conditions of weather and is false in other conditions of weather. The condition of weather that makes my statement true (or false as the case may be) is what I should call a 'fact'".[6] Russell calls the fundamental constituents of facts as logical atoms. These are two kinds - particulars (sense datum such as 'this is blue') and universals ('all men are mortal'). Facts are of different types.[7] A fact may be affirmative or negative. Some facts are 'completely general' referring not to particular entities but only to the general form (or syntax) of statements - these are the facts of logic. There are also facts about facts. There are not, however, true facts and false facts, for only propositions can be true or false and a proposition, for Russell is a (complex) symbol[8], not a fact. Russell explains,".... facts are ...not properly entities at all in the same sense in which their constituents are. That is shown in the fact that you cannot name them. You can only deny, or assert, or consider them, but you cannot name them because they are not to be named, although in another sense it is true that you cannot know the world unless you know the facts that make up the truths of the world; but the knowing of the facts is a different sort of thing from the knowing of simples".[9]

One fails to appreciate Russell's view that although we can know the simples (particulars), we cannot know the facts. It is not possible for us to ignore the knowledge of a compound thing, when its components are

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perfectly known[10], unless a deliberate attempt is involved to do otherwise. If one can know the simples (particulars) it automatically leads to the knowledge of facts also. Therefore, by his above explanation, Russell not only confuses himself but also the readers.

Since a proposition is complex symbol its meaning is derived from the meaning of the component symbols that constitute it. Through analysis Russell reduces propositions to those component symbols and determine the meaning of the basic symbols, and thereby obtain a clear understanding of the meaning of the original propositions. Because the meaning of the component symbols are the corresponding constituents of the fact that the proposition expresses. Russell acknowledges various types of propositions, consequently facts also. The simplest ones are atomic propositions and atomic facts. Atomic facts form a hierarchy according to the number of terms involved.[11] The propositions expressing them, atomic prepositions, also form a corresponding hierarcy. Russell speaks of molecular prepositions. These are complex in nature compared to atomic proposition.

All molecular propositions, Russell claims, can be expressed as truth functions of atomic propositions.[12] To exemplify the simplest case, the molecular proposition 'p and q' is ture if the atomic propositions ('p', 'q') both are true, and is false if either of them is false. But, the truth of 'p' is independent of the truth of any other proposition. We have as a schema 'p and q'.

T = true F = false

p	q	p and q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

As obvious now, there are two propositions corresponding to every fact one true and one false. Since there are no false facts, you can not get one fact for every proposition but only for every pair of propositions. All this

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applies to atomic propositions.

But when it comes to molecular propositions as p and q, 'Mary is girl and she drinks milk', here according to Russell, there are two different facts involved in the truth or falsehood of the proposition 'p and q' - the fact that corresponds to p and fact that corresponds to q. Both these facts are relevant in discovering the truth or falsehood of 'p and q'. Russell asserts, "I don't suppose there is in the world a single disjunctive[13] fact corresponding to 'p or q'. It does not look plausible that in the actual objective world there are facts going about which you describe as 'p or q', but I would not lay too much stress on what strikes one as plausible: it is not a thing you can rely on altogether... you must not look about the real world for an object which you can call 'or' ('and' in our case), and say, 'Now, look at this. This is "or", there is no such thing and if you try to analyze 'p or q' in that way you will get into trouble. But the meaning of disjunction (conjunction, in our case) will be entirely explained by the above schema".[14]

One can see that by making the above statements Russell contradicts his own theory. Molecular propositions are part of Russell's ideal language, in which each of the terms is precisely defined and sentences of which unambiguously reveal the logical form of facts (which are in the external world) which they represent. Here in this Russell has a fact for 'p' and also for 'q' or for any such, but not for 'or' 'and', or, 'if' as such in the external world. We ask, what kind of 'fact' do they correspond ? And if they cannot correspond to facts in the external world, can they be a part of his ideal language ?

Russell's conception of 'naming theory of meaning', requites a certain familiarity with what he means by a 'term', 'particulars', and 'proper names'. As we have seen only complexes (a proposition is complex symbol) can be analyzed, which have parts or components of any kind. Russell says, "All analysis is only possible in regard to what is complex, and it always depends, in the last analysis, upon direct acquaintances with the objects which are the meanings of certain simple symbols".[15] By symbols he means something that 'means' something else. He held that the word 'Abraham' means a certain man; the word 'mortal' means a certain quality; the sentence 'Abraham is mortal' means a certain fact. But Russell clarified that these three sorts of meanings are entirely different. An atomic fact contains terms of the relation also in addition to relations. Russell asserts,

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"These 'terms' that come into atomic facts I define as 'particulars'."[16] The subjects in a proposition will be the words expressing the terms of the relation that is expressed by the proposition. "The only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name, and the whole matter of proper names is rather curious.

Proper names = words for particulars. Df"[17]

That is, only proper names can be used as particulars. For Russell the names that we commonly use such as Mary, Jones are really abbreviations for descriptions. And in Russelian terms what they describe are not particulars but complicated systems of classes or series. "A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you can not name anything you are not acquainted with".[18] Russell holds that when one is acquainted with particular, one has complete understanding of the name. When one considers the interconnections that exist among Russell's analytic method, empiricism, pluralism and naming theory of meaning', one can see the Russell, in fact makes use of his empiricism to assign meaning to words apart from acquiring knowledge.[19]

Following the sense in which Russell had used the word 'particular', he himself admitted that it is difficult to get an instance of a name in the proper strict logical sense of the word. When we say 'This is blue; if one agrees that 'This is blue', meaning the 'this' that one sees, one is using 'this' as a proper name in Russell's sense. But if one is trying to apprehend the proposition that somebody is expressing when he/she says 'This is blue' one cannot do it.

Naming also helps in indicating objects that are recognized in thoughts. But the peculiarity of particulars, (They are self-subsistent like substances, with the difference that they persist only for a very short time, as long as our experience lasts) which form the object of genuine atomic propositions, is that they are ever fluctuating. Still for Russell, a world full of particulars is a possibility.

The argument is that if these particulars alone are taken to inhabit the world, then no world can be discovered in which we can draw out any programme which extends over past, present and future and we are to be fully satisfied with the mere momentary experience. We are of the view that this initiates solipsism and destroys the very foundation of knowledge

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if knowledge is viewed scientifically and from its acceptability.[20] Russell's further claim is that not only the objects in the world are simple but also the words in the ideal, non-natural language are also equally simples or particulars because there is a one to one relationship[21] between a word and the objects denoted by the word[22]. That is meaning of a name is the objects for which the name stands. This he calls 'naming an object'. This could be understood as in Russell's sense a name stands not only for any particular thing that exists at any place and time, but also for abstract entities of all sorts, to non-extent thing like the present Emperor of India.[23]

Russell discusses dercriptions as a part of his ideal language. There are two sorts of descriptions : (1) ambiguous description, e.g.: A cat, a post man (2) definite decription, e.g. The sum of 16 and 61, the first child who was treated in this hospital this morning. His primary aim is to show that definite descriptions do not function logically as names because a name is a simple symbold, and a definite description, for example, the author of Harry Potter, is a complex symbol. It contains parts that are symbols; and the meaning of these parts, here in this case, 'the' 'author', 'of', 'Harry', 'Potter' has already been fixed.

Now the question is, if descriptions are not names, then what are propositions in which they occur about ? This question implies that a proposition having descriptive phrase may assume a subject-predicate form.

Russell believes that if the proposition is freed from this grammatical garb, if one analyzes this complex (singular) proposition, then it can be shown that it consists of three general existential propositions regarding a property or properties possessed by some individual. They are :

(1) Some one wrote Harry Potter.

(2) Only one person wrote Harry Potter.

(3) Whoever wrote Harry Potter was English.

Russell would say that in the reconstructed version of the proposition containing the phrase 'The author of Harry Potter,' however, no symbol for the phrase, as such, appears. This is clear evidence that it is not a constituent of the proposition at all. As a result it can only be defined continually by translating the whole proposition in which it occurs. Also, if description is a genuine constituent of the proposition, there is no need for a contextual definition to show what they 'mean'. Consequently it would

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have remained indissoluble element in any restatement of propositions in which it occurs. Russell's analysis of descriptive phrases leads him to realize that some words that seem to function as constituents of proposition do not actually do so and in analyzing a significant sentence one must not assume that each separate word or phrase has significance on its own account. In other words, a word or a phrase has no meaning in isolation, but only in a context.

Russell wrapped up his theory of decription[24] by concluding that descriptions can be completely eliminated and can be shown as "incomplete symbols". "The sort of things that are like these decriptions in that they occur in words in a proposition, but are not in actual fact constituents of the proposition rightly analyzed, things of that sort I call 'incomplete symbols'.... These things, like 'the author of Waverly', which I call incomplete symbols, are things that have absolutely no meaning whatsoever in isolation but merely acquire a meaning in a context... Such aggregations of symbols are really the same things as what I call 'logical fictions', and they embrace practically all the familiar objects of daily life; tables, chairs Piccadilly, ... Most of them are either classes, or series, ... they are aggregations that only have a meaning in use and do not have any meaning in themselves".[25] In this context Russell wrongly insists that referring or mentioning must be equivalent to meaning.[26]

One will be justified in questioning Russell as far as the ontological significance of theory of descriptions is concerned. By showing descriptions as incomplete symbols Russell asked us not to assume that they designate objects in our ontological world. This should not be read as there are no objects corresponding to the whole lot of descriptive phrases, it is just that this theory has value ontologically, only in the denial of inclusion of "objects denoted" in our ontological world, in order to account for the meaningfulness of propositions containing descriptive phrases. Russell's theory speaks that assumption of objects devoted' is an unwarranted one and it in fact, results from confusing logical form with grammatical form. It also implies that we should understand Russell's logical fictions, as entities which have been stripped-off their metaphysical attire.

The important point emerging from the discussion so far is that sense data are the basis of Russell's knowledge and therefore of atomic facts, for he claims, as we have seen, that one can know atomic facts only as the

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facts of sense experience or sense data. Now we should consider what Russell calls ontologically and logically as atomic propositions, which he arrived through logical analysis, are nothing but 'sense datum statements' epistemologically.

As evident, in the empiricist phase Russell's aim was to understand the external world. In this quest, he tries to construct [27] a model of the physical world (i.e., an adequate substitute for the physical world), which has all the properties of the original, on the basis of actual and possible sense data. Having done an initial sorting of our data according to their certainty (in the Platonist phase) he now tries to sort them out logically. Here Russell speaks about hard (which are resistant to doubt) and soft data (which disintegrate when subjected to doubt). The hardest of hard data are of two types: t e particular facts of sense, and the general truths of logic. Because of its logical certainty Russell attempts to construct a world out of hard data. More, since hard data are limited in number he adds some very recent, facts of memory, some introspective facts, some facts of sense perception involving space and time and some facts of comparison.

Russell finds it difficult to accept our belief persist, as this knowledge is psychological derivative; or that other people have minds because this belief arises from observation of their bodily behaviour and is therefore derivative. For the same reason, he excludes the testimony of others. But now Russell is confronted with 'problem' of the external world: "Can we know that object of sense, or any other objects not our own thoughts and feelings, exist at times when we are not perceiving them ?[28]

Excessive devotion to empiricism makes Russell to conclude that what cannot be known in 'sense experience' cannot exist. Material object, therefore, cannot exist. In addition, now he believes that material-object-concept is equivalent to 'collection of sense-data'. Therefore the view that only sense data can be known empirically and consequently can exist, makes Russell to reduce all physical objects like tables, mountains, earth, etc., to a series of classes of sense data[29]. This way he introduces phenomenalism.[30] It is the view that a material-object-statement can be reduced to a series of classes of sense datum statements without residue. Now he conceives that material objects are logically constructions out of actual and possible sense data. He explains, "Given a set of propositions,

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nominally dealing with the supposed inferred entities, we observe the properties which are required of the supposed entities in order to make these propositions true... we then construct some logical function of less hypothetical entities which have the requisite properties. This constructed function we substitute for the supposed inferred entities, and thereby obtain a new and less doubtful interpretation of the body of propositions in question".[31] Evidently the uninferred and less hypothetical entities are the sense data and the inferred, more hypothetical entities are the material objects. Russell's phenomenalism is inspired by his belief in the principle, 'wherever possible substitute constructions out of known entities for inference to unknown entities'. Thus to exclude permanent things Russell develops the maxim in this phase viz., Occam's Razar.[32] One can see that phenomenalists do not accept objective reality behind appearances. They forget the fact that objective knowledge can be achieved only when we take both appearance and reality into account. Although Russell maintains the difference between appearance and reality in his platonic phase, he completely rejects it for the present phenomenalistic position. He claims that all appearances are real.[33] It will not be wrong to say that by demolishing the distinction between appearance and reality, Russell questioned the basis of our scientific knowledge.

Russell designates 'material substance to be a metaphysical assumption of common sense.[34] It is these material objects of common sense that are analyzed into sense data. It is obvious that Russell called sense datum propositions as atomic propositions. Atomic propositions correspond to the atomic facts. And, atomic facts are known through sense perception. The 'things' of Russell here are 'sense-data' or 'particulars' or 'simples'. That particulars are idectical with sense data is clear when Russell states, "logically a sense-datum is an object, particular of which a subject is aware of.[35]

Since 'only objects with which we are directly acquainted in perceptions are our own private sense data', it is important to consider 'how Russell constructs public material objects from private sense data'? Russell calls objects of sense experience as sense datum or sensible object. And the nature of the object of sense experience (sense datum) is private one as opposed to a public table, mountain and person. Russell claims that one has a sensation only when one perceives, feels or hears a sense datum.[36]

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Sense datum does not exist unperceived, that is, sense datum is subjective. Therefore, in order to construct 'public' material object out of 'private' sense data, Russell introduces the concept of *sensibilia*.[37] In addition to being physical both sense data and sensiblia endure for short period of time. Russell, therefore, constructs the public physical objects not only with private, actual sense data with which any single observer is acquainted but also with *sensibilia*. He writes, "The 'thing' of common sense may in fact be identified with the whole class of its appeatances - where, however, we must include among appearances not only those which are actual sense-data, but also those 'senseibilia', if any, which, on grounds of continuity and resemblance, are to be regarded as belonging to the same system of appearances, although there happens to be no observers to whon they are data".[38] Here one should not be confused about the status of *sensibilia* and material substance. Because *sensibilia is possible* sense data, which *can become actual* when we sense them. Russell, therefore, advocates that the common sense world is nothing but a logical construction out of 'particulars' or 'simples' or 'sense-data'.[39]

Now the overall problem for Russell is epistemological, to explain how physics is knowable. The solution involves in reducing its content, so that it no longer speaks of sense data transcending physical objects.

Russell not only constructs material objects through his phenomenalism but also human beings. For him a person is a series of his appearaances and nothing more. Russell is of the view that when we see a 'real' man, the immediate object that we see is one of whole system of particulars, all of which belong together and make up collectively the various 'appearances' of the man.[40] Through this he makes the subtle difference between sense data and phantoms and hallucinations though he considers the latter's to have the same level of reality as the former. He is of the opinion that when we see a phantom of a man, which is an isolated particular, it does not fit into a system like a particular which is an appearance of the 'real' man. Regarding the difference he says, "They (phantoms and hallucinations) differ from ordinary sense-data only in the fact that they do not have the usual correlations with other things. In themselves they have the same reality as ordinary sense data ... they are part of the ultimate constituents of the world, just as the fleeting sense data are".[41]

Here we should note that Russell himself treats sense data as fleeting.

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Further Russell constructs a world out of fleeting sense data. But we know from our everyday experience that the world we live in is not momentary or fleeting in Russell's sense. The world provides a platform for all our practical activities and also for our existence, at least sufficiently to cover the average lifespan of an individual.

III. Conclusion

This paper brings to light that although 'sense-datum' remains the core of Russell's epistemology, sense data fail to establish the connection between language and external world. Infact, his sense data work as the intermediary between the subject and external world and thereby causing difficulties for the acquisition of knowledge. A consequence of his transition from causal theory of perception to phenomenalism is that conscious human being is separated from his biological basis. Russell's view that the only objects (directly acquainted) of our perception are our own private sense data leads to solipsism.

Russell claims to have arrived at 'simples' through logical analysis. The truth is, his empiricism forced him to accept as existing nothing but sensedata. The 'simples' of his analysis are nothing but the sense data of his epistemology. These 'simples' or sense data constitute the 'only stuff of reality'.

This pluralistic view of reality helps Russell to believe that each particular 'stands entirely alone and is completely self-subsistent,' except that they are transitory. Evidently, Russell's sense data are fleeting. Since a thing that persists for an hour is to be regarded as composed of many things of less duration, Russell treats human beings and material objects alike as not one single persistent entity, but as a series of entities succeeding each other in time, each lasting for a very brief period. This way he rejects the notion of a permanent substance, one of the important concepts indispensable for scientific knowledge.

This paper does not approve of Russell's method of logical analysis as it causes the whole material and mental world with its causal laws of development to disappear. Consequently we are left with isolated, transitory sense data. By treating analysis as the only method and sensation as the only source of knowledge Russell's phenomenalism undermines role of human being and his various faculties in the acquisition of knowledge. Further it reduces the existence of human beings to a series of sense data.

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Precisely because of this it fails miserably in providing us with the knowledge of the existence of objective reality. Russell's analytic methodology reduces complex and causally interrelated objective reality to discrete, unrelated units. When private sensations are assumed as the only source of knowledge, the object of knowledge cannot be the objective reality.

One cannot regard Russell's constructions as genuine entities as they are not epistemologically better alternatives to what they replace. Consequently Russell's purpose of explaining the world through language is not achieved. In addition constructions lack any ontological significance, which would have otherwise contributed to our knowledge.

This paper has shown how Russell's so called 'particulars' fail to explain the nature of objective reality. Knowledge of the nature of objective reality is revealed through the knowledge of the unity of particular and universal, cause and effect and appearance and reality etc. Unless we try to grasp the true nature of reality by going beyond appearances, we will not be able to achieve complete knowledge. Russell limits his jurisdiction of knowledge only to appearances and particulars and thereby fails to achieve the aim of a true philosopher. If we ignore the synthesis of above-mentioned pairs of categories of understanding that will result in inadequate knowledge. Immanuel Kant rightly teaches us that 'concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind'. True knowledge is the realization of this unity, which Russell rejects throughout.

NOTES

1. Paul J. Hager, *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy* (The Netherlands: Kluwer Publishers, 1994)
2. Bertand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London : Gerorge Allen & Unwin, 1969), p.42.
3. Also see Suman Gupta, 'Bertrand Russell and A.J.Ayer': A Dialectico-Materialist Approach', *Marxian Sociology,* II (12); 1979, pp. 283-316.
4. Analysis as a mathematical method involves commencing with what is to be proved, the conclusion, and moving backwards to some fundamental truths or axioms. By contrast, synthesis combines basic truths or premises to deduce a conclusion. Greek mathematics is synthetic in method. Analysis in mathematical philosophy, which conforms to the modern analytic

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approach such as dissolving common notions, is found in Russell's idealist phase. Thus whereas Russell and Moore started the movement that became known as 'analytic philosophy' somewhere around 1899, the *analytic method* predates that. Also modern mathematics, stemming from 17th century developments in algebra and calculus is generally analytic. [See Paul J. Hager, *Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy* (The Netherlands : Kluwer Publishers ,1994)], p.10.

5. "I find that by fixity of attention division and distinction appear where none at first was visible, just as through a microscope you can see the bacilli in impure water which without the microscope are not discernible. There are many who decry analysis, but it has seemed to me evident, as in the case of the impure water, that analysis gives new knowledge without destroying any of the previously existing knowledge. This applies not only to the structure of physical things, but quite as much to concepts". Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959), p.133.
6. *Ibid*.p.182
7. According to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* there are only atomic facts. By contrast, Russell admits in his 'The Philosophy of Ligical Atomism', general facts with certainty, and though with some hesitation, negative facts and also 'facts' with more than one verb', that is, facts involving propositional attitudes.
8. "....Propositions are complex symbols and the facts they stand for are complex." Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', (1918), in *Logic and Knowledge* (London & New York : Routledge Reprint. 1994), P.192.
9. *Ibid*., p.270.
10. Combined with reflection, the knowledge of different compound thing gives rise to the knowledge of that compound thing.
11. The simplest atomic fact is recognized by its virtue of being unanlayzable into any further constituents.
12. Their truth or falsity is completely determined by the truth or falsity of atomic propositions that construct them. The truth of an atomic proposition on the other hand can be decided only by passing beyond the proposition to the facts it depicts.
13. Please read throughout this discussion disjunctive, as conjunctive and 'p

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or q 'as" p and q as we have taken the example of 'p and q' instead of Russell's own example of 'p or q'.

14. Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomis', (1918), in *Logic and Knowledge* (London & New York : Routledge, Reprint. 1994), pp.207-210.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 194
16. *Ibid.*, p. 199
17. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
19. Suman Gupta, *Tewntieth Century Philosophy* (Bangalore: Navakarnataka, 1991), p.19.
20. Russell realizes the problem and after years of reflection comes to the conclusion that particulars are strictly unthinkable and both terms in the atomic propositions stand for universals. Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into the Meaning and Truth* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992),pp. 127-130.
21. "A relation is said to be "one-one" when, if x has the relation in question to y, no other term x' has the same relation to y, and does not have the same relations to any term y' other than y'. [John G.Slater, Betrand Russell (Bristol: Thoemmes press, 1994), p. 18].
22. This is known as ostensive definition; attaching meaning to a symbol by pointing out to an object or a phenomenon in sense experience.
23. Also see A.J.Ayer, *Russell* (London: Collins, 1972), p.52.
24. "...the descriptions disappear when the propositions are rightly analyzed in which they occur". Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', (1918), *in Logic and Knowledge* (London & New York : Routledge, Reprint. 1994), p.266.
25. *Ibid.*, p.253
26. In this context, P.F.Strawson also rightly criticizes Russell. Strawson remarks, "He did not distinguish B^1 (an expression) from B^2 (a use of an expression); he confused expressions with their use in particular context; and so confused meaning with mentioning or referring. P.F.Strawson, 'On Referring', *Mind*, LIX (235); July 1950.
27. The first application of the technique of logical construction to non-mathematical material are contained in the article 'The Relations of Sense-Data Physics' (1914) and in somewhat abbreviated form in *Our Knowledge of External World.*

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28. Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Reprint. 1969), p.82.
29. "The things that we call real, like tables and chairs, are systems, series of classes of particulars, and the particulars are the real things, the particulars beings sense-data when they happen to be given to you. A table or chair will be a series of classes of particulars, and therefore a logical fiction." See Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', (1918), in *Logic and Knowledge* (London & New York Routledge, Reprint. 1994), p. 274.
30. The phenomenalists offer an analysis of material objects, without residue, in terms of sense data. For them sense data are the only ultimate constituents or reality.
31. Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London : George Allen & Unwin, Reprint. 1969), p.96.
32. "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity. In other words in dealing with any subject matter, find out what entities. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
33. "The first thing to realize is that there are no such things as "illusions of sense". Objects of sense, even when they occur in dreams, are the most indubitably real objects known to us. What, then, makes us call them unreal in dreams ? Merely the unusual nature of their connection with other objects of sense. ...Objects of sense are called "real" when they have the kind of connection with other objects of sense which experience has led us to regard as normal; when they fail in this they are called "illusions". But what is illusory is only the inferences to which they give rise; in themselves, they are every bit as real as the objects of waking life." *Ibid.*, pp.92-93.
34. He says, "Physics started from the common sense belief in fairly permanent and fairly rigid bodies - tables and chairs, stones, mountains the earth and moon and sun. This common sense belief, it should be noticed, is a piece of audacious metaphysical theorizing; objects are not continually present to sensation, and it may be doubted whether they are there when they are not seen or felt". *Ibid.*, p.107.
35. Bertrand Russell, 'The Relation of Sense-data to Physics' in *Mysticism and Logic* (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 142-146.
36. A Sense datum is distinct from a sensation in that a sensation is the reaction that relation that realtes a subject to a sense-datum, and a sense-datum is a term in this relation. Also see R.M. Sainsbury, *Russell*, (London :Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p.272.

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37. Russell thinks that ideally, since a single person can know physics, the basis of the construction would be confined to single person's sensedata. However, he finds the need to broaden this basis in two directions: he includes the sensedata of more than one preson, and he includes possible as well as actual sense data. "I shall give the name sensibilia to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind". Bertrand Russell, 'The Relation of Sense Data to Physics' (1914), in *Mysticism and Logic* (London : George Allen & Unwin, Reprint. 1986), p.143.

38. *Ibid.*, p.148

39. "Classes or series of particulars, collected together on account of some property which makes it convenient to be able to speak of them as wholes, are what I call logical constructions or symbolic fictions. The particulars are to be conceived, not on the analogy of bricks in a building, but rather on the analogy of notes in a symphony. The ultimate constituents of a symphony (apart from relations) are the notes, each of which lasts only for a very short time. We may collect together all the notes played by one instrument: these may be regarded as the analogues of the successive particulars which common sense would regard as successive states of one 'thing'. But the 'thing' ought to be regarded as no more 'real' or 'substantial' than, for example, the role of the trombone". Bertrand Russell, 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter' in *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Geog Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 125.

40. We regard a human being as much more than his appearances. He is combination of his mind and body; both these aspects have their own part to play in constituting a person. Moreover, if we consider a person as a series of his appearance alone, how will we account for his accumulated experiences and assimilated knowledge ?

41. Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', (1918), in *Logic and Knowledge* (London & New York: Routledge, Reprint. 1994), p.274.

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LIBERALISM, FALLIBILISM AND HUMAN NATURE JOHN STUART MILL'S VIEW

GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

I. Introductory

J. S. Mill thinks of individuality as the most essential of human interests. Individuality if equivalent to freedom as meaning self-determination - the principal condition of and main ingredient in self - development. Accordingly, non-interference is, for him, a vital prerequisite of the good life: it is a fundamental presupposition of his liberalism that individuals should not be interfered with unless their activities can be shown to injure the interests of others. But in addition to the individualist-functionalist strain in Mill's thought there is also a strong strain of skepticism and this is a fundamental component of his liberalism. As well as presupposing a particular view of the nature of man, Mill's liberalism also rests on an empiricist view of the nature and possibilities of human knowledge From this point of view, fallibilism is seen to be one basis of his belief in toleration. A corollary of Mill's fallibilism is his conception of human nature as essentially open and incomplete. His doctrine of individuality and self-development, open and incomplete His doctrine of individuality and self-development, on the other hand, appears to imply that the individual is definable by certain necessary and permanent characteristics. Following a discussion of the empiricist and fallibilist strain in Mill's liberalism, this paper offers an interpretation of Mill's view that reconciles these two seemingly discordant elements in his understanding of man.

II. Liberalism and Fallibilism

Mill is an empiricist in grounding all knowledge on experience - he

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believes that nothing can be established as being true except on the evidence of our senses. Moreover, it is always possible in principle for new observations to upset old conclusions, or to overturn long-established theories. Human knowledge is always fallible and always incomplete; hence we can never claim certainty for any theory or doctrine, but we may hold most firmly to those hypotheses which have been given the most opportunity of being questioned. "The beliefs which we have most warrant for," says Mill, "have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded."[1] If the quest for absolute certainty is fruitless even in natural philosophy, how much more is it likely to be so in human affairs, and how much more necessary is it therefore that any and every doctrine be allowed the possibility of refutation. As Mill points out, when we turn to "morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it."[2]

This very general theoretical belief concerning the nature of human knowledge is the basis of Mill's doctrine of toleration, which is a vital element in his liberalism. If in the ideological sphere it is especially true that uncertainty reigns, then unless toleration of all doctrines and practices (short of definite injury to others) is allowed, we cannot ever hope to arrive at true opinions, or discover which are the best ways of life. So Mill writes:

> "That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognizing all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men's modes of action, not less than their opinions As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it is that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them."[3]

Mills thesis is that men are fallible and imperfect at present (and will be as far as we can see into the future). We, therefore, cannot be sure that any

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doctrine is not a source of truth nor any way of living a source of goodness. Hence we must allow men and women free scope to dicuss diverse views and to try out various "experiments of living." Unless we do this, many at present unforeseeable opionios and forms of human fulfillment will be left untried and we shall never know whether they are true or worthwhile.[4]

Mill's doctrine of the fallibility of human knowledge also carries with it an assumption concerning the nature of man : it is assumed that human nature is essentially indeterminate and incomplete. Since man himself has the continuous capacity for free choice and experiment his nature is, in principle, left open for development in many different and unpredictable directions. Since openness is an essential part of Mill's concept of the individual it further follows that opaqueness is also to be regarded as part of man's nature. Our knowledge of everything, including persons, is necessarily incomplete. There will always be something unfathomable or impenetrable about every individual. Or, putting the same point another way, one may take Mill to be saying that no individual is ever completely definable, so that the concept of man carries with is what might be called the notion of partial idefinability. This way of looking at men and women provides Mill with a powerful argument for toleration; if we know we can never fully understand other people we do well to suspend judgment, to adopt a 'wait and see attitude'. Such a stance is implacably opposed to that of the fanatical moralist who, convinced that on the subject of human nature he has all the answers, is only too ready to impose his 'solutions' on other people.

From his various remarks on toleration it is clear Mill meant his renowned infallibility arguments, deployed most effectively in his discussion on freedom of speech, to apply to actions as well as to opinions.[5] As he grants when dealing with liberty of action, the state must act and act frequently e.g. to protect individual rights, and when it does so it necessarily has to act on the basis of knowledge which is far less than certain. With respect to freedom of speech, in particular, he at first takes the line that the suppression of any opinion whatsoever involves an assumption of infallibility. In seeking to qualify this position he concedes that opinions may sometimes incite people to commit harmful act, which is the duty of the state to prevent. There may be a clear danger that the airing of an opinion will bring about some positive evil before there is time for the opinion to be put to the test

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in the forum of free and open discussion. Even though in such circumstances the state should be reasonably sure that there is a 'clear and present danger' once it has satisfied itself on this score it must intervene in order to protect those rights which it is one of its primary purposes to maintain.

Whilst the infallibility argument may have to be qualified in particular contexts, it nevertheless remain an essential element in Mill's liberalism. It is such because it establishes an initial presumption in favour of toleration: if the state wishes to interfere with opinions and actiones it must be reasonably confident (i) that the activities it wishes to prevent are harmful and (ii) that the measures it proposes are the best means of preventing them. Unless it can claim reasonable assurance for its detailed moral and political judgments, the state is not entitled to intervene. The infallibility argument is seen at its strongest when employed against legislation aimed at enforcing morality. Mill deploys some particularly telling arguments designed to show how, in a number of different areas, the state cannot have enough rational assurance to be justified in protecting us for our own good. More might be said concerning the force of the infallibility argument in particular contexts. To follow up this question would, however, distract me from my task of trying to bring out the manner in which Mill's skeptical attitude functions as one of the basic elements of his liberalism. My purpose in the remainder of this paper is confined to exploration of the way in which the fallibilist strain in Mill's thinking is related to his doctrines of individuality and self-development.

The first point requiring emphasis is that fallibilism cannot, taken by itself, be a sufficient foundation for Mill's brand of liberalism. This is so because fallibilist liberalism is avowedly committed to the defence of one kind of freedom, viz. 'negative' freedom To say this is not to deny that Mill was himself rather muddled on this particular question. There are times when he evidently imagines himself to be defending a purely negative doctrine of freedom. He is then led into the impossible attempt to draw a line between permissible and impermissible social controls by distinguishing between those actions which concern only the individual himself and those which concern others. On the other hand, the more 'positive' side of his liberalism adds up to an extended and elaborate admission that skepticism on the issues of truth and moral goodness does not by itself constitute a sufficient foundation for liberalism. Whilst he never made it fully explicit

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the thrust of much of Mill's thought carries with it the underlying presupposition that 'negative' or traditional liberalism requires to be reinforced with a view of what activities are valuable in themselves and worth pursuing for their own sake. Accordingly, in practical contexts, Mill is to be found arguing not simply for the absence of interference as such, or the removal of restraints upon an unspecified range of activity, but for the removal of obstacles to the growth and expression of those positive and specific modes of thinking, feeling and behaving which he associates with the development of personality.

Even though he remained somewhat muddled about the true connection between the 'negative' and 'positive' aspects of liberty, Mill was shrewd enough to sense that negative freedom is an insufficient basis for liberalism. The same cannot be said of certain contemporary liberals, whose skepticism provides them with a normative argument for toleration, but who are highly suspicious of talk about 'positive' liberty and appear to regard 'negative' freedom as sufficient foundation for their liberalism. The writings of Berlin and Hayek exemplify the predicament of such liberals. While discussing in very general terms the meaning and justification of freedom, they may in principle stick to justification via negative freedom. Detailed consideration soon shows, however, that they do not really wish to, or in any case in practice cannot, defend non-interference simply as such, i.e. the absence of control over some range of human activity quite unspecified. On close scrutiny the moral substance of their writings reveals that what they are actually concerned with are various concrete ways of thinking and acting which they deem to be of the highest moral importance.[6] They are really bent upon defending certain particular liberties which are clearly related to, or even identified with, the forms of activity that they see as making up the good life. Berlin, for instance, stresses the positive value of free inquiry and Hayek emphasizes the worth of individual initiative and innovation. It is hard to see how their stress on the positive worth of these activities is compatible with a definition of liberty which restricts its meaning to simply the absence of coercion or constraint.

Skeptical liberals, such as Hayek and Berlin, are quite right in insisting that the denial of certainty provides a powerful argument in favour of negative freedom. They go astray, though, when in discussing the meaning and value of freedom, they write as if they think skepticism alone can

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sustain their liberalism. Their own handling of specific problems involves a covert appeal to the positive worth of whatever it is that they want freedom for; their skepticism needs to be and is fortified by their invoking what they regard as important human interests or modes of living.

III. Individuality and the Openness of Human Nature

It remains for me to comment on what might easily be thought of as a discordance in Mill's thinking about the foundations of liberalism, an apparent inconsistency between skepticism and his doctrine of individuality. On the one hand, the notions of self-development and individuality seem essentially to postulate for each man a distinctive configuration of characteristics and powers giving him some measure of independence of his social milieu and environment generally. On the other hand, the notion of individuality (self-determination) involves, as I have said, notions of openness and indeterminacy, which forbid us to conceive of the individual in terms of any unchanging characteristics. Does this seeming contradiction mean that there is an incoherence right at the heart of Mill's liberalism? I believe not. Let us now see how the apparent dilemma may be resolved.

The problem is hinted at but left on one side by Berlin in the course of tracing some of the implications of Mill's adherence to fallibilism. From fallibilism it follows that men are altered by discovering new truths and trying out new experiences so that, Berlin argues :

> "The notion common to Aristotelians and Christian scholastics and atheistical materialists alike, that there exists a basic knowable human nature, one and the same, at all times, in all places, in all men- a static, unchanging substance underneath the altering appearances, with permanent needs, dictated by a single, knowable goal, the same for all mankind, is mistaken..."[7]

Berlin is correct in suggesting that Mill's view of man amounts to a break with the picture of a determined and static human nature and the substitution for it of a conception of human nature as free to expand itself in innumerable and possibly conflicting directions. The picture of man inherited by Mill from his liberal predecessors did indeed tacitly assume that there is such a thing as a comparatively simple and unalterable human nature, completely formed and fully ascertainable. In place of the Benthamian image of man, with its crude and over-confident hedonism and its assumption that human

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nature is definable by a few unchanging characteristics, Mill proceeded to build up a more complex and open-ended picture As has already been noted, from Mill's point of view uncertainty, openness and opaqueness are part of the concept of man; there will always be something uncertain and unfathomable about every individual.

A great deal of the zest and interest in human life does in fact arise out of our discovering and rediscovering that the conduct and experience of human beings is not congealed in some a-historical state, that it changes (sometimes dramatically but more often gradually) over time. This part of Mill's account of human nature is incompatible with what Berlin describes as the classical model of man : the conception of human nature as something fully understandable, fixed and certain. But whilst Mill's empiricist-derived insistence that uncertainty of human nature is part of our concept of an individual remains incompatible with the classical account of man, it is not for that reason in conflict with his own view that man is, in part, definable by his possession of the distinctively human powers of mind, feeling and moral judgment. We can, while retaining the notion of the human species possessing certain essential powers, distinguish between those powers, and their particular form of expression within a given historical culture; in so doing room may be left within Mill's concept of human nature for the notion of contingency. It is not being suggested for a moment that this was Mill's own solution to the difficulty we have raised. There is, indeed, no evidence for his ever being aware of the need to try to reconcile the two apparently discordant elements in his picture of man. Still, the problem is one which his account of man's essential powers is required to meet; so there is some point in following up my proposed way of overcoming it.

Stuart Hampshie, when speaking of such persisting ideas of human excellence, such as friendship and justice, draws an important distinction between these relatively unchanging abstract ideals and the criteria by which men in different periods and cultures have in practice characterized them. He writes :

> "A common centre of meanng, and common conditions in the criteria, persist with teh persisting idea of that which is distinctively human. But the more specific conditions in the criteria of application of such terms as justice and friendship change, as the conditions of social life in which they are applied change."[8]

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Mill's model of man may be looked at once again, this time in the light o Hmapshire's remarks. Central in Mill's conception of the good man is hi individuality, his capacity for choice, and it scarcely seems possible tha this capacity should ever be thought of as irrelevant in a consideration o what the distinctive human endowments are. The same thing might be sai of those emotional and aesthetic powers which, for Mill, go to make up th personality of the good man; these also are among the relatively unchangin characteristics of man. If this is true, then it would look as if man may, i part, be defined by the possession of what are at least relatively unchangin characteristics. Yet while there are, in this sense, certain more or les permanent human powers which are part of the concept of man, th particular ways of thinking, feeling and acting, the various modes of characte that are thought to give expression to or embody these aspects of huma excellence do in fact change quite markedly over time. It is the existenc of these latter, relatively impermanent and inessential forms of behavior, i which the changing ideals of self-perfection are incorporated, that enable us to speak of the partial defensibility of human nature and so leave roo in our concept of man for the ideas of his openness and opaqueness.

The point may be brought out more sharply if we consider the valu Mill accords to the ideal of self-determination. Whether or not we accep his evaluation of it as the most important of the essential human interests we should probably agree that freedom, understood in this very general o abstract sense, has been for a quite considerable time an importan constituent in the liberal conception of man. It is doubtful, however, whethe men and women in a free society care very much for self-determinatio merely as such. What some do in practice seem to value are rather variou forms of activity or ways of life which, as it were, instantiate the abstrac freedom of self-determination. For freedom of self-determination may (eve within one society and at one time) assume a variety of different forms o modes of expression. Consider, for instance, Mill's insistence on the valu of participation in public life as a way of engaging and cultivating man' capacity for reasonable judgment and deliberate choice. Men and wome who do manage to be active in social affairs might be said to be allowin their powers of self-direction and particular avenue of expression, or to b embodying them in a concrete way of life. For them, taking an activ share in conducting the common affairs of the community is a form o

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self-determination, is a mode of living that enables their individuality to flower; they do not feel free (and are not free) unless they exercise their 'political' freedom. On the other hand, there may be other members of the same community who, while feeling the need to think and act for themselves, set little store upon participation in community affairs as a vehicle for the display and cultivation of their freedom. They may, for instance, find more scope for their realization of their active powers in the part of their lives given over to business, to the following of some profession or to the carrying on of an artistic pursuit.

It is in acting within the context of their various social roles that individuals may be said to exercise and develop their powers of self-determination; and it is not the abstract power of self-determination but the determination; and it is not the abstract power of self-determination but the exercise of their special powers of thought and self-will that they come to care for and to value. Mill was well aware that the ways of life of many men and even more women provide few opportunities for the display of this sort of freedom. What may be called the institutional structure of his liberalism is a fairly sustained effort to sketch, in institutional terms, the kind of society which would be required in order to provide the necessary setting for his ideal individual. No doubt, in making this attempt, he failed to consider carefully and systematically enough some of the difficult problems. No doubt he failed to take account of the complexity of the considerations to be dealt with in sketching the kind of political and social system within and by which the free life is to be realized and maintained. If I may pause to comment on one element in his outline of a liberal society, I should say he seems to have been altogether too optimistic in thinking that the majority of citizens in democratic nations would come to see participation in political and private associations as an important avenue for the expression and perfecting of their active powers Yet even in making this observation it is necessary to sound a note of caution. The notion of workers' control, for instance, is still a live political issue, or at least is not everywhere dead. We cannot be sure that it has no future at all.

To sum up, we may say that important implication of Mill's view of human nature is that the individual is not definable by any unchanging characteristics except his unspecified but designated in a general sort of way powers of reason, feeling and moral judgment. Insofar as they are

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capable of exercising these powers individuals can achieve some measur of self-perfection. What is more, because of the variety of human natur and because they live in a complex society and one in whch social condition are subject to constant change, individuals may take a variety of differen roads to self-perfection. Indeed, Mill's individual depends. for his ver being, upon the existence of this kind of society. It is only within a pluralisti and socially mobile society that individuals come gradually to be aware o their own identity and become capable of developing their powers o potentialities to their fullest extent.

NOTES

1. *On Liberty*, 1859, Edited by Currin V. Shields. Indianapolis : The Bobbs Merrill Co., 1956, 26.
2. *Ibid.*, 44
3. *Ibid.*, 68
4. According to Mill, free expression of opinion must always lead to th greatest quantity of good in the long run. But such a view appears to res on implausible empirical assumptions about the utility of truth and it inevitable triumph over falsehood. If we set aside any such empirical claims Mill's position leads unavoidably to the invocation of non-utilitarian moral considerations about the importance of individual expression.
5. The infallibility argument that intolerance involves an unwarranted claim to infallible knowledge, and hence may deprive people of access to true knowledge, is undoubtedly Mill's most important argument for freedom o expression and action.
6. See e.g. I. Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1958. 55; and see I. Berlin, *J. S. Mill and the Ends of Life*, London : The Council of Christians and Jews, 1959, 18.
7. I Berlin, *J. S. Mill and the Ends of Life*, *op.cit*, P. 17.
8. S, Hampshire, *Thought and Action*, London : Chatto and Windus, 1959, 1982, 247-8.

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SOME FEATURES OF HUSSERL'S LIFE-WORLD

S. A. SHAIDA

It is widely held that Husserl's early stages of thought could not answer several questions which he had in mind in relation to the transcendental subjectivity as well as the nature, scope and ground of scientific understanding. The foundations of knowledge which Husserl always sought to discover and explicate could not be classified and established with the help of phenomenological reduction. Rather, he was himself feeling more and more uncomfortable by the realization that complete relativism and subjectivism were possible consequences which were glaring at him. The programme of presuppositionless philosophy could not yield a proper stand point to start with. He was conscious of the fact that his theoretical attitude (and, for that matter, anyone's) must follow a "natural primordial attitude"- one of "original natural life' (*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* tr David Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970., hereafter *Criss.* p. 281). But what is the "natural primordial attitude" and how is it to be grounded ? Whether transcendental reduction leaves anything concrete to build upon any viable project of scientific understanding or is one left merely with transcendental subjectivity which brackets everything except itself ? How to understand scientific knowledge and its rootedness in some form of awareness before any theorizing starts ? Is there anything pre-scientific without being completely unscientific or anti-scientific ? And how and where to start from ? How to demonstrate or establish its historical journey ? Can some sort of relativity of all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, be incorporated without falling into the trap of full blooded relativism and subjectivism ? These are some of the issues and problems which Husserl was grappling with during the later stage of his life and the *Crisis* is the

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fruit of his deliberations and meditations on these.

As is known to every student of Husserl's philosophy, the most important concept or theme in *Crisis* is that of life-world (lebenswelt). But the 'life-world' is a response to certain situation which has partly been pointed out above but which needs some clarification. Before we take up a few specific points to elaborate, we may say a few words about the first part of the title which understandably forms the *raison d'etre* of his entire project.

The crisis of European sciences does not lie in its progress and development which was much too phenomenally rapid and globally respected. The mathematization of natural sciences had almost reached the stage of achieving a universal language where complete objectivity was established. There is no need to enumerate the well-known strides of achievement objective science had made. The problem which seems to have bothered Husserl is the lack of human concern which science universally showed and is still showing. Husserl was indeed bothered about the negative or harmful role of science The self-sufficiency of scientific objectivism was seen by Husserl as a false self-consciousness in which science is embedded. Husserl felt that science has been thoroughly dehumanized as it has become shorn of all anthropocentric considerations. The crisis of meaning is the real crisis of science. It is the complete objectivism of science which was in vogue since Galileo's mathematization programme that was found to be the main reason behind the crisis and hence the attempt to found it in the *a priori* of the life-world. With the assumed self-sufficiency of objectivism grew the fallacy of ignoring the life-world within which any theorizing and meditating takes place. This, however, does not commit one to subjectivism - he had before him the Kantian model of erecting an objective edifice of ethics and aesthetics on the subjective foundation.

In the entire corpus of Husserlian writings 'life-world' is one of the those very few concepts which in one book *Crisis* has been described in so many different ways that sometimes one finds if difficult to characterize it with even a tentative precision and exactness. In our attempt to bring some order to the mass of descriptions, we may put them under certain categories for discussing it. It may be pointed out that these features are also, in our view, the more significant senses in which Husserl tried to

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employ in his later phase of philosophizing.

(a) Historicity : For Husserl it was necessary to remember the historicity of all knowledge and understanding which is at the same time the mode of self-understanding. He says :

> What is clearly necessary .... is that we reflect back, in a thorough historical and critical fashion, in order to provide before all decisions, for a radical self-understanding (*Crisis*, p. 17)

As philosophers, he thinks, our task is to know 'only through a 'critical understanding of the total unity of history - our history' (p. 71). Obviously, Husserl's philosophers also include scientists. It is also, therefore, a call to science to be aware of its own roots which can only be located in the logical or phenomenological space which is the life-world. In some generic sense it can be said to be a development or evolution, with added qualities and functions, of the natural world or the surrounding world (*Umwelt*) of *Ideas*. The beginning of historical reflection must be seen as our necessity as historical being who 'not only have a spiritual heritage but have become what we are thoroughly and exclusively in a historical-spiritual manner' (p.71). For philosophical and scientific reflection and understanding, it is necessary that those who are engaged in it must think critically on the history of such knowledge in order to do it effectively.

Explicating the notion of life-world, Husserl observes,

> .... the everyday surrounding world of life is presupposed as existing - the surrounding world in which all of us (even I who am now philosophizing) consciously have our existence; here are also the sciences, as cultural facts in this world, with their scientists and theories. In this world we are objects among objects in the sense of the life-world, namely, as being here and there, in the plain certainty of experience, before anything is established scientifically...
>
> (*Crisis* pp. 104-5)

Husserl in his earlier works *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Cartesian Meditations* had emphasized the history or temporal genesis of any conscious life or ego. In *Cartesian Meditation*[1] he says that the ego constitutes himself for himself in the unity of a history'. In the *Crisis*

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the historicity is applied in a much wider field which is almost coextensive with the life-world where all that is individual, social and psychical must be seen as rooted in its historicity. Husserl is also aware of the situation wherein the tradition or historicity in which we are rooted includes not only what one accepts or rejects but may also extend to unacknowledged legacies which had, without our consent, shaped what we are - our history and tradition. There are prejudices which passively or actively have influenced our thinking and attitudes which can be recognized by unearthing them and subsequently these can be bracketed. But bracketing can be applied to those prejudices and assumptions which we are aware of. Unacknowledged and unknown can not be brought under the purview of bracketing or *epoche.* The elements or various constituents and constructs which go to make our natural attitude or the life-world can be bracketed - the contents of the life-world could be subject to change and variation but not the 'general structure' of the life-world (p. 139) which is not relative. As life-world, the world has the same structure that the objective sciences pre-suppose. The *Crisis,* as David Carr[2] observes, 'reveals a radical discovery which changes the character of phenomenological investigation'. Since the life-world is a historical-cultural world, many life-worlds are possible. This is a view which was also held earlier by Husserl[3]. For Husserl, the life-world has its own ontology and as a pre-scientific world its ontic meaning is the presupposition for any theoretical and practical activity. As he says,

> What is actually first is the "merely subjective - Relative" intuition of pre-scientific world-life. (*Crisis* p. 125)

Husserl's emphasis on the life-world's own and constant ontic meaning for beings who live in it suggests that he thematizes the problem of the manner of being of the life-world which would indicate 'what kind of "scientific" tasks. i.e. tasks to be resolved with universal validity, arise in respect to this world's own manner of being. (p. 123). The knowledge of the objective scientific world is grounded in the self-evidence of the life-world and, as he says, 'we as scientists are among the components of the life-world' which exists as pre-given; hence 'all science and we are pulled into the "subjective-relative" life-world'. (p. 131) One is reminded here of Gadamer's and Schleiermacher's concepts of understanding but we will touch upon Gadamer later. For Husserl, each one of us is "something of"

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the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon,

> We are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon of existing objects; without particular objects of consciousness it can not be actual. The world... exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it Every plural and every singular drawn from it presupposes the world horizon. (*Crisis* p. 143).

Such a pre-given world surrounds and limits us as a flowing, Yet constant horizon. In other words, Husserl is interested in the effective-historical dimensions which are uniquely constructed by all the elements and forces which are real at any stage of history - either of the individual or of the group. To say that we can not escape our history is to say that we can not escape ourselves. Calling such a life-world subjective - relative, or "subjective-historical" (Schlelermacher's phrase) is to recognize the role of the participants engaged in the theoretical and practical activity. But it is subjective in Kantian sense and relative in Gadamerian sense The life-world functions as a constant pole around which all our mental and physical acts and movements revolve. The historical character of all our scientific and philosophical activities which Husserl seeks to emphasize is a call to make such activities historically relevant and humanly fruitful. The scientists who develop knowledge and techniques are themselves completely neutral to their uses and those who weild power and control the scientific programmes are atrociously callous and unconcerned about their employment. Historical situation, specially in the contemporary world, demand the awareness of their responsibility and accountability to humanity at large. Whether science is beneficient or 'maleficent' is a question which is generally dismissed as silly and at best it is encouraged only as a topic of essay writing at the school level. Husserl's critique of scientific objectivism should also be appreciated in this context. The mathematised idealization of science is one aspect but it is not the only approach towards our living world which is also a historical-cultural world. The universal life-world is the cradle of all cultural and scientific theories and interpretations. Science, as 'a human spiritual accomplishment' presupposes the 'intuitive surrounding world of life, pregiven as existing for all in common'. Hence, science 'continues to presuppose this surrounding world as it is given in its particularity to the scientist' (p.121). The lifeworld is the way ultimate

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reality is given to people structured by the historical practical horizons towards which people direct their lives. It is the product of past cultural traditions, 'sedemented within it' that exercise their power over the present and future through the contemporary praxes they support. Historically, of course, people have lived in pr-science period. The life-world was always there before sciences as it continues in the period of science (p.123). Within the lifeworld the reality of particular objects is always provisional. Future experience and interpretation can always revise or reject them. Nevertheless, such revisions can only change details, not the 'ontic certainty of the world' (p.143).

(b) Another aspect of the lifeworld which we have sparsely touched upon but is very crucial to our understanding of this concept is the pre-givenness of the lifeworld and a number of other related ideas which we find in the *Crisis*. Life-world is mostly referred to as 'pre-given' (p.122), presupposed, taken for granted, pre-scientific', pre-logical, 'pre-predicative', it is intuitively given and intuitively known, taken for granted, the original ground of all theoretical and practical activity, (p.49), "a realm of original self-evidences', 'that which is self-evidently given is experienced as "the thing itself" in immediate presence or in any other mode of intuition (pp, 127-8), world of known and unknown realities (p.50). Husserl's emphasis on its pregivenness and other related ideas primarily aims at showing that life-world is prior to science. If is an obvious truth that scientific theories came up much after men and women lived in the world of perception which was the world of naive realism. Historically, people have lived in the epoch of pre-science. Husserl says that 'the life-world was always there before science just as it continues in the epoch of science' (p. 123). What he means by the 'most general structures of the life-world' (p.142) is a stronger sense of pre-givenness. Both perception and scientific theorizing equally pre-suppose it. It is 'pre-given as existing for all in common' (p.121), and even the straight forwardly perceptual is communalized (p.163). There is some ambiguity on this point in his earlier writings which shows how his various formulations move between direct realism and subjective idealism via conceptual realism. There is some tension in his views concerning the sphere of ownness in the context of life-world and intersubjectivity. Some times he suggests that we can not have intersubjectivity without the former but we can have the former without the latter. Again, despite his views

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concerning the *a priori* nature of the life-world, he gives it some concrete content. Lifeworld, as mentioned earlier, has certain cultural objects and properties. Scientists, their theories and their perceptions are elements within the life-world as sciences are 'cultural facts in this world with their theories' p.104). He says :

> The knowledge of the objective-scientific world is "grounded" in the self-evidence of the life-world. The latter is pre-given to the scientific worker... as ground, yet, as they build upon this, what is built is something new, something different. If we cease being immersed in our scientific thinking, we become aware that we scientists are, after all, human beings and as such are among the components of the life world which always exists for us, ever pre-given; and thus all of science is pulled, along with us, into the - merely "subjective-relative"- life-world. (*Crisis*, pp. 130-1)

For Husserl, all interpretations and pictures of the life-world can never be one with it. They are views or interpretations of the life-world, not the life-world. The validity of the pre-given life-world does not depend on some purpose or goal of investigation, 'every end presupposes it' (p.382). He says that the life-world has a structure though not purposive one. But to attribute structuredness to the life-world is to presuppose a role of subjectivity vis-a-vis the life-world. If it is structured, consciousness appropriates it and its pre-givenness and pre-scientificality would be compromised. Perhaps, what Husserl wanted to say is that as it is given to us intuitivity, any conscious being would perceive it having some structure, however vague, immediately given to us in a purely uniterpreted way. As he points out, the pre-predicated world always remains the 'constant pre-supposition and background for every conceptual world-view'. Nevertheless, since cultural properties and ideas are included in the life-world and they, in Husserls expression get 'sedimented' they may colour our perception of reality and the much-needed distinction between experience and interpretation may become difficult to make. The sedimented understanding and interpretation may sharpen the variations and changes in life-worlds belonging to different cultures and epochs.

(c) Finally, we may briefly discuss the role of prejudices within the horizon of the life-world.

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Along with various qualifications and descriptions that Husserl offe of the life-world, one repeatedly referred to is its status as a 'horizon'. It a horizon of perceptual objects' theories, ideal constructs and our fello men. In general, it may be said to be the totality of all that surrounds us mental and physical levels, and which is constantly and necessarily pr given (p.142). It is a horizon within which all other worlds are constitut and given. It is not another world but the condition and possibility of worlds. Its "constant validity", "self-evidence" and "ontic meaning" for beings who live in it seem to suggest the inevitable, pervasive a unsurpassable limit of our thinking and knowing. Husserl speaks of t 'natural primordial attitude' as opposed to the theoretical attitude of t Greeks. In the beginning of the scientific development it may be closer techne but with even the initial development of theoretical interest it g closer and closer to praxis. Sometimes Husserl's approach to the lif world has been described as 'theoretical praxis'. This horizon is understo and classified 'only through a critical understanding of the total unity history - our history' (p.71). We must turn to the tradition of which we a a part so that we may look into and acknowledge historical prejudic which determine the issues and problems of philosophy. What is requir is that we relive the tradition in order to bring to recognition the prejudic that are a part of the tradition. Husserl indeed often speaks of prejudices the pejorative sense unlike Gadamer's use of it in the neutral sense. B the general tenor of his discussions also sometimes suggests that a no pejorative neutral sense is not incompatible with his views. The turn fr the neutral to the negative sense is generally a function of later theoriz and reflection. Generally speaking, the Crisis is thematically the constructi of a history which reflects the philosopher's own philosophical prejudic in order to overcome or throw out those very prejudices. But one has work through the prejudices and tradition which are a part of one's li world in order to break through them. Husserl considers it a constant strug against historical prejudices (which require a sustained and cautions analy of them) to arrive at, or at least be aware of, the phenomenology of scien and culture and to place them in its proper perspective. The prejudic involved here do need proper attention. To the extent that there are prejudic which are unacknowledged and deeply embedded in one's tradition, i much more difficult to dredge them out. Still, the *Crisis* tries its best

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make us aware of these difficulties.

Husserl's life-world is the horizon against which all things stand out and without which they cannot appear to us. As horizon life-world is unique and unitary but the term 'singular' (as opposed to 'plural') 'makes no sense when applied to it' (p.143). What it actually means is that one persons' horizon is unique to him for various reasons including his own history and traditions. It clearly does not mean that there is one and the same for all. Life -world is the horizon within which all other worlds-linguistic, cultural, historical, scientific, literary, artistic etc. - are given and constituted. It is not another world in addition to them.

At this point it may seem relevant to look into Gadamerian thought to locate certain ideas in Husserl which can be further enwidened and related to some other contemporary trends. Husserl's treatment of prejudice has been referred to above and, as pointed out, it has a negative sense. But when admitted as unackowledged, it becomes one of the components of the life-world. In this sense it may function as a way to realize our understanding and awareness of our cultural and scientific world. It may later, however, be bracketed or reduced by some method of reduction. Gadamer, on the other hand, accepts it in his philosophical hermeneutics as a useful prejudgement or bias which constitutes our understanding. It provides an openness to the world which is a necessary contituent of our "effective history" whose structural elements are awareness of our hermeneutic situation and its 'horizon'. In hermeneutic philosophy, distance between past and present is bridged by tradition which is also emphasized within Husserl's concept of the life-world. For Gadamer, understanding is 'placing onself within a tradition in which past and present are constantly fused[4]. The openness for tradition help bring about the awareness of effective-history which is "hermeneutical consciousness". For Gadamer, 'all self-knowledge proceeds from what is historically pre-given[5]. Any historical situation contains its horizon - a view which Husserl must readily accept. Like Husserl's pre-givenness of the life-world, Gadamer also emphasizes the role of "fore-having", "fore-sight", and "foreconception" as presuppositions for the constitution of an object. These also provide the structure of meaning[6]. Like Husserl, Gadamer also accepts the significance of historicity as an ontological one, unlike Dilthery, as it affects the very nature of what is understood. In Gadamaer's thought, it is in the fusion of

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horizons that we 'approach what we understand... with the prejudices which constitute the historical reality of (our) being[7]. For Gadamer, hermenuetic reflection, like Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, is supposed to mediate between science and the life-world. And the life-world, in Heideggerian parlance, can be said to formulate or define the mode of being of the Dasein. It must not be implied here that we are equating Gadamer's views on linguisitic nature of understanding with Husserlian horizon which is all-inclusive. It is only the methodological semblance which we want to bring out. Gadamer comes close to Husserlian standpoint in his recognition that one's horizon of world is largely constituted by not only time and the history of being but also by the history of philosophical and aesthetic thought. Alfred Suchutz speaks of the life-world as,

> Arranged into fields of different relevance according to my current state of interest, each one having its own peculiar center of density and fullness and its open but interpretable horizon[8].

For Suhutz, "concrete historical, socio-cultural *lebenswelt*" within which all typyfications of common sense thinking are themselves integral elements of the concrete historical socio-cultural *lebenswelt* within which they prevail as taken for granted and as socially approved[9].

Now such a life-world cannot perforce be posited against the cultural relativists. Many a writer conveniently place Husserl against Gadamer on the point of objectivity or non-relativity of the life-world and the relativity of the 'Horizon'. In the case of the life-world, Husserl admits that the results of theoretical reflections 'flow into the very subsoil out of which they grow'. Thus it may be difficult to distinguish between the experienced and interpreted. They can become part of the way of experiencing. Theory in sedimented form may affect the structure of the life-world. Thus life-world may differ fundamentally from one cultural group or epoch to another depending on the nature of sedimented interpretations. Some pre-given world structure may be the back-ground for every new theoretical achievement but it may not always be the same structure that is taken for granted. This allows for a more flexible and accommodating concept of the life-world than a single, insulated one. Gadamer's fusion of horizons presupposes more open-ended horizons with an openness towards the other

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Husserl would not admit it though this may be worked out in the context of his *Crisis*. Various life-worlds constitute different possible worlds, always relative to the thinker or experience, but can still be fused together.

It is also significant to note that both Husserl and Gadamer have a common concern about the relation between sciences and the realm of human understanding. Juxtaposing along with what we have earlier said about Husserl, let us attend to Gadamer's words :

> .... the central question of the modern age ... is.... how our natural view of the world- the experience of the world we have as we simply live out our lives - is related to the unassailable and anonymous authority that confronts us in the pronouncements of science[10].

Husserl's disquiet with the fallacy of scientific objectivism finds it's echo in Gadamer's distrucst of historical objectivism which 'conceals the involvement of the historical consciousness itself in effective history[11]. Thus we find that there is a greater affinity between Husserl's life-world and Gadamer's "situation" and "horizon". Husserl has, at a number of places in the *Crisis,* recognized and stated that the life-world functions as horizon, i.e. the limit or boundaries of our knowledge and understanding. Gamader also admits that

> (every) finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of "situation" by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence as essential part of the concept of situation is the concept of "horizon". The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point [12].

NOTES

1. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, tr. D.Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p.75
2. David Carr, *Interpreting Husserl* - Critical and Comparative Studies, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, p.91.
3. Cartesian Meditaions, *op.cit*, p. 133
4. Gadamer, H.G. *Truth and Method*, tr. W. Glyn-Doepel, London, 1975, p.274-75 hereafter, *TM*

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5. *TM*, p.285-286
6. *TM*, p.193.
7. *TM*, p.245
8. Alfred Sctutz, *Collectd Papers*, I. Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, p.134
9. *Ibid*, p.149
10. Gadamer, H.G.*Philosophical Hermeneutuics*, tr. D.Linge, Berkeley, 197(p.25.
11. *TM*, p.268.
12. *TM*, p. 269

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ARE WE DREAMLESS OLYMPIAN TURIYA-NITES?

A. KANTHMANI

'Dreams are mental spandrels' - Owen Flanagan (2000)

I had to spend a great deal of agonizing over many option and spending the whole week on it before arriving at the above title. It is worth spending since I have to address myself to a perennial issue which is held dear by many fellow Indians for the last two millennia. In what follows, I propose to explode the myth behind the so-called 'dream argument' for the depth phenomenology of consciousness. The dream argument is celebrated since the time of Vedas and one of the most fascinating variant, with all evidences he could muster from traditions, is recently attempted by Professor R. Balasubramanian (2003) in the *Consciousness Series* (No. 6) released by **Indian Council of Philosophical Research.** The learned author endeavours to lucidly map the passage from the depth phenomenology of dreams to the depth phenomenology of consciousness. The former is supported by a metaphysics of sleep that entails that saksin (Witness-Consciousness) is self-luminous. Depth phenomenology, Professor Balasubramanain tells us, establishes a tenuous link between Saksin (Principle of Witness) and Deep Sleep (Principle of Turiya), is 'totally different' (29) from Western phenomenology which is only 'surface phenomenology' (14).

It must be presumed that wherever empirical support is missing for the former articulation of Turiya, the latter notion of Saksin is in peril. Turiya cannot serve as the *explanans* for Saksin. In my humble opinion, we have to motivate an independent argument for the latter. Distinguishing Saksin *Plus* that carries a cognitive load of mysticism of true self, from Saksin *Minus* that stipulates 'I have access to my thought', I argued that Saksin, in this sense, is to be unbound by means of higher order theory of

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consciousness (A. Kanthamani, 2002). From my point of view, there is dire need to expose such arguments for scientific treatment, from the po of view of cognitive neuroscience, especially the former. The question whether the so-called 'metaphysics of sleep' (44) is supported by the lat scientific research on sleep and dreams. The answer is that it is n supported by evidence and consequently, it leaves the *déjà vu* experienc of the mystic without any evolutionary explanation whatever.

Borrowing a figure of confession from Owen Flanagan (2000), hesitate to let the 'air out of the balloon and rain on their parade' as the hardly exists any evidence from the annals of cognitive neuroscience you ever interrupt me to ask what all this perambulating about, I will te that the message will be loud and clear at the end: the linguistic compone must go in tandem with the metacognition of dream. Dreams carve o their niche on the edges of meme (Daniel Dennett's use), but how outburs occur in the clouds continues to be enigmatic. I promise that the famo dream argument which holds that we are experiencing bliss when we a in a state of dreamless Turiya, that is obviously the fourth state after Visv (waking), Taijasa (dreaming selves), Prajna (sleeping), would not be drain off without due considerations. A more appropriate form of the patte would read as waking sleep, dreaming, and dreamless consciousnes Whatever is benignly missed either way, Turiya or Caturtha (dreamle sleep) symbolically occupies the fourth quarter.

The term Turiya-nite was coined by me following Professor I Balasubramanian's own use of Turity (perhaps his own coinage) in h recent expose of the dream argument. In my understanding, the ter 'Turity' must stand for something like Turiyahood, and my use takes ov the abstract sense of the stage by identifying it with the tribe of Turi (43). We are all tribes of Turiya. We are all Turiya-nites. All of us hav charmingly the Turiya-hood. If you want me to dwell more, I may add th the difference between the two uses comes to this. While he uses it as a abstract property that is shared by other stages in the sleep-cycle, I use to hold that we are all divine sparks. I include only the adjective 'Olympia to refer to dreams that are messages from divine (166) after considerin Flanagan's deflationary reading of the dream of Descartes as messag delivering, the Hermes of Ananda in tokening the bliss, as opposed to th erstwhile functionalist accounts stemming from the latest researches o

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sleeping and dreams, especially from path-breaking researches of Hobson and Llinas.

Earlier, I have been at the so-called Indian phenomenology of dreams earlier for the inordinate assumptions but not with such convincing evidence that motivates me to reconsider many of them from an evolutionary point of view (A. Kanthamani 2003 a). I correctly identify it with an 'intuition pump' argument. An Intuition Pump Argument is something you arrive at but no one can take seriously. A good example is the Cartesian *Cogito Ergo Sum.* Further, what we fail to take home is the distinction between the phenomenological and the phenomenal. The point is not that we mistake one for the other but we place it at the nadir of mysticism. The whole point of my endeavour is to show no premise about the nature of dreams entails a conclusion about the bliss state. We are prone to relate it to theory-theory (mind-reading capacity) to do a hyper-phenomenology and bet it at the high voltage phenomenological counter. We must be able to show how different are we from phenomenal approaches that is dominant in cognitive science, which are posed to support non-reductionism (Cf. Ned Block 2002) Invariably, what it is to be in a dreamless Olympian Turiyahood must be gauged to be part of what it is to be in the phenomenal state of consciousness. This looks very much like a species of 'conceivability' argument which claims that if it is conceivable, it is possible. It is possible to have a consciousness over and above body to which it cannot be reduced. But no such passage will ensure that we have over and above NREM, and REM, a dreamless sleep. To borrow the terminology of Dennett, there is no shyhook. This is the crux.

Dan Dennett derided the whole question 'What it is like to be in that state ?' by offering the following corrective. Unless it is read as 'What it is to that which it resembles ?' and not 'what it is to be the one who dreams?', it evokes no answer. This he did before striking down the presence of first-person phenomenology. The dreams that we all dream are not dreams after all. They resemble the meme (units of cultural transmission) that are the by-products of the narrative activity. The functionalists accounts stop short of asserting that

(1) The neural basis of dream - REM sleep.

Like ideal or strong reductionists, they founder on identity when it comes to be known that REM sleep is not REM dreams. Perhaps they are

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not identical, just as there is no identity between.

(2) Consciousness = pyramidal cell activity.

The Kripkean necessity operator is a real stumbling block here. The relation is only contingent. The former can be saved by some epiphenomenalism of an evolutionary sort, but not the latter. I believe that we have to sponsor independent arguments for an account of consciousness. The highest knowledge of Atman - Brahman identity will not serve the purpose. A modest questioning was construed to be a calculated attack on the Vedantic Fort (A. Kanthamani 1999). It was not. It was to impress that we use a tool other than identity. Professor R. Balsubramanian. corrected my understanding by saying the relation is one of causality rather than identity. Now the onus is on him to explain what kind of causal relation that holds between them. But the point I had in mind was not to recommend identity but to develop rules about identity. This is the exact plank to carry on the logic of Brahman-Atman Identity, which no one has understood. By parity, we must also recommend a causal argument for the dream hypothesis. Unfortunately, we have no idea how to proceed, given the Indian variant of the sequence of waking, dream and sleep

But the one which is amalgamated with the dream argument tends to lose its aura in the face of lack of scientific research on this unique sleep cycle of waking, sleep, dream, and dreamless mentation. Professor Balasubramanian might argue that we seek reliable authorities in the form of reasoning, experience and scripture (18). If so, we must understand that it must pass muster some form of reliability test if its epistemic virtue is to be proved. Neither one of the above triad would be immune to contestation. We lack empirical evidence for the first two, and no reliabilist support for the third. How to use such stuff to convince students who know a modicum of science ? - a question that should bother the advocates of Advaita Vedānta of present times.

I tend to think that there is something fundamentally wrong which we all Indians believed and taught to the generation of students. We must ponder over to more plausible arguments. The cognitive function is doubtful and hence we have no privilege to foist a mystical *déjà vu* to Turiyahood. The evolutionary function is equally unsustainable since they play no fitness-enhancing function, as shown in the falsity of the following conditional :

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(3) If sleep is an adaptation, then dreams too are adaptations.

The phenomenon of sleep may get an evolutionary explanation, but dreams do not. The REM sleep and REM dreams are radically different since they require different explanations. Dreams are neither adaptation, nor expatations (later in the scale of evolution, they become adaptations), but real, mental spandrels of sleep. Spandrels are the triangular architectural spaces in between the arches. This goes against the view called 'Pan-adaptationism' arising out of Darwinian Evolutionism. Such is the tenor of Panglossian-Darwinism according to which some biological traits adopt, but some others are to be called exaptations, but there are spandrels which are just non-adoptive freeriders. Accordingly, dreams are such noises having no particular significance for evolution. Dennett refuses to go beyond taking them narratives. But Flanagan wants to go further to motivate it in the direction of self-expressive narratives. Thus the only solace Flanagan gives is that dreams are self-expressive (narrative), identity-constitutive (I dream my dreams, and you dream yours), but contends that they are hardly self-knowledgeable. We must seek a Freudain Premise to motivate dreamless sleep as a project of self-knowledge. If dreamful state meets the above fate, dreamless must be worse off. Are they merely posits ? Let us posit dreamless sleep as an aftermath of dreams. Is it a logical consequence, causally entailed by dreams ? The evidence that directly goes against this is that it caused the dream state. So the only recourse here is to hold that dreamless sleep is uncaused. What scientific evidence is there to support this hypothesis? Medical evidence supports that we only pass from NREM sleep where our dream sequence is coherent to REM where it becomes incoherent. Do we go beyond this state ? Pershaps we return to delta (3rd stage of NREM) sleep where dreams are not supposed to occur. This must hence be dreamless state, but cognitive neuroscience is not ready to free it from dreams. The passage in the whole sleep cycle is prima facie from coherent dreams to wild, chaotic dreams. If deep sleep is delta sleep, then the evidence to show that it is dreamless is nor adequate. Churchland comments that in such a state, consciousness disapperas. This much detail is not arcane and they were not accessible to Malcolm. He totally missed the evolutionary dimension. These changes were accountable in their respective evolutionary explanations of both Dennett and Flanagan.

So also, the Indian sleep cycle must be reviewed in the light of latest

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evidence that grows around voluminous literature on dreams. We must be awakened to the situation that the notion of dreamless sleep is strikingly -absurd. As a fourth state (Professor R.Balasubranian refuses to call it a state in the sequence under a very fascinating plea for merging this with other three states and argues for contextual understanding), the knowledge that it gives cannot be held to be at the nadir of achievement. Before understanding the evolutionary explanations, let us concourse about the just-so-stories that have been handed down to us.

Is dream a gift of nature ? If so what is its telos ? If the answer is 'yes' it must be curious biological phenomenon. The phenomenology of dreams demands that we marry philosophy of biology (the genetic component) and philosophy of mind (the mimetic component) to understand its deep structure. The received opinion is that

(4) Dreams are experiences that occur in sleep.

Freud held that dreams have a depth psychology in which we overcome a hazy picture of ours. They are royal roads to the unconscious. According to state-of-the art cognitive neuroscience, dreams are decidedly non-standard deviant occurrences (Cf. Churchland). The Indian philosopher who calls it quixotic is Professor Ranjan Umapathy who wants to take on the role of Sancho Panza (A.Kanthamani 1998). The philosopher Malcolam exploded the received view by analyzing them out as experiences. He averred that dreams are not experiences the dreamers can directly verify. The only evidence we have is through the reports. We are conceptually confused if we think that dreamers are as good as awake mentation. The confusion may be one between conscious and the unconscious or between waking and sleep. We need an understanding of the above distinction. So, his *reductio* leads us to conclude that

(5) Dreams are nor experiences.

So, dream *experiences* are not *dream* experiences. Let us call this as the revisionary view. His failure, if it is to be called a failure (Dennett calls it a overstatement) is in not being able to relate it to a physicalist account of consciousness. *Contra* Malcolm, taking seriously the conceptual connections between the so-called dream experiences and the experience of recollection, Dan Dennett clinched the matter by arguing with a sound polemical acumen that

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(6) Dreams (veridical) are non-narratable unless they are proto-cognitive.

They enter into narratives because they are pre-cognitive. A point that goes contrary to Freud. But the Dennettian paunch is that if they are lie within the ambit of a narrative, then they are experiences in a different sense than the one Malcolm has conceded. While Malcolm tends to undermine the conceptual connections between the dream and the recollection, calling it a conceptual confusion, Dennett is ready to recover a conceptual connection but it comes only in the form of a narrative. The whole burden about dreams must be placed on the narrative. Besides, Malcolm would not oppose that dreams presuppose dreamers, while Dennett questions whether the dreamers can undertake such a phenomenology. Dennet raises three philosophical questions : one on its veridicality, on translation, on identity, following functionalist equivalence before concluding that *Experire est recordare*. That is to say, if most dreams are nor experiences, the natural conclusion will be :

(7) To dream is not to experience it, but to recall as a narrative.

While Malcolm is an eliminativist in dreams, Dennett is a Berkeleyan in a different sense. He recovers the conceptual connection between dream episodes (experiences) and the recollection in a way different from that of Freud as well as Malcolm. The conceptual connection is between the dream narrative and narrative of the dreams. They are not translatanle, nor are they identical. Dennett does not deny dreamer, nor the experience he has, but places the burden on narratives, but at the same time passes no judgement on its evolutionary significance. Malcolm denies the conceptual connection while Dennett goes 'antagonistic' and recovers it in the narratives. He is however not prepared to christen them as memes which is read as having evolutionary significance. They are not identical, nor are they translatable to each other, unless they are recorded verbatim. Thus while Malcolm hinges on the premise that it is possible to be skeptical about the memory, and so, it is possible to be skeptical about dreams. Dennett would say they are not one-to-one identical. At the same time, Dennett would deny that they are memes (rhyming with genes) in an ordinary sense. Memes refer to any item of cultural evolution. They belong to waking states (Library of Babel). But narratives of dream is a class that is different in being more haphazard. Further, while ideas are the genes of

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the mind-brains, biological traits become the memes of the genes. There is something like the genetic-mimetic (Library of Mendel and Library of Babel) interfaces, as I have cited in my previous works (A.Kanthamani 2002 a, 2002 b).

Thus Dennett finds himself against a cassette theory of dreams where dreams are recorded verbatim. Since this is so, we cannot rely on translation nor is there an identity. That motivates him in denying the cassette theory of dreams. The point that stands in support of the above point is that there is a non-linear trait (pandemonium even in waking states caused by taking consciousness as the centre of narrative activity). To what extent non-linearity would serve as an *explanans* for dream state as much as in the waking state would be anybody's guess at present. It must be conceded that the conscious activity during sleep and dreams in non-standard, though conscious because of the cerebral oscillations. The overwhelming evidence points to the non-standard or non-linear function of the brain (not serial, but parallel data processing) as it is attested to by parallel data processing. Brain is massively parallel machine, and its output gets modified due to the recurrent or back propagation algorithm. We cannot propose non-linearity as explanans unless we agree on the similarity of explanandum in waking and dream state. Do we need an alternative non-linearity that makes us dream ? Churchland is forthright in his reaction. Quoting Hobson, he hypothesizes that sleep and dreaming fall naturally out of the dynamical properties of appropriately recurrent networks (Churchlad 1995 : 222) Our understanding of non-linearity is not sufficient enough to serve as an explanas. Flanagan is not ready to accept any form of evolution let alone cultural evolution. He is also least interested in the phenomenon of non-linearity for which there is overwhelming evidence in biology, maths and physics. He claims to be only interested in 'deconstructing' dreams into one in which he can call them as mental spandrels of sleep. Flanagan equally opposed the functionalist account that is supported by a neural computational theory of dreams. He is equally opposed to epiphenomenalist theory of dreams which assert that

(8) Dreams are epiphenomena.

Of all the views adumbrated in the above, the exact Indian argument must be reconstructed in accordance with the following premisses :

(9) Dreams are such phenomenal occurrences that they are

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experiences of happiness.

(10) Dream experiences are recollected as experiences of happiness after waking.

(11) The recollection is a sufficient condition of the dream.

(12) There is something in common between the two experiences (say, light).

These above premise (9-12) entail that

(13) Dream phenomenology entails a pervading Turiya state of consciousness in all the three other states.

Our faith in the above is shaken, but cannot allow (10) to survive except when it is synchronized with a narrative. We have no means to hang on that since consciousness is an experience (anubhava), dream is also an anubhava. Dreams are anubhava narratives. The bliss clause will turn out to be a miasma, at least for the sake of argument. I propose to shown that the Indian view that deems it necessary to argue for Turiyahood is a husk. Since there is no distinction whatsoever between waking, sleep, dream and dreamless states, no canon of collective explanation is plausible. One wonders whether such events call for distinct explanations.

Nevertheless, we can perform a hat trick. We assume that all waking is dreamy (Premise about the Metaphysics of Sleep: duality) Both sleep and dream not only non-apprehend non-duality, but also misapprehend duality. We have knowledge -state that apprehends non-duality (44). We recollect this when we are fully awake. A fortiori, our knowledge would have occurred in our dreamless sleep. Such dreamless mentation is identical with waking mentation. Such an argument equivocates dream mentation with waking mentation and infers something about the transformation of self. This only reverses the first premise. That is to say, dreams occur even when we are in broad day-light. We are all Olympian Turiyanites as much in the waking state as we are in the sleeping state. This is nothing but equivocation. No doubt Indians deliberately skip the sleep stage because we are always supposed to be in that state. In all these, the transformation of self would again be redundant. Thus while all other positions have some grain of truth, the Indian dream argument requires a crucial premise like

(14) Some sleep is dreamless.

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We must examine whether this must be supported by sleep research. All scientific evidence points in the direction of showing that you cannot put delta or dreamless sleep on the attic where it is expected to cause a final transformation of the self. The typical sleep cycle that is common to all Indians reads in the sequence : waking, dream, dreamless state. No sleep stage and hence causal relations cannot be foisted on this. The neuroscientist reads a different story altogether. For them, the sequence is NREM (beta, alpha, delta, and theta stages) and REM that is chaotic. Dreams that occur in NREM carry psychotic and the dreams that occur in REM neurotic significance respectively. So,

(15) Dreams in NREM are not identical with Dreams in REM

since their sub-grammars are different. Flanagan's skepticism is directed against believing that at certain stages of sleep, our minds are totally blank, thoughtless and senseless (68) and maintains that all sleep is dream infected or

(16) All sleep is dreamy (69),

but at the same time, the identity or non-identity between sleep and dreams can be assumed to be controversial without trivializing the relation. If they are strictly co-occurrences, then there must be strong link or intimate connection between them (*Ibid.*,), but no biological evidence to prove this. If they are not identical, it is an open question whether such a non-identity could be proved by biological means. But in order to prove that there is a state of dreamless sleep, what one needs is that there must be hard and fast distinction between sleep and dreams. Such an identity cannot be presupposed. We must prove that

(17) Sleep is not identical with dreams (or vice versa).

This will never be forthcoming for the reasons stated in the falsity mentioned in (3). So deconstruction directly follows from this. Flanagan holds that the relation is one that can be called 'bi-directional' meaning thereby that they mutually direct each other (71). That means that there is no one-to-one identity between dreams and sleep but they might be co-occurrences, but they require separate explanations. It is not clear whether Flanagan will support a sharp distinction between spandrels and memes. Much hinges on this distinction. One objection however that can be leveled against Flanagan in this context is that he exploits Dennett's supposed general

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hypothesis namely that waking mentation or consciousness itself is a spandrel. In fact, Dennett cannot approve this particular way of understanding his views about spandrel as a skyhook. In a subtle critique of spandrel, Dennett broadens it to engender an explanation according to which language is a spandrel. So if one wants to carry deconstruction to its logical limit, as Flanagan does, then he can assert that dreams are mental spandrels. But it is difficult to be synchronized with Dennett's use. The only means by which the above conclusion is to be inferred is from a premise such as (18) below :

(18) All consciousness is spandrel

and, so

(19) Dream consciousness is spandrel

but we need something like

(20) All narratives of language are spandrels

to deduce that

(21) None of these is an adaptation.

Now, neither (18) or (19) is acceptable to Dennett in a straightforward sense just because it is not clear as to what extent (18) is an assumption and there is no passage from this to (19) in Dennett. We need to stretch (20) to cover both of the above that requires separate justification. Can Flanagan deduce (18) and (19) from (20) ? This looks tendentious at present. The reason for this is that Dennett does not openly infer anything like

(22) All narratives of dreams are spandrels

from (20). For him, dreams are only narratives. He does not say that all narratives are spandrels. So, there must be an acute difference in saying that dreams are narratives and dreams are spandrels. In other words, Dennett does not deconstruct. He accepts dreams (REM) are occurrences in sleep and dreams have dreamers and he is also ready to concede that

(23) Most dreams are not experiences (169).

For, we sweat in dreams that are nightmarish. Moreover, this will directly go against Malcolm's skeptical conclusion that dreams are not experiences. The evolutionary explanation he would seek in this context would altogether be different from deconstruction. To begin with, for Dennett, evolution is 'dangerous' because of two reasons, one is its pervasive

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adaptationism and the other is its algorithmic nature. Neither of them ar acceptable to him. We punctuate evolution with memes. Memes are wakin narratives. Dream narratives might bear an analogy especially in their non linear mode to memes. But still they are nor memes in Dennett's sense What is clear from the upshot is that both Dennett and Flanagan tak divergent routes. There is no reason why we cannot prefer Dennett t Flanagan. Now, look once again Indian conclusion which states that

(24) Consciousness (cit) is an experience (anubhava)

If such a conclusion is assumed to follow, if at all it is to follow, from (20) it will only state that the bliss narrative is a spandrel. The passage to sayin that consciousness is also a spandrel is not at all warranted and sinc Flanagan's passage from that to (18) and (19) look dubious, there is n way to legitimate (24). An objection here is that why should one seek circumscribed passage through spandrel to attest to the truth of (24). Thi can only mean that (24) must be proved by independent means. One shoul give up the support given by the dream argument. Moreover, one ca attempt a controversial reading of the identity assumed in (23) Irrespectiv of whether they are identical or not, they may be taken as co-occurrenc exactly in Flanagan's sense. But we know that

(25) Dream occurrences are not experiences

beacause either they are spandrels or they are merely anubhava narrative We can easily set at rest the first disjunct from Dennett's evolutionar point of view. We are left with the second disjunct. Accordingly, anubhav experiences are only anubhava narratives. Therefore, (24) is mistaken a we can explain sleep in evolutionary terms more in the sense used b Dennett (narratives) than Falnagan (spandrels). Anubhava narratives ca only yield consciousness narratives or bliss narratives. But bliss narrative as warranted by dream argument, cannot yield the essence o consciousness. Since they are only anubhava *narratives*, they are no *anubhava* narratives. First, they are not experiences; second, they ar not memes either. So anubhava narratives, as dream narratives, come t naught. If we take anubhavas as memes in Dennett's sense, or whatev they may imply, then to call them as spandrels, would not go a long way i explaining the nature of consciousness. Spandrels do not enter int evolutionary explanation, but memes must be naturalistic in Dennett's sens of explanation of consciousness. Thus Malcolm is skeptical while Flanagan'

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evolutionary account hardly adds anything more. That is, we can no more concede than Dennett in calling them that they are self-expressive. Then, in view of Flanagan's caution about its being the project of self-knowledge, we have no means to support an assertion like (24). If consciousness is not real anubhava, then what else it is. The ball is inevitably in Vedantin's court. Either the Vedantins must re-examine in the light of such evolutionary explanations of dreams and sleep or else they have to abandon their claim to entail a crucial mystical conclusion. Mine is to be as much a challenge as a pointer to a revision. The argument that we are different than the West cuts no ice. We must erase the boundaries in the wake of pluralism.

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THE MORAL PREDICAMENT OF EXISTENTIAL AUTHENTICITY

SIBY K. GEORGE

Just as it is difficult to define existentialism as a school or movement f philosophy, it is also difficult to define the important notion of authenticity ı it. The Latin word '*authenitic*' is derived form the Greek roots *uthentikos*', meaning original and '*authentes*', meaning one who does ings himself. *Authentikos* points to an originality derived from the fact at one has inherent *auctoritas* or authority over one's self. In this sense, nly God is authentic since He is said to be the source of His own being. In xistential writings the notion of authenticity may be said to have the llowing shades of meaning : (i) "...living in the recognition that one's life id choices are one's own responsibility,"[1] (ii) "...an individual's autonomy ı making moral choices that are bound by society's norms... Authentic erson acts from a sense of innate principles and does not depend on cial acceptance for his or her standards of ethics."[2] (iii) defying of rrespondence between the moral code and moral action.[3] (iv) search r originality; search for unique, uncopied, creative modes of existence,[4]) self-creation of one's own selfhood,[5] (vi) rejection of the metaphysical/ ntological status of the self-substance over and above one's existence,[6] nd (vii) substitution of reason with passion and commitment as the basis f authentic choices.[7] Put together, these meanings give us a rather difficult roject of authentic life and together with it a knotty moral dilemma.

In conversations about difficult, non-conformist decisions in daily fe, it is not uncommon that individuals explain their controversial decisions) baffled conservatives by saying that they cannot but be true or *authentic*) themselves. An individual may be impelled to take decisions of topsy-rvy commonsense logic with regard to his/her actions or behaviour, calling

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on an irresistible urge to be loyal to one's ineffable inner being, even if the consequences of such decisions may be appalling or life-threatening. In such cases, individuals use expressions like 'being true to myself', 'let me be authentic', etc. instead of 'I am being sincere or honest.' Roughly these are the dramatized, larger-than-life existential moments of authenticity in an individual's life.

Now, we may safely say, leaving aside the varying subtleties of the notion of authenticity in different existentialist philosophers, that authenticity is passionate commitment to a decision taken by an individual on the basis of his/her self-created system of meaning. Commitment, purposefulness and the individual's mental-attitudinal control over the events of life are the core to existential authenticity. Events, situations and relations in an individual's life *per se* are neutral; they are neither meaningful nor meaningless, neither valuable nor worthless- the existentialist thinkers insist. Meaning or value is an attitude of the human mind; what humans consciously and deliberately attribute to situations, events and relations in their lives. W. C. Thomas has apt generalized expressions on the notion of authentic existence in existentialist thinkers :

> .... existence is authentic where a man shows a sense of responsibility, initiative and capacity for self-effort, freedom in thought and action, and a value-making power... Authentic life is... creative - of meanings and values.. By and large, a man who may be said to live an 'authentic' life does not undergo his experiences passively; nor does he remain a mere spectator of events occurring around him; rather, he actively participates in them, determining how exactly they are to relate to him or to affect him.[8]

Authenticity is an ongoing self-awareness of the self-created meaningfulness of one's life, and so, there is no becoming authentic once-and-for-all. By making authentic choices one becomes authentic and one makes choices with regard to one's actions primarily, and also with regard to one's attitudes.

I am not going to deal with the frameworks of authenticity given by the prominent existentialist thinkers in any detail, though I will lean heavily on Heidegger's authenticity-agenda more than that of any other authenticity philosopher in this paper. My title speaks of a predicament, 'the more

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predicament of existential authenticity.' Even though I have not dwelt on the diverse aspects of the notion of authenticity in existential philosophers in general at sufficient length, I proceed to dwell upon the 'predicament', fancying that in the process, the notion of authenticity itself will be sufficiently elucidated.

The philosophy of authenticity as we have it in the writings of existentialist philosophers, borders on the perennial tension between the individual and the society, with a more-or-less decisive bend towards a higher status for the individual, especially at the level of human actions. As for the combating rights of the individual and the society, the trend was set very early - early as when the great Socrates lived. In an attempt to pierce into authentic individual conscience, Socrates tried to free himself from the clutches of the law and the society, though not entirely. In the friction between his own moral conscience and Athenian democracy, the mob killed him. Socrates could have escaped death, but he would not, for he was convinced that radical reliance on truth alone could provide authenticity. The proverbial Socratic attempt to free personality from the claws of the society was vehemently put down.

Existentialists go a step further and insist that humans should always act individually and everyone must act with certain amount of originality. "Authentic existential behaviour is truly original, not determined by social influences." Thus they rejected the 'tyranny of the social unit.'[9] This stream of thinking pitches the individual against the society; an individualist, personalized and sometimes idiosyncratic basis for human action against a general code of moral principles as its basis. Philosophers of authenticity constantly pick on the 'suffocation of the mob' or, as Heidegger puts it, the 'dictatorship of the 'they", and more vividly in a pithy statement amidst the jargon-filled expanse of *Being and Time* : "Everyone is the other, and no one is himself."[10] In fact, Heidegger uses the word '*eigentlich*' or 'authentic' rather literally (and the 'how' of the use of a word is of extreme importance in *Being and Time*), meaning real, 'something of its own',[11] not borrowed from the 'they', true to one's own self and its possibilities etc.

Authenticity, then, is a subjective phenomenon. It cannot be measured or judged. It is an individual's perspective that makes his/her action authentic in a particular case and his/her life authentic in totality by certain focus of

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meaning he/she is able to give to it.[12] The individual alone can know if the action or the self is authentic.[13] Moreover, no one can prescribe any particular action or mode of acting as authentic because to be authentic is to rely on one's own inner realities instead of counting on something external. What we generally call the good and the bad acts (morally, that is) could both be authentic or inauthentic. Both morally good and bad persons could be authentic and inauthentic individuals. Strictly, authenticity is a manner of being without any reference to being good or bad. However, since 'being authentic' has much to do with the actions of humans, I believe, the question of morality cannot be effectively overlooked by any attempt to propound a philosophy of authenticity. Through what Ryle calls 'the phenomenological analysis of the root workings of the human soul,'[14] Heidegger, for instance, glorifies acting authentically.[15] However, this is exactly what the philosophers of authenticity have done, and that fact, points to certain problems.

I mentioned the fact that there is a lack of prescribed content to authenticity. Random content as befits the will of the individual[16] is key to the making of the authenticity of an action or decision. It is not so much 'what' is done that is key to authenticity, but 'how' it is done; whether it is done with an authentic attitude or not. Now, what an individual randomly chooses to do may have negative social repercussions. Hence, existentialist writers do not so much use logical arguments to convince their readers on the authenticity ideal; they instead use the literary styles of irony, dramatization, short stories, novels, plays, poetic descriptions etc., to cajole the reader into introspection and conviction about the authenticity ideal. Radicalizing the irrelevance of the content of the action, they do not point to any historical figures or their actions as examples of authenticity. They, rather, point to mythological and fictional heroes. And many of the heroic actions and heroes magnified are starkly moral quandaries. Let me list a few examples of the extra moral heroes and their extra-moral theories of human behavior to make the point here :

> a) ... what a tremendous paradox faith is, a paradox which is capable of transforming a murder into a holy act well-pleasing to God, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abrahm.. The ethical expression for what Abraam did is, that he would murder Isaac; the religious expression is, that he would sacrifice Isaac.. (on Abraham in Soren

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Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*)

b) Human existence is uncanny and still without meaning... I will teach men the meaning of their existence - the overman... Man is something that must be overcome... God died: now we want the overman to live. (Zarathustra's soliloquy in Frederick Nietzsche's *Thus Spake* Zarathustra)

c) ... I'm condemned to have no other law but my own... I can only follow my own path. For I'm a man ... and each man must find his own way. (Man Orestes tells God Jupiter in Jean-Paul Sartre's *The Flies*)

d) I explained that I didn't believe in God.. I told him that I wasn't conscious of any 'sin'; all I knew was that I'd been guilty of a criminal offence... (Meursault, the murderer's soliloquy in Albert Camus' *The Outsider*)[17]

The above passages make it clear that for the existentialists social life is the chief threat to authenticity. I do not challenge this and agree that social pressure is like a strong current holding us back from reaching out to the shore of being true to our own inner most self. However, to say that because of this challenge to authenticity posed by the social factor one should defy all social codes and defiantly flout all other-imposed ethical norms just because they are not self-imposed, takes us to nowhere. The idealizers of authenticity do not take adequate care of reining in on the authenticity ideal and this leads to too many awkward corners.

Let us take the example of anti-socials who claim to follow their own inner visions. The famous 'Want-Ad Killer', afterwards identified as Harvey Carignan in the early 1970s, raped and killed at least six young girls and any more in all probability in the Minnesota state of U.S. , later claimed that he was an Instrument of God and that the awful murders, mutilation and rapes were part of a Grand Plan; that God had demanded he attacked the girls 'because they were whores'.[18] This serial killer was clearly a psychotic who had to kill compulsively. But he claimed to be a kind of hero of authenticity and expressed no remorse at having been a homicidal maniac. Flouting morality, with strange claims of being true to

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inner selves and voices, could thus prove dangerous and cannot be socially acceptable. However, in the same breath, I must add that humans have always admired 'authenticity heroes' and in fact, all strange behaviors, not worrying too much about the unethical tinge in their behavior. When David Berkowitz was identified as the multicide known as 'Son of Sam' in 1977, his apartment in New York was all but torn to pieces by souvenir hunters desperate for some memento of the killer who had already become a cult. Popularity of *The Silence of the Lambs*, a horror movie about a motiveless serial killer broke all types of box office records in Britain after two days of its release and a ciritic in *The Sunday Times* (11 August 1991) asked, 'since when is a mass murderer a lovable rogue ?'[19] The Indian masses rush to see the larger-than-life heroes in Hindi movies who achieve great fits overcoming all obstacles from the crowd, probably betraying their own need to be original selves and heroes of authenticity.

I have mentioned that the philosophers of authenticity generally do not argue for the authenticity ideal. They rather lure and entice their readers to see it for themselves by way of introspection in the background of passionate writings on the pathos of authenticity and then embrace and propagate the ideal. The difficulty of logical argument arises from the problem of social and ethical tight corners that blind authenticity can lead to. One question we now need to face is whether authenticity, because of the problems mentioned, is an ideal to be abandoned.

One fact of our everyday life is that we act best when we are convinced, committed and passionate about the action. We are passionate and committed about anything, when that thing is in line with, what we call, our inner convictions, our ownmost self. In such cases we own up what we do; we do have a special sense of belonging to such things or events. We feel we are not duplicating or acting in variance with our own inner self. When an artist puts his/her all into a painting or a piece of music, the satisfaction thus gained is indescribably excellent and this feeling is experienced in certain loneliness because of its inexpressible nature. When a couple get married for love in defiance to family prescriptions despite mounting difficulties, what keeps them together is the sense of having done something for their truest inner phenomenon of love. I am fascinated by the proposal that people should strive to be true to themselves. No one other than the person concerned can say what it is to be so true. I also

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believe that if it is not for the social barriers and crowd-pressures, it may be treated as a general principle that human being by nature desire to be true to themselves. This is similar to the Aristotelian dictum, 'all men by nature desire to know.' Though every human being desires to know, impediments may obstruct the desire. Similarly, though every human being by nature desires to be true to herself, the social barrier may obstruct the desire to be so true. Like knowledge, this desire to be true to self is a distinctive feature of humans. The plants and animals that share this planet with us differ from us in this regard, because they have only biologically given natures and destinies, while we have the capacity to shape our destinies around our own purposes. We have a purpose to live for; we can design our future as we like. One may believe like Heidegger, Sartre and Camus that since there is no given purpose in-built into our lives, we need to create our own purposes. Or one may believe like Kierkegaard, Marcel and Buber that God wills that we be true to ourselves. In either case, we must live our lives authentically.

However, I must immediately add that one must strive to be authentic only to the extent possible. I stand by the Aristotelian maxim of 'virtue stands in the middle', which was earlier expressed in the East by the great Buddha, 'the middle way'. I also believe that all efforts and abosolutely solving the tension between authenticity and morality like a logical/ mathematical puzzle are directed to ultimate futillity. By the way, can problems of life, of love and hate, of joy and sorrow, of believing and doing, of knowing and practicing, ever be solved like jigsaw puzzle ? The logic of the problems of life is a logic of give and take, of adjustments, of some sort of compromise or the other, of borderless merging where the sharp edges of various ways of thinking about the human person, - may be, one attaching significance to human individuality and another to human sociability - disappear into the whole, leading to a more complete and thus better thinking of the human person. Hence, a more desirable form of authenticity is a 'moral authenticity' instead of an amoral authenticity that comes across in the dramatico-philosophical writings on authenticity among the existentialists.

Let us once again consider a person marrying his fiancee, being true to himself, standing tall against the calculations of family and society. This action, I would say, is not only authentic but also morally good. Thinking

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deeply, it is hard to pick on this action, except by the stringent conservative who believes that humans should lead their lives like a cog in a machine, always strutting round and round in the same circle. However, if someone strives to be authentic by an act of murder, like Abraham, the hero Kierkegaared, or Meursault in *The Outsider,* then there is a tight corner. Such an ideal cannot be propagated in a civil society, except by laying yourself open to dangerous consequences.

There are two important objections to a moral authenticity, (i) That such a proposal takes the dramatic glare off the ideal as proposed by the existentialists This objection is certainly sentimental. Even if the dramatic dazzle is partially left out, it is left out for a higher good. (ii) That a moral authenticity is a contradiction since morality implies subscribing to an external guideline which is exactly what the authenticity ideal strives to replace. This is a more serious objection, but the underlying assumption here, I suspect, is that anything moral is external. Rather, it should be the human responsibility of the individual to see to the morality of his/her authentic action or choice. The reasonableness of morality is only plane to normal human beings and it is up to them to make it a choice to act morally and thus make their inner self moral. I also believe that philosophers, as responsible members of the society, should help add to making life more beautiful for everyone and making this planet a better place to live in.

The whole question boils down to how much of freedom should be allowed to an individual. It is not difficult to agree that there should be as much freedom as may be necessary for an individual to be authentic and moral. Too much or too little of freedom in any society would prove too costly. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan is an example of the suppression of basic freedoms. The U.S., we are told, is the model nation for a liberal way of life. During the Nazi times in Germany, when intellectuals of Jewish background like Einstein and Freud were harassed, they fled to the U.S. in search of basic freedoms and got it. However, the present American President has gone on record claiming that the American way of life is not questionable, presuming it is ultimate model of civilization, freedom and liberal life. In this society individuals are free, to an extent, to pursue their own authenticity. However, aberrant and deviant behaviors is a cause of constant concern in this free state. In a popular *Encyclopedia of Serial Killers,* claiming to be a worldwide selection, more than fifty percent of

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cases reported are from the U.S. This may be an indication of the availability of information and the competence of the country's police system. Nevertheless, it is also an indication of the aberration of freedom, pointing toward the dangerous sides of absolutistic practice of authenticity, against which I have been pleading so far. Such facts show that humans are capable of experimenting with sick notions of the freely choosing individual.

Authentic individuals are the paragons of responsibility. They make themselves by the choices they make, and they are responsible in the choice-making activity. One may deceive herself by giving up her responsibility for taking charge of her life and may float in the social current. By doing so, she is going against her own self and denying herself the human prerogative of designing own future. This in terms of her humanness is a sin against herself. However, in one's choice-making activity, one need not step on to other people's toes. It is definitely more worthwhile to act morally on the basis of own convictions, than by quoting a thousand scriptures. If one's inner self is both authentic and moral, I believe, one has become definitely more human. Let me conclude by quoting Shakespeare's immortal verse :

> This above all : to thine own self be true :
> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man.[20]

NOTES

1. Christopher M. Aanstoos, "Existential Analysis and Therapy," *International Encyclopedia of Psychology,* Vol. I, ed. Frank N. Magill (London : Salem Press, 1996) p. 681
2. "Authenticity," *International Encyclopedia of Ethics,* ed. John K. Roth (London : Salem Press, 1996) p. 69
3. Lionel Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1972) p. 11. Trilling says that authenticity suggests "a more strenuous moral experience that 'sincerity' does, more exigent conception of the self and of what being true to it consists in, a wider reference to the universe and man's place in it, and a less acceptant and genial view of the social circumstances of life."
4. Jacob Golomb, *In Search of Authenticity : Form Kierkegaard to Camus* (London : Routledge, 1995) p.5. Golomp quotes the 18th century poet Edward

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Young who wonders : "Born originals, how comes it to pass that we die copies ?" This originality drive has been inspiration to art. W. B. Yeats' *The Circus Animals' Deseretion* came at a time when the poet thought all his work thus far was of no account and he needed new inspiration to start afresh. A part of the poem reads :

Now that my ladder's gone,
I must lie down where all the ladders start,
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart.

5. Jocob Golomb, *In Search of Authenticity,* p.11. This role of the authentic individual is similar to the work of Kant's transcendental ego which create the whole knowable world and even the empirical ego around itself. Like "transcendental ego the notion of authenticity is also formal. The focus is on 'how' rather than 'what.' While emphasizing on spontaneity and creativity, the content or direction of this creativity is left open by the writers on authenticity.

6. Jocob Golomb, *In Search of Authenticity,* p.11. Kant's transcendental ego also ultimately points to a universal self. A universal essence. In the rejection of this universal essence, prior to the one created by the individual, the existential philosophers are in agreement with Hume. However, their rejection in this case is not as sustained by way of philosophers are in agreement with Hume. However, their rejection in this case is not as sustained by way of philosophical arguments as that of Hume. In fact, existentialist philosophers are united in their contempt for the rationality of stick logicality and argumentation. They reject the 'metaphysical self-substance' matter-of-factly, applying introspective phenomenology to good effect. They would ask the identity-question with regard to the human person not really metaphysically (that is, 'what is fundamental to personhood or human identity or the universal 'I'?') but phenomenologically (say, 'what makes me an individual, the individual 'I'?). Hence, a question like whether Kierkegaard, an existentialist Christian reformer, believed in a soul substance that can survive death, a cardinal Christian belief, other than the self-created self of the individual human person during his/her earthly life, is not really relevant. What Kierkegaard was interested in was not a metaphysical review of issues but an existentialist review, which he did with rare flare.

7. This faith in the passion is like Hume's faith in human passions to the

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detriment of reason in the spirit of Blaise Paschal's famous saying ; "Heart has its reasons which reason knows not of." Hume writes : "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions." David Hume, *A treatise on Human Nature* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1951) p.451.

8. V. C. Thomas, "Authentic Existence, Temporal Experience and a Problem" *Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Art : Essays in Honour of Margaret Chatterjee,* ed. R. Balasubramanian and V. C. Thomas (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1993) pp. 69, 70 & 71. The problem spoken of by Prof. Thomas in this article is the problem of intersubjectivity, and not the moral predicament we are concerned with here.

9. Paul August Rentz, "Existentialism," *International Encyclopedia of Ethics,* ed. John K. Roth (London, Salem Press, 1996), 295-296.

10. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1973), p. 164 & 165.

11. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* p. 68.

12. In the Heideggerian framework of authenticity, a particular comportment towards one's own approaching death-the final possibiltiy that annihilates all other possibilities -, which he calls 'Being - towards - death', 'an impassioned freedom towards death - a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they', and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.' (*Being and Time,* p. 311. see section 53. "Existential Projection of an Authentic Being - towards - death")

13. There is no 'inner self' over and above one's actions, and even if there is one, that self is just ignored by most of the existentialist philosophers in preference to the self that unfolds from the happenings/actions/relations of our lives. Speaking of Heidegger in this matter, Julian Young writes : "When Heidegger says that 'our essence lies in existence' (*BT* 42) he means... that there is no pre-given nature of which our lives are to be regarded as the mere unfolding. Rather we are what, in our actions, we make of ourselves." Julian Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 59.

14. Gilbert Ryle, "*Heidegger's Sein und Zeit,*" *Heidegger an Modern Philosophy : Critical Essays,* ed. Michael Murray (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1978), p. 64.

15. In fact, Heidegger projects authenticity as the framework of human actions over and against the framework of morality. Like Nietzsche's overman,

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Heidegger's authentic individual is above and beyond morality. Aga his claim of pure fundamental ontologh without any practical impo Heidegger's magnum olpus calls upon the reader to act authentically. S the following, for the same argument : Jacob Golomb, *In Search Authenticity : From Kierkegaard to Camus,* (London : Routledge, 19 Joanna Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics* (London : Routledge, 1995), Micha E. Zimmerman, *Eclipse of the Self : The Development of Heidegger's Conc of Authenticity* (Athens : Ohio University Press, 1986), Richard A. Cobe "Dasein's Responsibility for Being," *Philosophy today,* 33 (1989), pp. 31 325 and Karsten Harries, "Fundamental Ontologh and the Search for Ma Place." *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy : Critical Essay,* ed. Mich Murray, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1978) pp. 65-79.

16. Absolute freedom finds expression in Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre a Camus. In Heidegger, on the other hand, the individual is limited by his/ world, by his/her heritage, fate and destiny, pointing to a limited but se created freedom.

17. As quoted in Jocob Golomb, *In Search of Authenticity,* pp. 1-3. The and 38th sections of *Being and Time* speaks of the social burden that caus inauthenticity and the later sections on resolute authenticity will spe about the overcoming of this burden.

18. Brian Lane and Wilfred Gregg, *The Encyclopedia of Serial Killers* (Lond Headline Book Publishing Plc, 1992) pp. 87-88.

19. Brian Lane and Wilfred Gregg, *The Encyclopedia of Serial Killers,* pp.

20. William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, Scene 3, Verse 80.

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INFORMATIVE AND PERFORMATIVE: WHAT PERFORMATIVE EXACTLY IS?

RANJAN K. PANDA

This paper attempts to read R.K.Pandey's essay on "How erformatives Exactly Work"[1] vis-a-vis J. L.Austin's and John R. Searle's ieories of speech act. Pandey's endeavour in his paper has been to deify earle's conception of speech act semantics, while setting aside Austin's osition. Ironically Pandey misreads and omits many of Searle's concepts nd has tried to develop his own criteria for defining speech act theory. ence, this paper brings out those misinterpretations on which Pandey's ssay "How Performatives Exactly Work" is developed and also shows at Searle has already emphasized those aspects of speech acts semantics hich Pandey feels are missing in Searle's theory of speech acts.

. How Performatives Exactly Work

Pandey's essay is concerned with certain problem in speech-acts emantics, especially those occur when there is a communication gap etween the speaker and the hearer. He points out that most of the nterpreters of Austin's theory of speech act have only emphasized 'the ontext of the hearer's perspective' but not focused on the speaker's erspectives. As he puts it, they

> Ignore[s] an indispensable dimension of an utterance, like *the intention of the speaker,* which has a major role in our communication. Although, an utterance is constative and performative both, nonethelss on the basis of the speaker's intention, one can plainly distinguish between two aspects. *A speaker does not always use a performative sentence for doing; sometimes he simply wants to inform the hearer or listener.*[2]

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Performatives certainly work in context or in a convention. A conventi mode of communication is not sufficient to indicate intention of the spe to the hearer. The speaker plays a major role in Performatives, preci because a speaker's intentional representation determines the natur an utterance. An utterance may be either constative or performa depending upon the speaker's intention. Hence, one must note that w making a statement, it is not necessary that the speaker is maki performative statement. His/her utterance may be an informative. informative is evaluated by its truth-values. An informative, therefo subject to truth and falsity; and lacks preformativity. Pandey writes :

> Thus, the intention of the speaker is critically important in understanding the meaning of utterances. Merely knowledge of the context in which an utterance takes place may not be adequate in understanding the meaning assigned by the speaker. The hearer also attempts to make inference regarding intention of the speaker.[3]

While passing information a speaker may hide real intention, which w dilute the very mode of communication. As a result, hearer misunderst the speaker's intention. Thus Pandey, rightly mentions that differe between *pseudo intention and the actual intention*[4] is embedded in speaker's performative utterances.

However, Pandey is doubtful regarding the Searlean notion of *guaranteeing* and *self-referential* feature of speech acts. Pandey wr

> When a person, for example, utters, I hereby promise to do so and so, then he does not describe or report about his promise. Indeed, he promises or he guarantees about his promises, which betoken the real intention of the speaker. Otherwise an utterance may be confused between actual intention and pseudo intention. Searle therefore introduced hereby as a useful touchstone, which reveals the self-referential character of performative.[5]

The use of certain auxiliaries makes a performative explicit; help revealing the real intention of the speaker. Searle's use of *hereby* is on the cases that make an explicit representation of performatives. Pan intends to show that use of such auxiliaries does not prove its *referentiality* and *self-guaranteeing*, rather the very use of such auxili

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is problematic[6] for a speech act theory. He finds the use of *hereby* in performative is in fact 'meaningless'. There are four problems that the notion of *hereby* inflicts. Pandey writes,

> Firstly, hereby is not common language, it is an official language. It has been used in the various offices for various legal proceedings. Secondly, it must demand some written documents. In our conversational talk, therefore this word is not used, and if it were used, it would be redundant. Thirdly, the word 'hereby' has always been used for continuing the processing, discussed prior. Fourthly, even if the speaker uses the word hereby notwithstanding, his intention may be confused between actual and pseudo intention.[7]

Pandey believes that without 'hereby' one can derive meaning of performative utterances by looking at 'speaker's personality, sincerity, character, nature and so forth.' In this regard the self-guaranteeing feature of performatives very much subsists with 'speaker's personality.' Thus Pandey writes,

> Although Searle's contention appears correct, at first glance, nonetheless he did not discuss an inevitable dimension of communication, like the speaker's personality, i.e., the speaker is sincere and insincere, honest or dishonest and the like.[8]

Considering the hearer's perspective of performative, Pandey mentions that it is difficult to know the speaker's intention and the hearer must also be competent[9] as well with 'equal skill, caliber, talent' to comprehend speaker's intention. On the other hand, the hearer fails to recognize the meaning of performatives because performatives involve a subjective mode of utterance. Pandey writes,

> Moreover, intention is subjective, lacking objective way to judge it and there nobody can provide any clear-cut touchstone for inferring it. Even a speaker may assert that he is telling his very intention; however, he may actually hide his real intention and report a *pseudo* intention.[10]

Once intention becomes a subjective phenomenon then its preformativity is lost. The force imposed on it is either hidden or gets omitted by the hearer. No rules can be conventionalized on the basis of subjective intention.

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Hence, convention based on subjectivity is not sufficient ground for revealing the force of performative utterances, especially in a context where performatives are not overt.[11] Thus, the Searlean emphasis on the overt and explicit form of performative utterances does not provide a clear meaning.

However, the 'semantic property' of language aims at establishing relationship between *words to the world.* Pandey finds that Searle's performative utterances fail to maintain the relationship. He writes,

> Linguistic declaration creates a linguistic fact like, promise, order and so forth. Whereas, extra-linguistic declaration creates an extra linguistic fact, i.e., it must perform some act in actual world vis-a-vis merely saying something, for example, adjourning the meeting, declaring wars and so forth... It quite likely implies that these utterances do not perform any sort of act in the actual world, except world, except saying something. Thus they work between word to word and not word to world.[12]

According to Pandey, the Searlean use of performatives only holds a relationship between word to word because they are not effective. Their extra-linguistic features do not bring any changes in the world. Thus performative utterances without their preformativity become informatives. If the speech acts lose this grip in preforming the *word to world* relationship then it collapses in maintaining its basic premise, i.e. to show how language works.

II. Grammar of Performatives : Austin & Searle

Austin's early distinction of performative-constative utterances was based on *doings and saying*. Sayings are mostly constatives that don't result in any *action*, rather they are statements directly associated with their truth-values. Performative utterances, are statements of promises, warnings, greetings, commands, etc.. that consequently result in producing certain action. Asutin believed that there is no fixed formula for performative utterances. However, his endeavour was to make the formula of performative *explicit*. Looking at the growth and complexities in the form of language use he thought that it would be 'fatalistic prediction' to make performative-constative distinction with any specific grammar of performatives. Hence, his discourse on performatives provides a systematic

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analysis of certain *use* of performatives.[13] Performative is *special case* of language use in which speech and action go together. More precisely, speaking language is considered as preforming an activity. Unless we take note of those conditions of performatives then its performativity goes in *void*, dissolving its own distinction with constatives. One of the basic features that performative utterances seek to employ is the 'doctrine of unhappiness'. A performative must result in the *condition of satisfaction or happiness* by fulfilling this doctrine.[14] This is one of the aspects Searle brings out in his theory of speech acts. Searle writes, "What is crucially important to see is that for every speech act that has a direction of fit *the speech act will be satisfied if and only if the expressed psychological state is satisfied, and conditions of satisfaction of and psychological states* are identical."[15] Linguistic communication must have a condition of satisfaction and a reference because a performative involves propositional content as well as *psychological mode*.[16]

Propositional content and psychological mode are two necessary components of speech act semantics. Propositional content results in condition of satisfaction, whereas direction of fit between *word-to-world* is a result of psychological mode. For Searle, every mode of linguistic representation involves a psychological mode and a propositional content. Linguistic representation is the primary form of linguistic communication. But Searle does make a distinction between *representation intention* and *communication intention*. Searle writes, "Communication is a matter of producing effects on one's hearer's, but one can intend to represent something without caring at all the effects on one's hearer. One can make a statement without intending to produce conviction or belief in one's hearers or without intending to get them to believe that the speaker believes what he says or intended without even intending to get them to understand it at all. There are, therefore two aspects of meaning intentions, the intention to represent and intention to communicate."[17] Thus communication-intention precisely focuses on the intention of both the speaker and the hearer. The speaker finds it certainly awkward to communicate unless he would make an effort to recognize the hearer's intention. Linguistic representation, in this regard, could be a misfire statement if it fails to involve the hearer. It could be a monologue either, even if it happens in the presence of a hearer. Thus, communication intention opens a field; a space for dialogue/ intention

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in which both the speaker and the hearer at least put in a mode of intentio to communicate with each other. An intentional engagement discloses eac other's intention. Subsequently it become a step towards understanding Understanding each other's intention is not only to grasp the meaning b also results in the condition of *satisfaction*. Performative is basically abo effective communication, rather than representation. Significance c performative lies in the statements *taking effect*[18] into its structure. Whil analyzing this Austin was more concerned *illocutionary* statemen precisely the *explicit* representation of performatives. A lot of emphasis i given on making the utterance explicit, because there is always a apprehension that it would dilute the very *mode* of communication. Henc the emphasis was given on *force* of the utterance for generating intendin effect/meaning.

A linguistic act is about the illocutionary act in the sense that it is th minimum 'unit of communication'. Searle write, "To put this point mo precisely, the production of the sentence token under certain conditions the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguisti communication."[19] Linguistic communication, thus involves two element i.e., 'have meaning' and 'mean something', i.e. having a literal meanin and an additional meaning imposed on it by the illocutionary force of th speaker and that is further inferred by the hearer. The illocutionary forc is known through the 'stress, word order, intonation, contour, punctuation the mood of the performative verb'.[20] Austin and Searle emphasize th very function performatives taking gesture and mode of speech into it account. To capture the meaning of performatives one must look at th way illocutionary force is embedded in literal meaning of an utterance Unless performatives are explicitly stated the entire field of communicatio gets distorted. And the danger that is often apprehended in performative i that the hearer does not follow what the speaker *intends* to communicat and sometimes it also happens that the speaker may hide the real intentio and communicate with pretension.

However, to avoid these difficulties performatives are 'issued in a appropriate situation'.[21] An appropriate situation is an essential prerequisit for analyzing performatives. An explicit representation of performativ utterance needs a 'preparatory condition'.[22] Austin and Searle categorically emphasize these aspects of performatives so that the uttered statemen

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does not go void or causes any *unhappiness*. Hence performatives are not only situated in a context but also use the term 'hereby' making an utterance *serious* as well as explicit. As Austin apprises it, "If we ask ourselves, as sometimes we may, whether a given utterance of this form is performative or constative, we may settle the question by asking whether it would be possible to insert in it the word 'hereby' or some equivalent - as, in French, the phrase '*par ces mots-ci*'."[23] Austin writes about it while discussing the 'normal form' of performatives need not be always 'a first person singular present indicative', there could be use of 'verb in a passive voice and in the second or third person of present indicative'. Searle's use of 'hereby' indicates an explicit representation of commitment made by the speaker. Searle writes, "I think we use 'hereby' because 'I promise' and 'I hereby promise' ar among the strongest function indicating device for *commitment* provided by the English language. For that reason we often use these expressions in the performance of speech acts which are not strictly speaking promises but in which we wish to emphasize our commitment." [24] In this regard, any additional phrase can be used or not depending on its conventional mode of expression. That is, the phrase which would be appropriate for English is not certainly appropriate for a French speaker. Hence, the convention of *language use* must be discussed from the point of view of the social/local *background*. And the difficulty mostly arises when we translate expressions of performatives from one language to another language.

However, the *preparatory condition*[25] must take into account the *sincerity condition*. For instance, in case of passing an order, the speaker should realize that he owns the authority to pass an order and also believes that the hearer would obey it. And without this essential condition a performative may not work. In the case of uttering a promise-statement if the promisee does not believe in his statement then it reveals lack of sincerity on the part of speaker. The lack of commitment on the part of speaker or hearer makes a performative *infelicitous*. Hence the grammar of performatives is very closely related to the moral sentiments of a convention. By undermining speaker's and hearer's sincerity and commitment no performative communication can be held. A 'breach of commitment'[26] either on the part of the speaker or the hearer would result in defective *condition of satisfaction*.

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III. Searle on Meaning, intentionality and Illocutionary force

One of the important aspects of performatives that needs t specifically illustrated is the ontology of force in language use. The u expression focuses on meaning and its relationships with action. It sh meaning and reference are context based in which the 'speaker w saying something refers to something in the utterance of an expressio For Searle there is an internal an external aspect of analyzing performa utterances. He writes, "To perform illocutionary act is to engage in a governed form of behaviour".[28] And secondly, "no sentence is comple force-neutral. Every sentence has some illocutionary force-potentia only of a very broad kind, built into its meaning."[29] So far as the exte aspect is concerned use of performatives is in accord with conventi rule following. Secondly, the internal aspect involves illocutionary f that is imposed on the statement to make it explicit. It is the force associ with an utterance that makes it an illocutionary act. Searle writes, ". need a distinction between the content of illocutionary act and illocutionary force it has or-what is the same thing-the type of illocutio act it is. For purposes of our analysis, we can represent the structur illocutionary acts as F(p), where F stands for illocutionary force *p* propositional content. That is, we can separate the part of the speech that constitutes its illocutionary type or illocutionary force from the that constitutes its propositional content."[30] Every proposition has a *cont* which holds its *literal* meaning, whereas the force of the expression a *speaker's meaning* to it. Literal meaning depends on words used their syntactical structures of sentences. Speaker's meaning lies in *intention* of the speaker, i.e., the speaker specifically *means* someth while uttering a statement. To talk about no-force-neutrality characte expression is to give primacy to speaker's utterance meaning. As Se puts it, "The meaning of the sentence is entirely a matter of the conventi of the language. But sentences are tools to talk with. So even tho language constrains speaker-meaning, speaker meaning is still the prim form of linguistic meaning, because the linguistic meaning of sente functions to enable speakers of the language to use sentences to m something in utterances. The speaker's utterance meaning is the prim notion of meaning for our purposes in analyzing the function of language The attempt is to fuse both literal meaning and speaker's meaning wit

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the framework of convention and to clarify that every serious literary utterance cannot separate force from expression. Hence, Searle's attempt is to resolve the rigid distinction between meaning and force maintained by Austin while advocating the principle of expressibility.[32]

Moreover, perfomative expressions are suitably uttered within a *convention* of language use. The speaker chooses to make utterances within his/her conventional background. In this connection the grammar of prefomatives is related with the conventional use of language. Searls writes, "So there could not according to my analysis, be a general and mutually exclusive distinction between the meaning and the force of literal utterances, both because the force which speaker intends can in principle always be given an exact expression in a sentence with a particular meaning, and because the meaning of every sentence already contains some determiner of illocutionary force."[33] Moreover, the difficulty Searle finds is to analyze meaning keeping apart the force of expression. No expression is force neutral, rather force is an extra addition employed by the speaker while uttering a statement. The force builds into the expression due to intentionality of the mind.

Intentionality is central to the Searlean theorization of speech act. It defines the very mode of intentional representation of a speaker while uttering a statement. Every mode of communication shows speaker's interest to covey his desires, intentions or beliefs to the hearer. Intentionality is the property embedded in human intention, desires, beliefs, motives, compulsions, willingness, etc. It is the semantic properties of human consciousness. Language use is a conscious activity in which intentionality is reflected showing the intentional mode of relation that persists between the mind and the world. Every mode of speech act is an intentional representation involving a condition of satisfaction. When one expresses his desire, intention, etc. he expects that it should be fulfilled. Searle writes, "If I am answering a question, I intend to communicate an answer to the hearer. The intention to speak meaningfully in words should not be confused with the intention to communicate that meaning to hearer. Normally, the whole point of speaking is to communicate to a hearer, but the intention to communicate is not identical with the meaning intention-the intention that utterance should have truth condition or other condition of satisfaction."[34] That is to clarify that the speaker's forceful utterance of the speaker is to

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keep the meaning of an expression in tact and then make a statement, which could be interpreted by the hearer. Infelicities occur if the speaker fails to convey the meaning of expression to the hearer. Thus speech-act semantics maintains a subtle interrelationship between force and meaning.

Meaning-force interrelationship is shown in the function of intentionality. Intentionality has two levels of function, i.e., at the mental level and the social level. Searle writes, "The conventional intentionality of words and sentences of a language can be used by a speaker to perform a speech act. When a speaker performs a speech act, he imposes his intentionality on those symbols."[35] The 'conventional intentionality', or the intentionality at the social level, is related with *regulative* and *constitutive* rules of *language use*. 'The regulative rules define the interpersonal linguistic activities and relationship, whereas constitutive rules regulate linguistic activities as well as define new forms of behaviour'[36]. Searle further relates the defining feature of constitutive rules to certain *extra linguistic* features, like intentionality, subjectivity, etc. That is, while interpreting a sentence or understanding any forms communication is not only related to convention, but also depends on the psycho-semantic features of the mind. Intentionality as semantic feature of the mind thus acts at the mental level. It's being a feature of the mind; intentionality is treated as an *extra-linguistic* property. The speech acts one performs and encounters just exhibit these five types. But if these really are five basic types, these must be deeper reasons for that. If the way that language represents the world then these five must derive from some fundamental features of the world. Searle writes, "The intentionality of the mind not only creates the possibility of the meaning, but also limits its forms. ....Another aim, then of the analysis of meaning is to show how the possibilities and limitations of meaning derive from the intentionality of the mind."[37] The representational feature of language is based in intentionality, which also defines the five basic types of performatives namely, *assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives*. Thus intentionality as an extra-linguistic feature explains the semantic relationship between the mind and the world.

IV. Reading Speech Act Semantics : A Searlean Response

While reading speech act semantics Pandey finds that philosophy of language is related with moral philosophy. Though Searle thinks

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differently, however, he clarifies that every action is subject to evaluation and so also our performatives, since they are central to speech delivering actions. They are statements that Searle calls them *evaluative* statements, which are different from *descriptive* statements. Searle writes, "The underlying reason for their differences is that evaluative statements perform a completely different job from descriptive statements. Their job is not to describe any features of the world but to express the speaker's emotions, to express his attitudes, to praise, to condemn, to laud or insult, to commend, to recommend, to advise, to command and so forth. Once we see the different illocutionary forces the two kinds of utterances have, we see that there must be a logical gulf between them."[38]

The illocutionary force of performatives makes them subjective, whereas descriptive statements are objective. A performative utterance is evaluated by the *constitutive rules* as the standards of institution. Thus an exercise of meaning in the case of performatives is to meet objectivity of standards of evaluation through subjectivity of illocutionary force.

Moreover, a performative is evaluated not just by looking at its force, but also by looking at the speaker's attitudes, the moral standards he/she maintains. That is to say we consequently go beyond the linguistic criteria of verification of performatives while employing different methods of evaluating a speaker's statement. While analyzed an obligatory mode of utterance of a promise, Searle mentions that "One may be tempted to think that promising can be analyzed in terms of creating expectations in one's hearer's or some such, but a little reflection will show that the crucial distinction between statements of intention on the one hand and the degree of commitment and obligation undertaken in promising."[39] Performatives do cause expectation in the mind of the speaker, but the speaker's commitment can be measured with regard to the statement made by him. Thus he maintains the distinction of illocutionary force between two statements, i.e. a) 'Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars'; b) 'Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.'

Furthermore, reflection on a promise statement can be clarified by examining it from the point of view of condition of *defeasibility.* That is, 'the fact of consideration outside the act of promising bear on what obligations one has or what one ought to do.' (Ibid.) Hence, promises attitudes, manners, activities are taken into account to feel certain about

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his level of motivation and commitment. And, apart from the defeasibility condition, it is important to note the *tautological* feature of an utterance, i.e. 'when a person places himself under obligation, he then and there is under obligation, even though one gets out of it later,' one may have conflicting and overriding obligation, the same time.'[40] Searle's emphasis is to show that a person for a moment at least *experiences* the *content* of his utterance. One may change his intention, in the next moment of his utterance, but the act of promising, itself is an indication that a promise *experiences* the very *content* of his representation.

However, the meaning-value relationship is to be analyzed with reference to the convention. The grammar of performatives is expressed meaningfully within a conventional framework. In other words, performatives are treated as institutional facts. They are the expressions/ statements, which go in accord with certain standards of 'obligation, commitments, rights, and responsibilities, but a matter of intentional facts, and performative are not to be reated as brute facts.'[41] Searle emphasizes that values are independent of facts. And institutional facts are generated over a period time while acknowledging that our socio-cultural and socio-ethical, socio-political norms/rules get transformed in the course of time. Moreover, evaluation of performative lies in conventional rules / constitutive rules. 'But it is difficult to say where the conventions begin and end'[42]. Following the rules of a convention can be shown only in its practice. Hence, Pandey's problem about standardization of convention does not arise. It is because the notion of standardization is a process of transformation of a convention. Therefore, there are no *the* fixed standards to evaluate a convention or constitutive rules.

Since meaning goes conventional in performative, in spite of it's imbued with subjective force getting, it also includes certain additional auxiliaries in its use, which makes a significant difference in the meaning of performatives. According to Searle, the use of *hereby* makes paradigmatic cases of difference in its meaning when someone says 'I hereby promise' and 'Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars'. The second statement could be treated as an *informative* if it is uttered by any third person, although it is a promise statement. But when a *first person utterance* is stated, it is an explicit representation of performative. It is not only Searle who is concerned about its use in his *speech acts,* rather

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Austin, as already shown, has interest about it while using *par ces mots-ci* in French, as I have mentioned it in my previous section. Pandey does not take note of this that a conventional English person's speaks English, especially within a certain specific context. For example, A Jury says that *hereby the court is adjourned* or a groom says in the church before a priest that *I hereby accept this woman as my lawful wedded wife,* can we say that they are informatives ? Similarly in the case of expressives, there is no formal use of specific terms 'sorry' or etc. but that does not undermine its performativity. For instance, when Tony Blair expressed his deep concern immediately after the aftermath of 9/11 that 'we the democracies of the world must come together'. A similar of type concern was expressed by Bush, the president of USA, while addressing the workers at WTC after the collapse of its twin towers, "I hear you and the whole of the world hears you". They are all expressives, explicit enough to show a person's commitment to his citizens. One may not find sufficient reason to say that they are less motivating. It is interesting, therefore, to judge a performative, not just by a person's expressions but also by the person's commitment, the background in which he/she acts. In this regard, a convention in speech act semantics discloses the *common knowledge* that both the speaker and the hearer share; there is a sort of mutual agreement and coordination among themselves in which they all participate. The rationale behind sharing a common knowledge is to maintain the *coordination equilibrium.*[43] One can analyze the above two statements and can very well see the speaker's intention/expectation and simultaneously express to meet the expectation of their citizens. In this regard, the Searlean analysis goes deeper into the fact that the semantics of the performatives is governed by the *local background*[44] or *the local cultural practices,* so far as the interpretation / understanding of *meaning* of utterances is concerned.

The self-guaranteeing feature of performative is an aspect of the local background. The imposed force works within the conventional language use. A convention is based on *we intentionality* which guarantees objectivity of meaning. Searle says, "Whenever you have people cooperating, you have collective intentionality. Whenever you have people sharing their thoughts, feelings and so on, you have collective intentionality; and indeed I want to say this is the foundation of all social activities."[45]

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The social grounding of the performatives shows every expression carries a force in it; sometimes it is explicit and sometimes it is implicit. Hence, the specificity of its use can be comprehended if we look at it both from speaker's as well as from hearer's perspective, who share a common thought and feelings. It provides space for construing self-referentiality. The condition of self-referentiality is involved in the use of performatives. This shows the flow of intentionality from *mind* (utterance / word) -to- world and world -to-(word) *mind*. That is, every performative utterance attempts to make changes in *world;* the speaker's intention is to make successful representation (i.e. word-to-the world direction of fit) whereas the further direction of fit is from *world-to-the mind* once the speaker succeeds in realizing his/her intention. Realization of desire /intention is a mental activity. Intentionality is a mental feature, which makes semantic of speech act theory an extra-linguistic activity. In Searles' theorization philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of the mind. Intentionality is being an intrinsic mental property, which not only characterizes various possibilities of intentional representation but also acts as a unifying principle[46] between the mental activities and linguistic activities.

Conclusion

Seen in this way, one must mention that Pandey is unnecessarily skeptical about the Searlean speech act theory, which he feels undermines certain essential features like 'mutual understanding between the speaker and the hearer, job orientations among persons, motivations and propensities of the hearer and the intention of the speaker'. I call it his misreading or misinterpretation of Searlean speech acts semantics which gives rise to his skepticism. My doubt is that Pandey would not have succeeded in interpreting Searle in his own ways, had there not been an opponent of the Searlean theory of speech act.

NOTES

1. See, Rishi Kant Pandey, "How Prefomatives Exactly Work", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. XXX, NO.2, April 2003. (Henceforth in short HPEW)
2. The author italicizes these words and sentences probably to highlight or emphasize the point. And there are many instances where the author repeats this in the paper. *Ibid.*

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3. See, *Ibid.*, p.200. This is an extract from his earlier paper "Why to distinguish performative and constative utterances ?" *Indian Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. XXXVII, NO.3, 2001, p.361.
4. See, HPEW, p.220.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p.221.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p.222.
9. *Ibid.*, p.225.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, p.224.
12. *Ibid.*, p.225.
13. See, J.L.Austin, "Performative-Constative", *Philosophy of Language,* (henceforth in short PL) ed. John R.Searle, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p.16
14. A misfired statement results in unhappiness. Hence there is a need to employ the doctrine of unhappiness of the performative.' See, Austin, Ibid.p.18. I would be stressing on this point that Searle's notion of condition of satisfaction is very much a part of linguistic communication. The communication must maintain the *intentional fitness* between the speaker and the hearer.
15. See, John R.Searle, "The Nature of Intentional States", *Intentionality : An Essay in Philosophy of Mind,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp.10-11. (Henceforth, in short *Intentionality*)
16. *Ibid.*, p.12.
17. See, Searle illustrates this in the chapter "Meaning", *Intentionality*, p.156-166.
18. See, Austin's "Performative-Constative", p.14
19. John R. Searle, "What is a Speech Act ?" ed. *Philosophy of Language*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p.39.
20. Austin talks about use of gestures, intonation, etc. in performatives. See, "Performative-Constative", *PL,* p.16. Searle makes it more clear in drawing the distinction between 'function indicating element and function indicating device', See, Searle, "What is a Speech Act?", *PL,* p.43.
21. See, Austin's "Performative-Constative", *PL,* p.52.
22. See Searle, "What is a Speech Act ?", *PL,* p.52
23. See, Austin's "Performative-Constative", *PL,* p.15.

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24. See Searle, "What is a Speech Act ?", *PL,* p.49.
25. *Ibid*., p.53
26. See, Austin's "Performative-Constative", *PL,* p.14.
27. Searle mentions it as development in philosophy of language that Austin advocates in use of speech act theory. See the introduction, "What is a Speech Act ?", *PL,* p.6.
28. *Ibid*., p.40
29. See, Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Act", *Essarys on J.L.Austin,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, p.148
30. See, Searle, *Mind, Language and Society : Philosophy in the Real World,* Phoenix, London, 1999, p.138. (Henceforth in short, *MLS*)
31. *Ibid*., p.140.
32. See, Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Act", p.153
33. *Ibid*., p.153.
34. Searle, *MLS,* p.144.
35. *Ibid*., p.141.
36. See, Searle, *Speech Acts : An Essay in Philosophy of Language,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p33.
37. See, Searle's *Intentionality*, pp. 166-167.
38. Searle, "Deriving 'Ought' from 'is'", Speech Acts, 183. The earlier version of the paper was entitled 'How to derive "ought"' from "is"', *The Philosophical Review*, January 1964.
39. Searle shows it while differentiating to statements, a) *Ibid*. p.178
40. *Ibid*., p.180.
41. *Ibid*., p.185.
42. See, Austin's *How to Do things with Words*, especially in the end part of *lecture vii*, (*The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955*) Clarendo Press, Oxford, 1962, p.118
43. See, David Lewis, *Convention : A Philosophical Study,* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, pp.52-57.
44. See, Searle's Intentionality, especially the Chapter on "The Background", p.144
45. See Searle's M L S, p.120
46. I have discussed it elsewhere in paper entitled "Consciousness and Language : Towards a Unifying Principle", *Scientific and Philosophical Studies Consciousness*, ed. Sangeetha Menon, M.G.Narashimhan, Anindya Sinda, B.V.Shreekanthan, NIAS, Bangalore, 1999.

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EMPIRICISM, ANTIREALISM AND REPRESENTATION OF HUMAN ACTION

GEETA RAMANA

Contemporay empiricists, like the earlier positivists are sceptical about abstract non-testable and non-experiential concepts. When the atomic observation- statements indicative of actual or possible sense experience led to an inevitable reductionism, post-positivism extended the test of confirmation to include, not a one-to-one correspondence between statements about sense-experience and its object, but 'face the tribunal of sense experience, not individually but only as a corporate body ..... the totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges' as Quine puts it[1]. Many contemporary philosophers thus deny that empirical content can simply be decided by the related experience. Its significance lies only as a part of a 'network' of other accepted belief systems.

A fall-out of the debate on the verificationist principle is the extreme reluctance to take 'experience' as the only criteria of knowledge-claims and consequently to hook on to a shared linguistic framework that avoids explaining the direct confrontation with sense-experience. A pragmatic tendency to go by mutually acceptable and nonconflicting perspectives is however still tied to an empiricism that now is only doubly assuring through a collective linguistic apparatus. A very crucial notion of what is true or the real as reflected in an accuracy of representation of ones experience is attacked. In fact Rorty goes so far as to accept the pragmatist doctrine wherein, 'there are no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints

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provided by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers'[2]. To some extent it truly futile to expect either an unclouded intellect or the most sophisticat language to do the job. So we never know' when one has reached t truth, or when one is closer to it than before' (*ibid.*)

We see thus that the philosophical conundrum of trying to expla the naive realists notion that knowledge had something to do with the relati between the knowing subject and the object of the his knowledge, quickl accelerated towards adopting some form of an antirealist stance. Anyw the positivists never claimed any special allegiance to realism; although realist interpretation of the object language did entail reductionism to sense-data language. Both physicalists and phenomenalists stayed cle of the (material) object itself. In fact Dummett calls phenomenalis 'sophisticated realists' concerning material objects[3] (material) thus not rea being able to avoid metaphysics. One must not however confu reductionism with antirealism. The Verifiability principle, says Dumme must actually be interpreted so as to provide for a theory of meaning an so itself embodies a metaphysical outlook. Dummett differs on this reducti tendency of the positivists program to develop a non-reductive anti-realis wherein our understanding of what verifies or falsifies a statement involv taking into account certain theoretical considerations. Consequently, unlik the positivists there is no suspicion towards metaphysics but a healthy us of the verifiability principle to maintain the empiricist criteria at the level an epistemic cum linguistic analysis that does not fall into the trap representationalism. Dummett believes we cannot delink any theory meaning from epistemological constraints. 'The meaning of an expressio is what a speaker must know if he is said to understand that expression' It is in this light that he understands realism as follows : Realism requir us to hold both that, for statements of the given class, we have a notion truth under which each statement is determinately either true of false, an also that an understanding of those statements consist in a knowledge the conditions under which they are true[5]. Such a semantic interpretati analyses meaning of all statements in terms of our *knowledge* of the truth conditions. This position combines two ideas, the realist notion that on must be able to delineate truth-conditions as well as the antirealist notio that this is expressed or manifested only in our *use* of language that is als a prime indication of rational activity. The suggestion is that there is n

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compatibility in an antirealist semantics and an empiricist epistemology that ties truth to experience, rather available experience and information in the form of determinate linguistic / semantic structures. Since this is necessarily propositional, prelinguistic thought has no bearing except directly on our theories of meaning and truth.

Traditionally too realism has been understood as a position that allows talk of things that exist regardless of how we think of it. Accordingly, the principle of bivalence for these statements must be maintained. That is, they must either be true of false. This is tied to a theory of meaning that relates essentially to a truth-condition. It means a condition that obtains if and only if the statement is true. This is the same verificationist spirit that says, unless I know how the conditions of what you say are applicable and available, I don't know what you mean. On a semantic level then there is little to help differentiate between realism and antirealism. Dummett's antirealist stance draws on the epistemic constraint that determines truth. (The endeavour then must be to know the conditions under which truth can be ascertained). To the positivists, external questions of ontology were pseudo-statements without cognitive content[6]. Dummett however does not preclude significance of statements on the basis of an inability to decide on the ontological question. In fact this cannot be avoided and is probably the basis for any theory of meaning.

Since one cannot imagine an unconstrained notion of truth, a general antirealist semantics would require *the availability of evidence for its truth*. It is in this context that Wittgenstein too related meaning inextricably to character and behaviour. A general pattern of publicly accessible grounds for discerning pain for instance does not attempt to make use of truth-conditional account of the meaning of such statements. Rather, understanding pain-ascriptions consists in a mastery of their actual use that is part of a public language, enabling grasp of connections between pain, pain-stimuli and pain-behaviour[7]. Meaning is constrained by evidence that is available and which then suffices for determining truth of say pain-ascriptions. Constant lying or pretence in some ways *subverts* the institution of language. As Dummett himself puts it, 'if most members of a society started to lie most of the time, they would cease to be able to communicate. ..... it is *apriori* impossible that most assertions should be mistaken'.

The fact that most communication does take place and most often

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facilitates truth or factual information has inspired many philoso represent this situation either through studies in some sort of a Cho analysis into the (probably) genetic structures of language or so akin to Fodor's notion of a language of thought. It has always contention of philosophers that somehow language is the most means of not only representing, but also interpreting and commu our world. That one naturally tries to do so, and constantly grapple logic of its semantics proves that representation is to a large exten successful. When successful communication takes place, su representation of a state of affairs also gets established. (For tha even an unsuccessful communication can be adequately represent realism about the world of events and actions, is still tied to the r representation that is neither a genetic or linguistic blueprint not an photocopy or record of facts. Truth is rightly constrained by avail evidence and representation of truth is similarly constrained by a evidence. It is only when all evidence is shared and communicable can get hold of the 'same' reality, if ever there was one.

In the light of contemporary discussion on empiricis representation, some of the significant elements of human action lik language and consciousness do not succumb any more to the old mis division of mind and body. Human actions cannot be strictly cl (though they may be described as such) with purely physical or calculi. Language has very often been used as a means to solv concerning meaning and truth wherein the ontology of events and do not really matter. What matters, is how you talk about it. There in itself (like there are no pure facts by themselves that can s matter) that can be used as the very basis of a discussion. We cho starting points, develop our boundaries as to what would or wo count as action.

Are there any facts about human nature that make us act rather than another. It is only knowledge of available evidence in t of constructed or reconstructed 'reasonings' that can explain a understand the nature of human action. There is no reason why attempt should not yield to a truth-conditional theory of meaning tha be *sufficient* to describe human action. This does not entail a des that is reductionist (or causalist). As Dummett perceptively poi

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hilosophers have frequently failed to distinguish between a reductive
is and the repudiation of a truth-conditional meaning theory of the
dard kind; it is the latter which is constitutive of antirealism... realism
ires us to hold both that, for statements of the given class, we have a
on of truth under which each is determinately either true of false, and
that understanding of those statements consists in a knowledge of the
ditions under which they are true'[8].

Whatever information is available to us helps organize and structure descriptions of human behaviour that further enable formulation of h-conditions. All interpretation is realistic in that it suffices to depict a e of affairs that can have-conditional representation. In this context al as well as non-literal discourse will need to be addressed by the e logic whether successful or not. Also in this context, our consciousness n enabling factor cannot function by itself without other enabling ures like rationality and language apart from other culturespecific ures we may inherit. The role of consciousness, like life, is something all universally share, but not quite the same way. Human action is strained most concretely and significantly by language and rationality remain a prime exhibit of human mentality. It is only when this network ade explicit by conceptual as well as empirical tools that we can make e foray in the field of human action. Although the dynamics and fluidity nguage may never yield to a full-blooded theory of meaning, one should eneral be able to specify or represent in a loose sense, what is required 'understanding' to take place or for a person to share a concept that ilitates communication. It is here that one tries to discern a pattern, a acture to one's thoughts and actions. Most often there is a need felt for ernal consistency, that is between thought and action as well as a erence amongst an external network of related and convergent belief tems. There is a semantics of reasoning that cannot be independent of tual situations. They are, if one may use the technical term, supervenient our perceptions of reality or states of affairs.

The problem now of reading our own minds and that of others has ontological but semantic significance. It is a question of interpretation 'facts' and 'events' through an amorphously intricate web of language d reality. The complexity of life is challenge to the conscious mind that nstantly seeks to demystify and deproblematize a given situation that

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seems to only deepen in relation to human behaviour. One needs to
an adequte description of a given situation; ones own as well as th
others, to decide only about what to do but also how to think. In fact pa
practical reasoning is also to be able to describe and redescribe event
will help provide for the logic of human behaviour.

I think it is in the structures of practical reasoning that one
discern some pattern that can represent human behaviour. For exa
there is what is called the classic desire-belief model that is said to e
directly or indirectly result into some form of action. Bernard Will
introduces or rather qualifies this model with an 'internal interpret
(that) must display a relativity of the reason statement to the ag
subjective motivational set', which is called the agent's S[9]. The tru
falsity of a belief does not alter the *form* of the explanation that is appro
to the action (ibid.). It is always possible that further deliberation
reveal the falsity of ones premise such that it may no longer functio
reason for action. The process of reasoning is quite complex and not e
captured by the schema of practical reasoning. As Williams puts it, 'prac
reasoning is heuristic process, and an imaginative one, and there ar
fixed boundaries on the continuum from, rational thought to inspiratio
conversion'[10]. Nevertheless, they are a part of the internal reasons
action (that also contribute significantly to the rationality of an acti
when expressed through explanations and justifications is seen to stan
definite ways to human conduct.

It is the humean idea that one cannot act on certain beliefs u
they are part of the motivational set that also makes extra demand
why x not y is the reason for *ones* action. Though one may not have
pro-attitude towards the performance of a particular act, unless s
'reason' (which is constituted within a basic desire-belief frame) has
atleast temporarily adopted, consciously unconsciously, as part of
own internal reason, action cannot relate to reasons meaningfully. Th
of internal reasons (*or 'the motivational set' to use Willi
terminology*), is not unnecessarily egoistic in character. They could
well include altruistic goals as well as non-egoistic plans for actions
deliberations that may not necessarily also be the preferred one.

One aspect of the rationality in human action deals with notio
consistency and coherence between reasons and action. It is debate

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matters of morality whether this may at times contradict with universalizable moral maxims that very often clash with the set of internal motivational reasons. We thus see on the one hand, an internal relation between thought and action that contributes to our notion of rationality and on the other, a non-internal set that very often influences our description and classification of actions in general. To describe an action as rational or irrational, moral or non-moral is using non-internal criteria that may overlap with the internal motivational set and also level the is-ought gap. However conflicts arise precisely because there are also accepted or unaccepted belief systems that determine the moral and rational character of many of our actions. Convertionally these are termed as 'external' reasons that Williams argues must also be part of the internal set if it is to be part of any explanatory or justificatory process.

Apart from the controversy of whether external reason are external to the agent there are two levels of representation that needs to be worked out. One is the internal consistency between thought and action and the other is the externally related description and criteria of description. It is at the latter level that one is forced to depend on an intersubjective criterion that is actually a semantic corroboration of statements affecting the premisses of the schema of practical reasoning as well. Although the truth of propositional contents in general of ones own mind and that of other is undermined by the semantic opacity that distinguishes talk about propositional attitudes, rationality is a logical constraint on reasoning that relates thought to action. In fact Davidson also makes it supervenient on some linguistic ability. To quote, 'in order to be a thinking rational creature, the creature, must be able to express many thoughts, and above all, be able to interpret the speech and thoughts of others'[11]. The argument is based on the necessity of a *concept* of belief or desire in order to possess propositional contents that *rationally* or morally determine human thought and action. And this cannot be attributed to non-communicators with absolutely no repertoire of linguistic skills.

Williams general idea of reason being internal to action and Davidson's notion of *reason being a rational cause*[12] converge to make the same point that unless the logical relation between thought and action is internally related in some way one cannot bring out the rational or moral structure that underlies human action. The relations then between thought

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and action at one level and language and action at the other, both contribute to our sense of morality and rationality. Consistency of human action depends on the agent's rational ability to relate thought and behaviour. Whether this is so can only be semantically expressed or described to yield norms of human conduct. Thus it is possible that the logic of practical reasoning as well as the semantics of human action be susceptible to some truth-functional theory of meaning in order to be meaningfully represented in our discourse. It may be fruitful to note another observation that Davidson makes; '....although the *criterion* of agency is, in semantic sense, intensional, the *expression* of agency is itself purely extensional'. That is, the difference between events and events that are actions is again only semantically achieved. But 'the relation that holds between a person and an event, when the event is an action performed by the person, holds regardless of how the terms are described'[13]. The difficulty is to relate the two categorially different levels of description.

Descriptions of events and actions are determined by both semantic as well as pragmatic considerations. These determinants need to be identified if we agree that communication and understanding require some systematic structure that makes possible the recurrence of human thoughts and actions. One may not be very sensitive to either the grammar or nuances of natural language but one cannot deny its logical dependence on some psychological as well as social structures that enables a speaker to think, talk, communicate and respond to one another. Though the *subjective motivational set* is largely based on a preferential or pro-attitude towards one's actions, this must not be taken to mean only desires or subjective preference that ignores duties and obligations but to include all factors adopted by reason as part of the *subjective motivational set.* This is important if we want to employ consistency and coherence as rational criteria for thought and action. The only significant debate that arises in this context is whether this is strictly correct, for as Davies puts it, 'it imposes upon language a requirement that is properly a condition upon thought'[14]. But this presumes that thought and language need not share the same logical requirements. It is true that to some extent we have hitherto privileged like 'speech' over 'writing', thought over action and intention over deed. But is it unnatural ? Whether natural or unnatural, truth-conditions of thoughts are more difficult, if not impossible, to grasp.

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There is also the *hard problem* of epistemology as Davidson too acknowledges. *How does any system of beliefs relate to the world, epistemologically*[15]. The truth of propositional contents can only be ascertained by some empirical criteria that are available in the form of evidence that is then interpreted. This is however achieved by some kind of semantic correspondence as well as coherence that relate propositionally and not factually. If we give up the intuitive notion of truth as epistemic and relate 'truth of utterance to their human context'[16], then we see that truth still does have to do with beliefs and therefore is 'neither radically non epistemic nor radically epistemic'[17]. Also, a basic correspondence of statements like 'this is yellow' or 'that is a book' with yellow things and books can be maintained because Davidson rather unsatisfactorily says' .... what determines the meaning of such sentences is what routinely makes them true' (*ibid.*) He is however cautious to add that 'it is the attitude of belief rather than acts of assertion.... that provide the central clue to truth...'[18]. 'Our speech acts reveal our underlying attitudes towards sentences, but often indirectly'[19], says Davidson. But can we access this without some theory of meaning that may help as it were 'read between the lines'. Davidson however believes we cannot really have a *theory* of meaning, only 'passing theories' that make allowances for a 'charitable interpretation'.

The intersubjective criterion that interpretation uses depends heavily on interaction and dialogue. Interpretation can only begin with what is visible, and the radical interpreter must be able to capture something of the *unshared* world of communicators as well and this very often, will not only resist a *routine* interpretation but also remain inaccessible, It need not have any bearing on our understanding unless linguistically manifested. Nevertheless imagining what is going on in someone's mind must logically require one to some extent share the frames of reference (though not necessarily agree), that also include worldviews and values. We may say that such interpretation is represented in our communicate practices and *attempts to reinterpret is an attempt to represent a situation* (correctly or incorrectly). If knowledge of oneself, of others as well of the world of objects are all varieties of *empirical* knowledge[20] then, they must be accessible, describable and ascertainable, It is this minimum requirement that is always suspect by antirealists and since the realists can only offer

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qualifications to the realms that they can conquer, it may serve their purpose to follow only the linguistic or semantic implications that may point to truth more definitely. The form of *propositional content* may seem to fulfil this requirement though some concepts and attitudes may resist propositional integration. As members of a community participating in speech-acts we can only go by what is given and thereby what is assertible.

As pointed out earlier, Dummett's theory of meaning is constrained by *available evidence* and it is this that may be taken as the stating point of a non-foundational interpretation that may *somehow* lead to an understanding of the nature of veridical process of reasoning. The question now is how do assertability-conditions relate to communicative and intersubjectively determined truth-conditions. Though Davidson describes Dummett's approach to language subjectivist, a realistic interpretation, especially of human behaviour, must at least presume the *subjective* point of view without regressing into some kind of solipsism. We do share an objective world but do not want to communicate all that we really share or think we share. If communicability is to be the only way to knowing then as Davidson rightly says, 'if we want to speak the truth about truth, we should say no more than need be'[21]. The pertinent question is how much is sufficient for successful communication of supposedly true *states of affairs*. All notions of truth are still tied to facts. But reasoning in general and practical reasoning in particular has still not been able to get its descriptions in order. The epistemic and the pragmatic structures underlying truth and truth-conditions needs to be still explored for a productive theory of human behaviour.

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SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S LOGIC

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

In this paper I wish to articulate some of the salient features of Dharmakīrti's Logic,[1] which, I hope, will enable us to understand his place in Buddhist logic in particular and Indian Logic in general. The paper does not aim to undertake a full-scale inquiry in its various aspects but only attempts to highlight some of them. The paper is divided into three sections. The first, attempts to articulate some of the distinctive features of Dharmakīrti's logic. The second deals with insights behind them and thereby tries to bring out their rationale. Third highlights some important implications.

I

Distinctive Features :

It is a fact that Dharmakīrti's logic did not emerge in vacuum. He had a background of his predecessors from his own tradition as well as from other non-Buddhist traditions. Yet, in the present context we restrict ourselves to Dharmakīrti's logic, which is made available to us through his various works. One can find in the *Tripiṭaka* and the Buddhist Sūtra-literature some of the logical terms occurring at various places and even logic being used for arguing one's own position or criticising that of others.[2] However, it is Nāgārjuna who laid down the foundation of Buddhist logic in terms of defensive mechanism and methodology of critical evaluation. Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu attempted to deviate from the then prevalent trends and humbly pave a way for separate Buddhist logic, however faltering it may be. But the real credit of comprehensive foundational enterprise goes to Dinnāga. And it is on this background that Dharmakīrti constructs the edifice of Buddhist logic. Hence, there are

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traces of similarities of thought prevalent in Dharmakīrti's logic and that of his-non-Buddhist opponents-both predecessors and contemporaries. At times he exhibits courage in pointing out the faults of his Buddhist predecessors in the domain of logic. Thus, his indebtedness to his Buddhist predecessors is neither blind nor uncritical. Before we take up discussion of some of the salient features of Dharmakīrti's logic, let us note in passing two important points in this context.

A) Dharmakīrti's Views on Knowledge :

Knowledge is not for the sake of knowledge, rather it is an instrument of emancipation. This view is advocated by almost all philosophical traditions of Indian origin including Buddhism in general and Dharmakīrti in particular.[3] With the help of knowledge one can at least reduce, if not destroy altogether, ignorance, error and misunderstanding, which is a necessary condition for emancipation. Inferential knowledge too is not exception to it.

Granting that we wish to emancipate for which knowledge is essential, two important questions emerge viz. what is to be known ? and how to know it ? Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular emphasize the former, rather than the latter. According to him, there are basically only two kinds of objects (*Viṣayas*) worth knowing viz. *Svalakṣaṇas* (unique particulars) and *Sāmānyalakṣanas* (general describables). The classification of them is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. For knowing these two objects, respectively as knowables (*Prameyas*) there are only two distinct kinds of *Pramāṇas* (modes/ gateways of knowledge) viz. *Pratyakṣa* (experience) and *Anumāna* (inference).[4] These distinct kinds of Pramāṇas are independent both cognitively as well as certificatorily, and hence there is a kind of mutual irreducibility of them. Though one can hold that there is complementarity rather than water-tight compartmentalisation between the two sorts of features they respectively enable us to comprehend.[5] Corresponding to these two kinds of knowables (*Prameyas)* and with the help of *Pramāṇas* repective to them, we get two sorts of cognitions of them, viz. *Sākṣat-jñāna* (direct cognition) and *Parokṣa-jñāna* (indirect cognition). On fulfilment of proper conditions, both these kinds of cognition are reliable and authentic (*Samyak*). But the former is reliable both ontologically as well as epistemically, while the latter is reliable only epistemically. That is, the former is real in order of being, where as the latter in order of knowing or thought. Hence, the former is

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correlated with the real as it is given to us, while the latter with the real in context of thought or communication through language. Thus, real as it is (or exists) and our knowldge, comprehension and communication of it are two distinct aspects of the same reality[6]. However, *Svalakṣaṇas* are real ontologically and hence ultimately philosophically worthwhile (*Pramārha-sat*) on the their own,[7] whereas *Sāmānyalakṣaṇas* are real derivatively through convention (*Saṁvṛtti-sat*).[8] It is this distictness and co-relatability starting form *Viṣayas* through Prameyas *Pramāṇas, Jñānas* and culminating into corresponding *Satyas* that is emphasised clearly by him.

Although, as mentioned above, *Sāmānyalakṣaṇas* is real only conventionally it is not to be confused with a fiction or imagination (*Kalpanā*), because all our thoughts, concepts, ideas, images etc. are not necessarily outcomes of fabrication of mind. Rather, they are related derivatively to ontological reality through our comprehension and understanding of the former, however distortive it may be. Thus, it opens an avenue for creative and conceptual understanding of the real. But, what we take to be real for our convenience and practical guidance, needs to be tested and examined with the help of inference or ratiocinative thinking, and metaphors in which it is often packed need to be unpacked. Inferential sort of cognition is of a distinct kind and is not, in any way, being determined by perception, the latter has no jurisdiction over deciding reliability of the former-cognitively and/or certificatorily.[9]

B) Truth and Reality :

Another important point to be noted is that his conception of knowledge is also connected with that of reality. According to Buddhism in general, reality both ontological (i.e.given) as well as conventional (i.e.constructed) - is to be understood within the framework of *Anityatā* (susceptibility to change) and *Anātmatā* (non-substantially). According to Dharmakīrti, nothing could be real that is resistant to change or substantial in character. Nor could it be object of any worthwhile knowledge. Worthy knowledge, in turn, could be taken to be so only on the fulfillment of three important conditions viz. *Avisaṁvādaktva* (non-in-consistency), *Avijñātārtha-prakāśkatva* (disposition to bring out hiterto unknown feature or aspect) and *Vyavahartavyatva* (applicability).[10] Whereas truthfulness, which is a sub-set of knowledge has something to do with relation of knowledge with actual world and hence Arthakriyā-sāmarthya (disposition

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to induce response or provocation to act) are important considerations

On this background we can turn to understand Dharmakīrti lo properly. Following points could be noted as distinctive features of his log

1) Dharmakīrti, uncompromisingly, stresses on the need to disting between epistemic, structural and regulative conditions of *Anumā Svārthānumāna* is an epistemic/cognitive condition. *Pakṣa Sādhya* Hetu are structural conditions while *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* regulative conditions.

Hence, *Svārthānumāna* is not a kind of *Anumāna* but a necess condition of inferential cognition in general. Rather, to be precise, it is cognitive (*Jñānātmaka*) aspect of *Anumāna*, whereas *Parārthānum* is communicative (*Sabdātmaka*) aspect of it. In the process of *Anum* the former is prior whereas the latter is posterior. But in each and ev case of *Anumāna* both these aspects are present. So, too, the number nature of structural conditions, viz, *Pakṣa*, *Śādhya* and *Hetu*, of *Anum* do not change with reference to both the aspects.[13] Likewise, it is anthropocentric understanding of these two aspects of Anumāna[14] but process and form-centric one. Further, *Vyāpti* and *Paksadharmatā* two distinct conditions regulating *Anumāna*.[15] Basis of the cognition, fo formulation or communication of *Anumāna* do not change from perso person or taking into account for whose benefit it is formulated-oneself someone else. Similarly, context of debate and discussion is irrelevant fashioning, formulation and articulation of an *Anumāna*. For, I may enter an argument in complete privacy, formulate it and examine its reliability my benefit and clarity. Accordingly, it is untenable and counter-intuitiv hold that social-context, discussion or debating situation is an essen condition of an *Anumāna* being ever entertained and fashioned rather t communicated as some of the non-buddhist adversaries like *Naiyāyi* hold.

2) Coming to Hetu-centrality, which is a unique contributio Dharmakīrti's logic. Whether it is epistemic condition or regulative condi of *Anumāna,* or consideration of form and formulation of *Anumān,* is important, essential and indispensable, according to Dharmakīrti. Thi mainly because every crucial aspect of *Anumāna* and its pro consideration must revolve, according to him, around *Hetu*. It is in sense that *Anumāna,* is uncompromisingly *Hetu-centric* in character

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his view. In the same vein, he holds that the issue of classification, cognition or certification of *Anumāna* together with Hetvabhās incidental to it must also spin around nature and consideration of *Hetu*. For instance, classification of *Anumāna* context-freely, has to be based on the nature and kinds of *Hetu* viz. *Svabhāva*, *Kārya* and *Anupalabdhi*. Moreover, *Anvaya* and *Vyatirvaka* are not kinds of *Anumāna,* of *Vyāpti* or of *Hetu* either, but only alternative modes of formulating and communicating the same argument.

3) *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā*, which are claimed to be the backbone of *Anumāna,* are necessarily determined by the nature of Hetu. *Vyāpti*,[16] according to Dharmakīrti, is not Saṁbaṅdha (relation) but a Niyama (rule)[17] - context- free and universal in character. Being a rule, it uniformly exhibits three important features viz. it is necessary (*Avaśyaṁbhāva*), exception-in-tolerant (*Avinābhāva*) and incapable of being altered through human efforts or interventions (*Aprayatnāntariyaka*). That is, it is not anthropocentric in nature.

Pakṣadharmatā is a unique and distinctive feature of Hetu only, and hence, inalienably related to it. There is indeed a fundamental difference between *Pakṣatā*[18] (which is a feature of *Sādhya* in relation with *Pakṣa*) and *Pakṣadharmatā* (which is unique feature of *Hetu* in relation in *Pakṣa*), and it is completely misleading to confuse between the two. According to Dharmakīrti, *Vyāpti,* and *Pakṣadharmatā* are the two indispensable regulative conditions of *Anumāna.* In fact, consideration of *Vyāpti* and *Pakṣadharmatā* as decisive conditions of *Anumāna,* is the original and very fundamental contribution of Dharmakīrti to Buddhist and Indian logic.

4) Coming to validity and/or soundness of *Anumāna* according to Dharmakīrti. Any *Anumāna* is valid or formally reliable provided it fulfills three conditions of *Hetu* viz. *Pakṣa-sattva*, *Sapakṣa-sattva* and *Asapkṣa-asattva*. But it would be sound as well if it fulfills one more condition viz. *Svabhāva-pratibaṅdha*[19] (natural close tie between *Hetu* and *Sādhya*) within the broad framework of *Vyāpya-Vyāpaka-bhāva*. the latter gives us the domain, whereas the former context and range of soundness of an argument. *Vyāpya-Vyāpaka-bhāva* connects soundness of an argument with its validity, while *Svabhāva-pratibaṅdha* differentiates the two. *Svabhāva-pratibaṅdha* in its turn contextually is two-fold in nature : a) occasioned by *Tādātmya* (subsumption or set-sub-set relation, but not

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identity) or b) *Tadutpatti* (emergence from, and not causality). Howe *Tādātmya* and *Tadutpatti* are not themselves necessary and suffic conditions of soundness of an *Anumāna*.[20] In this context, it is importa note two points of great importance : i) For Dharmakīrti consideratio validity as well as soundness of an argument in every aspect of *Anum* must be *Hetu*- centric in character and it is a folly to confuse betw validity and soundness or consider range of valid and sound argument be co-extensive. ii) Causality is not the back-bone of inference as so non-Buddhist opponents seem to be prone to hold.

5) According to Dharmakīrti, the nature, structure, range importance of *Anumāna* as a mode of indirect cognition needs to be inqu into independently of the social context of communication, discussio well as debate. This is for two main reasons : a) such a context is compl irrelevant for fashioning and formulation of an argument, its employ as a tool of indirect cognition or for testing it on the count of validity a or both validity as well as soundness. b) Logic as a tool of methodol and an objective inquiry and investigation into philosophically interes truth all by ourselves independently of social context is always availabl us, though its employment in that sort of context is not forbidden by means. Further, there can be two kinds of debates, viz. *Vijigīṣuvāda*, wh success and victory in debate and defeat of an adversary is the only conc and *Tattvabubhutsuvāda*, where discovery of truth is all that matters *Vijigīṣuvāda*, persuasive force of an argument is important and gain victory over the adversary somehow and anyhow is a crucial issue. He it is perfectly legitimate in such a context to resort to illegitimate argum and illogical means. In the *Tattvabubhutsuvāda* (a debate aimed philosophically significant truth), on the contrary, success or failur insignificant. What matters is discovery of relative truth (relative beca no truth is final and irrevocable), and clarity in understanding. Such inquiry can be undertaken by like-minded or unlike-minded persons, teacher and a student, or two stalwarts from the same or opposing ca or traditions. What counts is commitment to impartial and non-parti truth. It is complementary and reinforcive rather than competitive character. As a result, consideration of success / failure, victor vanquishment are pointless and irrelevant. In such an enterprise, employment of illegitimate and unconducive means (*Asādhanāṅ*

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vacana) and failure to detect and force withdrawal of such a means by anybody (*Adoṣodbhāvana*) alone are counter-productive and need to be detested and despised by all means. They alone are the proper *Nigrahasthānas* (points of censure or condemnation) in such a context, and none others.[21] Further, they cannot be confused with Hetvabhasas determinative of invalidity of an argument viz. *Asiddha*, *Virudha* and *Anaikāntika*, which emerge respectively because the Hetu fails to be relatable with the Pakṣa itself, or it remains relatable with something contrary to the *Pakṣa* or else the Hetu not only in principle but in point of fact as well remains related with something similar to *Pakṣa* over and above its being related with *Pakṣa* alone. For, according to Dharmakīrti, in a valid *Anumāna Hetu* must be both relatable and related with Paksa, relatable but not related with *Sapakṣa*, while both unrelatable and unrelated with *Asapakṣa* . As one can notice, each of these considerations is *Hetu*-centric in charater.[22]

In the above discussion, we attempted to articulate some of the distinctive features of Dharmakīrti's logic by way of a sample. The inquiry is not aimed to be exhaustive in character. Methodologically speaking, however, it is not enough merely to note down, major distinguishing aspects of his logic. It is also essential to inquire into the rationale behind them. It is to the consideration of this that we turn in the next section.

II

Rationale :

From the above brief sketch of the salient features of Dharmakīrti's logic it should be clear that it is independent and original in many respects. It is not determined by any tradition-Buddhist or non-Buddhist, preceding or then prevalent. Nor does it rationalise or defend it somehow and anyhow, however counter-intuitive or blindfold it may be. It is rather given to upholding rationality and reasonableness and follow them systematically. It neither rejects tradition and views of the predecessors for the sake of their being so, nor does it accept them without their due critical evaluation. It seems to stand at equal distance from two extremes concerning them viz., their dogmatic acceptance or thoughtless rejection, and thus, exhibits following Buddhist, message of *Madhyamā-Pratipad* with judicious discretion.

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It is true that Dharmakīrti does not boast his logic to be free fro any sort of ontological commitment. But his two-fold ontological commitme springs directly from the two principal features of the real accepte definitionally by Buddhism viz., *Anātmatā*[23] (anything that is real must b essenceless/non-substantial in nature) and *Anityatā*[24] (a real must b susceptible to change without any pre-set limit of whatever kind). Howeve this ontological commitment of his falls apart from three kinds of oth ontological commitments noticeable in the context of Indian philosophy a) uncritical commitment to ontology of common sense almost of the natu of Platonic realism as accepted by *Nyāya*. b) At least bio-centric, if n mammalo-centric, ontological commitment embracing models of evolutio and involution accepted by *Sāṁkhya*. c) Modal ontological commitme accepted by Jainism, where the appropriate mode is attempted to b captured through mode either of comprehension (*Naya*) or communicati (syādvāda) of the nature of the real, and real according to it is definitional changeable-cum-stable in nature. Such a definition of the real, howeve appears more to be of the nature of selective rationalization of ordina common sense.

In spite of such a kind of ontological commitment, vario considerations in Dharmakīrti's logic are neither dictated by nor restricte to it. That is why his logic extends into the domain of coherent conceivabili beyond what is contextually and actually given, though the latter falls with the scope of the former. It is looking to such domain that he brings in ma formal or methodological considerations concerning *Anumāna,* which once embrace principle of economy on the one hand and comprehensivene and universality on the other. We may passingly mention some of the relevant in the context under consideration. For instance, *Vyāpti* as a ru is unitary, figures in the same form in any *Anumāna* and there are no kind or types of it; nor do kinds or types of *Vyāpti* spell in any way those *Anumāna.* Or that logical priority is not commensurate with tempor epistemic or ontological priority on whatever count. Or further still, in th same vein, fashioning and formulation of *Anumāna* does not necessari presuppose a social or debating context. Similarly, cognition of *Anumā* is prior to its certification as fashioning and formulation of *Anumāna* prior to its communication. Such considerations concerning *Anumāna* wou hardly have been available to him, were he not to inquire into it in

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methodologically appropriate way.

Further, independence of *Anumāna* from *Pratyakṣa*, the only other *Pramāṇa* accepted by Dharmakīrti, is a direct consequence of the principle of Pramāṇa-Vyavasthā, in opposition to Pramāṇa-*Saṁplava* accepted by *Nyāya*, that he endorses. In addition, given that any *Pramāṇa* that he accepts can enable us to cognise only one sort of feature of the real, it is futile, according to Dharmakīrti to expect Pratyakṣa should make any significant contribution to *Anumāna* - for its formulation or vindication. On this background it is not surprising that Dharmakīrti rightly refused to consider *Dṛṣṭānta/ Udāharaṇa* to be constitutive of *Anumāna* or *Bhūyo Darśana* (repeated observation) to contributive to formulation or comprehension of *Vyāpti* in any way. All this is methodologically illuminating and logically insightful i. nature.

For Dharmakīrti *Hetu*-centricity of *Anumāna* is methodologically unifying and logically uncompromising principle in his original and insightful investigation into various aspects of *Anumāna*. Accordingly, any *feature of Anumāna* related with its nature, form, cognition, certification, formulation, communication, classification, soundness, validity etc. that does not spin and revolve around *Hetu* is ruthlessly rejected by Dharmakīrti, no matter if it is brought in by his Buddhist or non-Buddhist predecessor or contemporary. This is one of the most decisive reasons behind his rejection of the form of *Anumāna* with five constituents, or acceptance of *Pratijñā, Udāharaṇa* etc. to be *Avayavas* of *Anumāna,* or taking Badha or *Satpratipakṣa* to be legitimate *Hetvābhāsas*. As one can see, such and other rejections at his hands are neither uncritical nor arbitrary.

Dharmakīrti rightly and unwaveringly makes a legitimate distinction between a) domain of rhetoric and that of logic, b) context of formulation of *Anumāna* as a mode of indirect cognition and context of its certification, c) *Nigrahasthāna* (a point of censure in a dabate) and *Hetvābhāsa* (a basis of invalidity of an argument), d) context of inquiry into truth and context of debate and controversy, or e) two kinds of debate (*Tattvaubhutsunāds* and *Vijigīṣuvāda*). These distinctions are not made merely for academic reasons looking to some short-term gains. Instead, they are backed by appropriate methodological perspective and proper logical insight. Likewise, his distinction between validity and soundness of an argument is of decisive significance although it was not paid as serious

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attention as it deserved. Had it been done so, it would have been realise that minimum condition of reliability of an argument is its validity and n both validity as well as soundness, as adherents of such trends of Indi philosophical thought like *Nyāya* unwittingly held.

On the background of, the discussion of some of the salient featur of Dharmakīrti's logic and their rationale in the preceding two sectio we may proceed in the next section to study some of their importa implications.

III

Implications :

The following are some of the significant implications Dharmakīrti's logic :

a) While inquiring into *Anumāna* one needs to discriminate judicious between methodological, logical, epistemological, linguistic, ontological a common-sensical considerations and it is a major set-back in one intellectual enterprise to confuse between any two of them. Adherents many trends of Indian philosophical thought, Buddhist or non-Buddhis unwittingly fall prey to such confusions. For instance, to hold what boi down to be merely formulation and communication of an argument, to b of two distinct types of *Anumāna* as held by *Nyāya* is classic case of suc confusion.

b) Such an inquiry further needs to be free from dogmatic a uncritical partisan commitments. Otherwise, much of the scholarship more likely to be wasted in rationalization of what is natively accepted at per-systematic stage and fail in bringing forth requisite insight methodological or logical. For instance, the *Nyāya* dogma that *Anumān* has fives *Avayavas,* that four of them viz. *Pratijñā Hetu, Udāharaṇ* and *Upanaya* respectively correspond to the four *Pramāṇas* viz. *Śabda Anumāna, Pratyakṣa*, and *Upamāna* that it accepts and that the la Avayava viz. Nigamana corresponds to the conclusion of an argumen jointly drawn with the help of the four accepted *Pramāṇas* is a case of thi kind.[25] Accordingly to Dharmakīrti it is pointless to accept *Upamāna* and *Śabda* as *Pramāṇas* as done *Nyāya* and it is equally untenable to hold th *Anumāna* cannot even survive, much less thrive, unless it receive contribution from *Pratyakṣa.* To hold this, in his view, is to destro

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independence of *Anumāna.*

It needs to be understood very clearly that certain kinds of priorities and preferences need to be respected, since they are methodologically as well as logically well-founded. And it would be intellectually disastrous to neglect them altogether or compromise with them in any major way. For instance, formulation of an argument is certainly prior to its communication, but it is a folly, as *Nyāya* holds, to consider these two stages to be commensurate with two kinds of *Anumāna.* Or, incidence or occurrence of knowledge - direct or indirect is always prior to its communication. But while context of the latter is essentially social and interpersonal, it is a very basic error to hold, as *Nyāya* does, that even occurrence of knowledge too should be public in character. For, occurrence of knowledge is always personal, while its communication interpersonal in character. Similarly, an *Anumāna* could always be entertained in privacy. And it is untenable to hold that as communication of an already entertained argument necessarily presupposes a social context, so too its entertainment invariably anticipates such a context.

Likewise, principle of economy and context-free universality have a decisive role to play in any methodologically respectable inquiry. And according to Dharmakīrti, it is unwarrantable to neglect or circumvent them. Consider for instance the former. Dharmakīrti, for example, insists that in so far as three constitutive conditions of *Anumāna* are strong enough, it is a mistake to admit five *Avayavas* as *Nyāya* does. It is true that some arguments are valid alone, while some others are both valid as well as sound. Conditions of validity are necessary and sufficient to decide respectability of the former kind of arguments, while necessary but not sufficient with regard to the latter kind of them. However, conditions of validity have greater range of universality as compared with those of soundness. And it is a very basic mistake, as *Nyāya* does, to hold that only those arguments which are at once both valid as well as sound alone are paradigmatic or that distinction between validity and soundness of an argument is irrelevant.

NOTES

1. One can undertake inquiry into Dharmakīrti logic in various ways viz. in the light of (a) inter-school controversy between Dharmakīrti on the one hand

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and *Naiyāyikas* (Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Bhāsarvajña. Jayanta Bha Udayana etc) or Mimāṁsakas (Kumārila) etc or even Jainas (Haribhari Akalaṅka etc) on the other, or (b) his intra-school controversies with Asa Vasubandhu, Maitreyanātha, Diṅnāga etc. Or else, his contribution to Ind logic in general and Buddhist logic in particular could be systematica studied. I refrain from undertaking such an exercise at present. It lies outs the scope of the present paper.

2. On the basis of this one claim that considerable amount of logical litera - both pre-systematic and quasi-systematic type-was available in Budd camp even before !st cen.A.D. And while, it began to be systematised f that time starting with Nāgārjuna. Taking this and such other facts account and noticing absence of such exercise in the literature produ by other trends of Indian philosophical thought of the time un consideration, it could very easily help us see that Buddhism in gen and Buddhist scholars in particular made fundamental, profound pioneering contribution to the origin, growth and development of Ind logic systematically.

3. Samyag jñāna pūrvikā sarva purūsarthasādhaye ----------/ *NyāyaBin* p-1

4. Mānaṁ dvidhaṁ, viśays dvaividhyāt / *Pramāṇa-vartika*,.2.1.

5. In emphasising independence of *Anumāna* from *Prtayakṣa* Dharmakī logic differs from perhaps earlier vesion of Diṅnāgas logic.

6. Meyaṁ tu ekaṁ svalakṣaṇam / *p.v.II*.53

7. Svarupasya svato gatiḥ /*p.v.I*.6.

8. Prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa /*p.v.I*-7, II-1,3, 32, 58, 75.

9. It is this which enable Dharmakīrti to reject Dṛstanta as a necessa condition of inference, unlike the one admitted not only by Nyāya but Diṅnāge also.

10. P.V. I. 3-8 and also "Dharmakīrti on criteria of knowledge"; *Indi Philosophical Quarterly,* vol. XV. 2, 1988, pp. 177-88

11. *Santāna* and *santānāntara* : *An Analysis of the Buddhist Perspecti Concerning Continuity, Transformation and Transcendence and the Ba of an Alternative Philosophical Psychology*; Chinchore, M.R. pp. 191-9

12. Dharmakīrti's predecessors and contemporaries from the Buddhist or no Buddhist camps seem unable to comprehend the need and necessity such insistence on distinguishing between epistemic conditions, structu

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conditions and regulativc conditions of *Anumāna.* That is why *Drṣṭānta* is held by some of them to be both epistemic and structural condition or the latter kind of condition only. So too, Pakṣa is a structural condition according to Dharmakīrti and not a regulative one, as is claimed by his adverories. For instance, Nyaya does not seen to explilcity mention *Pakṣa* as an Avayava and so a structural condition of *Anumāna.* For futher details see my *Dharmakīrti Theory of Hetu-centrcity of Anumāna.*

13. Which, unfortunately, seem to be advocated by Vasubandhu. According to him, structural conditions of *Svārthānumāna* are only two viz. Pratjñā and *Drṣṭānta*, whereas *Parārthānumāna* has to fulfill five conditions like those of *Nyāya.*
14. Like Uddyotakara form *Nyāya* side or earlier Diṅnāga from Buddhist camp.
15. Vadubandus seems to have confused between *Pakṣa-dharmatā* and *Vyāpti.* As would be observed below clear acceptance of these two regulative conditions is the most distinctive contribution of Dharmakīrti in particular and Buddhism in general.
16. In later *Nyāya* tradition capital has been made of *Vyāpti* as a relation but never as a rule, whereas Jaina tradition emphasizes only on *Pakṣa-dharmatā.*
17. *Dharmakīrti's Theory of Hetu-centricity of Anumāna,* Chinchore, Mangala R; p.104.
18. Very often scholars confuse between *Pakṣa*, *Pakṣatā* and *Pakṣa-dharmatā.*
19. *Svabhāva-pratibandha* is very often confused with causality, which is not correct according to Dharmakīrti's point of view.
20. By soundness very often one understands corespondence with ontological reality. However, for Dharmakīrti genuinely ontological reals are *Svalakṣaṇas* only. And in *Anumāna* in particular and ordinary communication in general we deal only with the real comprehended interpersonally and not with the unique and incommunicable reals like *Svalakṣaṇas.* Therefore, soundness of *Anumāna,* should be understood as a relation between what we comprehend ordinarily on the one hand and what we communicate on the other, rather than between what is really the case and what we communicate about it. To ignore this would pave away for confusing between the approach of *Nyāya* and that of Dharmakīrti with reference to *Anumāna,* which are very fundamentally different.
21. For further details see my Vadanyaya : A Glimpse of *Nyāya*-Buddhist Controversy.
22. For further details see my *Dharmakīrti Theory of Hetu-centricity of*

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Anumāna.

23. For further details see my *Anattā / Anātmatā* : An Analysis of Buddhist *Antisubstantist Crusade.*

24. For further details see my *Aniccatā / Anityatā* : *An Analysis of Buddhist Opposition to Permanence / Stability and Alternative Foundation of Ontology and /or Anthropology.*

25. Agamaḥ pratujñā Heturānumāna, Udāharaṇaṁ pratyakṣaṁ ---- tadāśrayā cattattvavyavasthā / *Nyāyacaturgnthikā* vol. I p.4.

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A NOTE ON GOTTLOB FREGE'S CONTRIBUTION TO LOGIC

SUNITI N. DEO

G. Frege (1848-1925), a German logician, mathematician and philosopher, spent his life almost entirely at the university of Jena. He was the founder not only of modern logic, but of analytic philosophy[1] also. Frege was not only the most important figure in the history of logic after Aristotle, but a philosopher of the same importance as Kant, Leibniz or Descartes His main philosophical works are all in German. It was Russell, who wrote an appendix in his *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) which introduced Frege to the English speaking philosophical community.

Frege's principal writings are : *Begrifsschrift* (1979), *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetick* (1884, translated by J.L.Austin as *The Foundations of Arithmetic)* and *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* in two volumes (1893-1903), the first part of which was translated by M. Furth as *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic* During 1891 to 1892 three of his famous papers were published. These are : 'Function and Concept', 'On Concept and Object' and 'On Sense and Reference'.

Frege was not celebrated in his days. Among philosophers only Russell and Winttgenstein were considerably influenced by him. Russell and Whitehead adopted his approach to logic in *Principia Mathematica* and wrote in the preface to volume 1, 'In all questions of logical analysis our chief debt is to Frege'. Russell criticised Frege's theory of sense and reference in his paper 'On Denothing' (1905). Wittgenstein spoke in the preface to *Tractatus* (1921) of 'the great works of Frege', and repeatedly referred to him in the text. Frege's recent fame is mainly due to Ludwig Wittgenstein, who explicitly referred to and discussed Frege. Apart from these two, mathematicians and philosophers alike ignored him.

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But this is not the case now. Frege is now generally recognised by philosophers and mathematicians as one of the great figures of the nineteenth century. Frege's logical works were revolutionary, and are often taken to represent a fundamental break between contemporay approaches and the older, Aristotelian tradition.

Aristotelian and Scholastic logic concentrated on the relations between terms. It was only with the work of Frege (late in the nineteenth century) that the focus of attention was shifted firmly away from terms to propositions and their relations.

Secondly, the earlier logic had largely ignored relational arguments. Aristotle and the Stoics had investigated only inferences involving sentences containing only one expression of generality. Relations were widely held to be merely 'ideal'. Sentences involving multiple generality were thought, in principle, to be reducible to sentences involving only one-place predicates. So it was thought that the study of multiple generality was unnecessary. Leibniz's work also failed to tackle the problem of multiple generality.

Modern logic stands in contrast to all the great logical systems of the past. It gives an account of sentences involving multiple generality. This account depends upon the mechanism of quantifiers and variables. Frege's discovery of quantifier - variable notation resolved the age old problem of analysing sentences involving multiple generality. It is really a 'paradigm of philosophy'.

Frege in *Begriffsschrift* presented a formal system. This involved the framing of a formal language together with formal rules of inference. Long before Frege, Euclid had given a deductive system for Geometry, but it was not sufficientyly rigorous. It appealed to intuition occasionaly. Frege was a harsh critic of psychologism[2]. Frege's purpose in constructing a formal system was simply to attain the ideal of rigour. Complete rigour and genuine certainty were the interests of Frege in constructing a formal language.

The modern notation of quantifiers and variables, as also the modern treatment of sentential operators appeared for the first time in *Begriffsschrift*. It is, as Quine says, the beginning of modern logic. In this system negation, implication, universal quantifier[3] and the sign of identity were taken as primitive.

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One of the insights underlying Frege's discovery of the quantifier notation was that sentences are constructed, not in a linear way but, in a series of stages. The sentence, for example, 'Everybody envies somebody' is not constructed out of the three constituents, 'everybody', 'envies' and 'somebody', but it involves multiple generality. In quantificational symbolism the existential quantifier would be within the scope of the universal quantifier.

Frege's insight consisted in considering a sentence as constructed in stages, corresponding to the different signs of generality[4]. A sentence is formed by combining the sign of generality with a one-place predicate.

The one-place predicate is itself formed from a sentence by removing one or more occurrences of some proper name.

For example, we begin with a sentence such as 'Peter envies John'. Form this sentence, the one-place predicate is formed by removing the occurrence of the proper name 'John' i.e. 'Peter envies ξ'[5]. This one-place predicate can be combined with the sign of generality to get the sentence 'Peter envies somebody'. Now this new sentence may be subjected to the same process. By removing 'Peter' we get 'ξ' envies somebody' and combining this with the sign of generality 'everybody', we get the sentence 'Everybody envies somebody'.

By understanding the sentence as constructed step-by-step, we can give a simple account of truth-conditions of sentences involving signs of generality. Thus, a one-place predicate is true of a given individual when the sentence which results from inserting the name of that individual in the argument - place of the predicate is true. A sentence formed by means of this predicate, and the sign on generality 'everybody' means that the predicate is true of every individual, and formed by means of the predicate and the sign of generality 'somebody' says that the predicate is true of at least on individual.

Having gained this insight, Frege replaced the expressions of generality in the natural language with quantifier and variable notation. This notation permitted a uniform explanation for each universal and each existential quantifier.

Medieval theories followed the forms of expression employed in natural language too closely. If we consider the sentence - structure of a

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natural language, the signs of generality, e.g. 'someone', 'anyone', behave like proper names and, they occupy the same positions in sentences. The difference between them and proper names becomes clear when truth-conditions of sentences containing them are considered.

Frege, on the other hand, had solved the problem which had baffled logicians for millennia. He had devised a wholly new quantifier variable notation for the sentences of natural language expressing generality. He developed an artificial language (Begriffsschrift) for this purpose. He axiomatised propositional logic, quantificational logic and second - order logic.

Frege was the first to attempt to transcribe the old statements of categorical logic in a language employing variables, quantifiers and truth-functions. He was the first to understand a statement such as 'All students are hardworking'[5] as saying roughly the same as, 'for all values of x, if x is a student, then x is hardworking[6], and freed logicians from the limitations of subject predicate analysis of Aristotelian logic. Moreover, Frege's logical system was the first to capture statements of multiple generality, such as 'every person loves some city' by using multiple quantifiers in the same logical formula. This too was impossible in all earlier logical systems. Indeed Frege's "firsts' in logic are almost too numerous to list. He invented modern quantification theory, presented the first complete axiomatization of propositional and first-order predicate logic, attempted the first formulation of higher order logic, presented the first coherent and full analysis of variables and functions, first showed it possible to reduce all truth functions to negation and conditional, and made the first clear distinction between axioms and inference rules in a formal system. It is no wonder that he is called the founder of modern logic.

NOTES

1. Michael Dummett remarks, 'Frege's *Grundlagen* may justly be called the first work of analytical philosophy'. (*Frege : The Philosophy of Mathematics*, p. 111).
2. Psychologism is the view that logical truths are truths about psychology.
3. Frege did not include existential quantifier in his list because it can be expressed alternatively with the help of negation and universal quantifier. E.g. 'Something is mortal' $(\exists x)(Mx)$ is equivalent to 'It is not the case that

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
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nothing is mortal', (~ (x) ~ Mx).

4. This step-by-step understanding of the construction of a sentence is applicable to truth-functional compound sentences also.

5. Here the Greek letter 'ξ' should not be confused with the 'free variable' of modern predicate logic Nothing exactly corresponding to a free variable that appears in Frege's symbolism. 'ξ' only indicates the argument-place.

6. In Frege's symbolism 'All students are hardworking' will be expressed as



Since this way of symbolization is complicated, Russell's way is now widley followed. In Russell's symbolism it will be expressed as,

$$(x)(Sx \supset Hx)$$

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(1) M. Dummett : Frege : *Philosophy of Language (2nd ed.)*

(2) Peter Geach and Max Black : *Translations from the Philosophical Writtings of Gottlob Frege.*

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LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE GAME
(A Search for meaning)

L. BISHWANATH SHARMA

Analytic Philosophy gives a new direction in the study of philosophy with more emphasis on the consideration of the relationship between the language and the world since the beginning of twentieth-century. The main objective of this new trend is that we can describe the reality of the world and make a resolution of the philosophical problems through analysis of language, which we normally use. The story of twentieth-century philosophy is in large part the story of the notion, sense or meaning of linguistic expressions. Richard Rorty, in his introduction to the *Linguistic Turn,* maintains that the greatest discovery in the twentieth century philosophy is the discovery that philosophy is concerned with the analysis of language. The problem and analysis of language and reality play, therefore, a very important role in the Analytic philosophy and Wittgenstein's philosophy as well. They attempt to find out a method of interpretation through analysis of meanings of the linguistic expressions.

In the introduction to the *Revolution in Philosophy,* Gilbert Ryle writes on the different considerations of meanings by different philosophers.

> "Meanings are what Moore's analyses have been analyses of; meanings are what Russell's logical atoms were atoms of; meanings in one sense but not in another, were that Russell's 'incomplete symbols' were bereft of; meanings are what logical considerations prohibit to the antinomy-generating forms of words on which Frege and Russell and tried to found arithmetic; meanings are what the members of the Vienna Circle proffered an general litmus-paper for; meanings are what the *Tractatus,* with certain qualifications, denies to the would-be propositions both of Formal Logic and of philosophy; and yet meanings are just what, in different ways,

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philosophy and logic are ex-officio about."[1]

The inquiry into the meaning of our expressions has become a important and fascinating area of study in philosophy. The very de over the importance of meaning and its interpretation is as old as philoso We can trace back the roots of the concern over meaning to the histor ideas since its inception. But the study of meaning is considered a important area of philosophy from the beginnings of twentieth cen The analysis of meaning has become more popular and influential afte publication of Frege's celebrated work on *Sense and Reference.* Regar the contribution of Frege to the analysis of language vis-a-vis his theor meaning Michael Dummett clearly spells out in the following manner

> "It was not, therefore, qua logician, but qua philosopher, that Frege pushed his inquiry further; he was not satisfied with giving an analysis of language - or, at least of a large part of language - adequate for the purposes of the logician : he wanted to give account of the working of language, an account which did not proceed by taking any fundamental concept for granted. An account of the working of language is a theory of meaning, for to know how an expression functions, taken as part of language, is just to know its meaning. So Frege's philosophy, so far as it is concerned with language generally, rather than specially with mathematics, is largely constituted by his theory of meaning."[2]

This tradition of analysis of language as a philosophical probl spread out through the continental and the British philosophical commun As contemporary trend the discussions on the problems of meaning carried on in many parts of the world. In England, Russell, Moo Wittgenstein and other analytic philosophers joined the new movemen philosophical study. They advocated their own theories of interpretation human expressions in search of meaning. According to them, the task philosophy is to describe the world that we live through the analysis language.

The objective of this paper is to explore Wittgenstein's concep of philosophy with particular emphasis on his view on the relationship language and world. The author will concentrate the present discussion the theory of meaning as reflected in Wittgenstein's two major works, the **Picture theory** of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* 19

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hereafter refered as *Tractatus*) and the **Use theory** of the *Philosophical Investigations*, 1953 (hereafter referred as *P.I.*). When we talk about Wittgenstein's philosophy we can generally classify his works into two phases - the early and the later phases. The *Tractatus* represents the early phase and the *P.I.* the later one. The study of the meanings of an expression, according to Wittgenstein, is considered one of the most important tasks in philosophy. It is certainly true that our thoughts, feelings and desires are expressed through language to give a definite meaning in our communication. Language is used as a means of communication to convey some meaningful ideas to other people in our social discourse.

The difference we have referred to Wittgenstein's philosophy is the difference in the conceptions of philosophic method between the earlier and later philosophies. This change in the conception of language parallels the change in the method of philosophical analysis. There are two radically different ideas of language that Wittgenstein uses differently in the analysis of two philosophies :

1. Language as logical picture depicting forms and structure of objects through forms and structure of names;
2. Language as one human activity, integrated with other human activities through countless different kinds of uses of words.

Wittgenstein's conception of language in the earlier work emphasizes the essential structures of language. The meaning of a word is determined through the name of an object that depicts the object as it is. There is a common structure between the structures of word and name of an object. The structure of language has the superficial similarities with the structure of the grammar of ordinary language. This superficial similarity creates confusion when we try to know the language of our discourse deeper. We have to dig out the hidden essential structures by using a logically correct symbolism that will prevent mistakes. Wittgenstein shows this intricate relation of the structure of language with the structure of world in the *Tractatus*. He says that now, too, we understand our feeling that once we have a sign language in which everything is all right, we already have a correct logical point of view.[3] According to Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy is an analysis of a sign language that is governed by logical grammar in place of ordinary grammar.

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On the other hand, a new metaphor of language is introduced in *P.I.* as a box of tools replacing that of language as a picture. The idea the absolutely simple logical picture was replaced by that of the model language-game. At the same time, the idea of the all tools having someth in common or all games having something common which will be essence of game or tool, was abandoned. And this reduces super concep of the *Tractatus* such as name, object, sentence, reference and descripti to ordinary words without single and final meanings.

While we study the meaning of an expressed thought, our analy will confine to a technical sense of the term, not to the lexical and grammatical sense. To determine the meaning of a given sentence we observe the grammatical structure which necessarily refers to grammatical rule of syntax that governs the forming of a meaning sentence in a language system. If the rule of syntax is not violated in then every sentence is meaningful. Otherwise, it is not. Moreover, meanings can be understood in the lexical and semantic sense, too, something that has to be conveyed or signified by the sentence. In t sense, every word or a combination of words has a peculiar meaning. B in Wittgenstein's view, every statement, which has been used to expr an idea in our language, does not necessarily have a meaning, even thou the statement appears to be meaningful from grammatical standpoint.

The meaning of a statement is shown to be the relationship betwe the statement and its state of affairs. A statement, for instance, 'the sto is soft' may have perfect meaning in a particular context of discourse b it is not true, vis-ā-vis, impossibility to ascertain in the real experience external phenomenon. Wittgenstein, for example, does not speak of th use of a word (1) as grammarians or students of linguistics do or (2) most logicians do or (3) as linguistic philosophers, such as J.L.Austin, d He does not, in other words, speak of the use of a word to bring co linguistic, logical or cultural points about language, but rather to bring co philosophical points of the kind philosophers traditionally have been interest in.[4]

To determine the truth value of a statement is another inquiry philosophy. A statement or proposition, which is taken as synonymous ter by Wittgenstein, can be divided into atomic and compound propositions As atomic propositions has its own truth-value it can either be true or fals

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by virtue of being a picture of reality. In this respect Wittgenstein points out that "In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality".[5]

The truth functional value of a compound proposition is determined by the truth-value of the component atomic propositions along with the respective logical connective. Let us take a compound proposition, for instance, "If it is raining then I am not going out" has a truth functional value. In this proposition if the antecedent of the proposition is true and the consequent is false, then the truth-value of the proposition will be false. However, the inquiry of such determination of the validity of an expression is not related with the study of meaning.

II

The early work of Wittgenstein mainly devotes to a study about the structural meaning of language as relating to the reality of the world. Russell's remark that Wittgenstein is concerned with a logically perfect language and not with any ordinary language is just not true if we see that Wittgenstein is interested in the problem of description. To forbid nonsense it is enough to show that the true function of language is to describe. Metaphysics is only a pseudo-description.[6]

Wittgenstein thinks that language is there to depict the facts of the world. According to this view, he puts forward that every word does have a meaning with reference to object and sentence also have a particular sense vis-a-vis the objects. Thus every sentence has a meaning of its own because it is an outcome of a combination of words which consist of names signifying simple objects. The early position of Wittgenstein's philosophy stated on the determination of meaning, assumes that the ultimate meaning of the word consist in what the object names or means. This theory of meaning is not exactly similar to the view presented by Augustine's theory of particular picture of essence of language.

It is held in the *Tractatus* that any proposition presupposes the whole of language. "If objects are given, then at the same time we are given all objects. If elementary propositions are given" and "If all objects are given, then at the same time, all possible states of affairs are also given".[7] An elementary proposition is a combination of names, and in order to understand the proposition one must in some sense know the objects for which the

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name stands. In understanding any proposition at all one must know objects and all possibilities. Any proposition whatever carries with it whole of 'logical space'. The view is connected with the idea that ther an essence of propositions. The essence of propositions is the "essenc all description and thus the essence of the world".[8] The essence proposition is the same as the universal form of proposition. That there universal form of proposition is proved by the fact that all possibilities forms of proposition - "must be foreseeable".[9]

Language represents or depicts the reality of the world in the se of signified assertions. Elementary proposition is a picture of rea especially of state of affairs. In a picture a certain situation is depict The picture has the same structure as the situation. It is the way in wh the structure of the language pictures a possible combination of eleme in reality, a possible state of affairs. "Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* may called a synthesis of the theory of truth functions and the ideas that langua is a picture of reality. Out of this synthesis arises a third main ingredient the book, its doctrine of that which cannot be said, only shown".[10] In t opening line of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein states that 'the world is all th is the case'.[11]

Language is an instrument with which we describe the reality of th world. The limit of our language is the limit of our world. The point simp is that man cannot imagine a thing without language or beyond the bounda of his language. The language that a man possessed is used to map out th limit of his world. It shows that there is an isomorphic relation between th structure of language and the structure of the reality. This means a one-t one correspondence between the components of language and th components of the reality so as to depict the picture of the world. Th state of affairs or the facts are independent of us. Propositions cann represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection i language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logica form of reality. They display it.[12]

Wittgenstein further shows the relation between language and reality in the phrase: "What can be shown can be said."[13] This means tha something which can be said at all can be said clearly and what cannot b talked about we must pass over in silence. "The world of reality not only

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determines the truth or falsity of our assertions but gives content to them. Language is hooked on to reality all the time by displaying it in a form of common to the arrangement of facts."[14]

The above Wittgensteinian analysis of meaning is called the picture theory of meaning. But this theory of meaning fails to interpret all the uses of language. Thus, Wittgenstein himself rejected the picture theory in the later part of his work.

III

For the later Wittgenstein, the meanings of words are grounded neither in the external objects to which they refer nor in the internal objects, sensations, images, or feelings accompanying them. The meanings of words are given by the rules or norms that govern their use. Use, according to Wittgenstein, means necessarily public use and refers not just to a conceptual, linguistic sphere in a particular context, but also to the life form in which our concepts are constructed. And again, according to Wittgenstein, the rule or norm is not so much that which tells a person unambiguously what he must do. Rather the rule or norm is that which displays the sense or meaning of the action or practice, once it is carried out. In the *P.I.*, Wittgenstein came to know that the picture theory of meaning has certain limitations in determining the meanings of our expressions in some cases. The picture theory of meaning fails to solve the problem arising from the fact that we use the same expression in conveying different meanings in different situations and contexts.

Moreover, it also fails to interpret the meanings of the statement expressed by one as private language user. The Private Language Argument was developed in the *P.I.* This fascinating argument was intended to establish the impossibility of conveying of meaning in a private language. Wittgenstein gave more analysis on the possibility of meaningful expression of language. Wittgenstein tried to adopt a new approach of inquiry into meaning is his *P.I.* with a critical analysis of Augustine's theory. He opines that 'the meaning of word is its use in the language'.[15] This form of language is used in public. To determine the clear meaning of the word, Wittgenstein adopted a distinctive method of study that has been used to analyse the primitive form of language, i.e., the analysis of language-games.

The *P.I.* emphatically rejects the idea that each proposition carries

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with it the whole of language. A sentence does presuppose a 'language game', but a language game will be only a small segment of the whole of language. An example of a language game is the following, which appears at the beginning of the *P.I.* Wittgenstein gives a clear example of language-games in the form of relationship between two persons when they perform an activity. Wittgenstein writes:

> "That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is idea of language more primitive than ours.
>
> Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stone : there are blocks, pillars slabs, and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them our; - B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. - Conceive this as a complete primitive language."[16]

Wittgenstein called the words and the actions with which they are joined a language game. He said that it is complete in itself and could even be conceived to be the entire language of a tribe. If we think it is incomplete we are only comparing it with our more complex language. In the *Brown Book* there is an analogy of someone's description of the game of chess without mentioning pawns. As a description of chess it is incomplete, yet we can also say that it is complete description of a simpler game. This simpler game does not presuppose chess, nor does the part the part played, for example, by the words 'block' in the game its use in description or question.

The *Tractatus* assumes that there is a universal form of language, just as it assumes that there is a universal form of number which is common to all numbers. The *P.I.*, however, rejects this assumption. Wittgenstein discovers characteristic concepts of language in *P.I.* that there is nothing common to the various forms of language that makes them language. The language is an activity in which we speak or write whatever we think, feel and desire to communicate with the others just like performing an action or playing a game. One language can differ from another language. As there are different communities, there are different languages. Every language

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community has its own activity of language in which we learn to speak the words or sentences. These activities are similar with playing a game. There is not something common to all games. We are asked to consider the various kinds of games. There are, for example, board game, card game, ball game and the variety within each game. If we pick out a feature common to two games we shall find that it is absent from some other place in the spectrum games. Not all require competition between players and so on. What make all of them games, what gives unity to those activities is not some feature present in all games but a multitude of relationships overlapping and criss crossing. Wittgenstein says family resemblances are mere resemble of genus, not common to all the species. He writes:

> "And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
>
> I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblance'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-crooss in the same way. - And I shall say: 'game' form a family.
>
> And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a 'number'? Well, perhaps because it has a-direct-relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibre."[17]

Wittgenstein employed an analogy of a family resemblance. One can often see a striking resemblance between several generations of the same family. Study them at close hand, one may find that there is no feature common to all of the family. The eyes or the build or temperament are not always the same. The family resemblance is due to many features that overlap and criss-cross. The unity of games is like a family resemblance. This is also the case with sentence, description, and numbers.

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IV

Language-game is the fundamental method of Wittgenstein's analysis of language that measures the sense of an expression in the *P.I.* In trying to determine the sense of a sentence in the later philosophy we have to look at the use of the sentence in connection with a particular language activity. The same sentence can have different meanings depending on what we are using in different situations and contexts. The intended meaning of an expression can be fixed by looking into the manner how we use the words when we express it. Language is mere activity of use with many words.

The later philosophy of Wittgenstein as shown clearly in the *P.I.* is a coherent arrangement of his discrete ideas found in the prototype work of the *Blue and Brown Books*. Wittgenstein begins to analyse the philosophical problems from a new dimension. He thinks that we have a tendency to be misled by substantives to look for something that corresponds to them. Doing philosophy is an effort to answer many questions that come in our minds when they interact with the physical environments. There are a number of questions to be answered when we critically look at the world, such as what is time ?, what is meaning ?, what in knowledge ?, what is thought ?, what are numbers ? etc. and expect to be able to answer these questions by naming something. Wittgenstein formulated the technique of language game to break through the hold of tendency :

> "I shall in the future again and again draw your attention to what I shall call language games. These are ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of our highly complicated everyday language. Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of the words. The study of language game is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages. If we want to study the problems of truth and falsehood, of the agreement and disagreement of propositions with reality, of the nature of assertion, assumption and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear without the confusing background of highly complicated processes of thought. When we look at such simple forms of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears. We see activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and transparent."[18]

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The view stated in the *P.I.* has been considered as a turning point of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. In the later work, Wittgenstein changes the earlier view to a new a dimension while studying the concept of meaning. In the analysis of language, Wittgenstein deals with language into two ways in order to serve his own purpose. Generally we use language in the interaction among us as community based language. Through this medium one can communicate one's thought. The expressions of a thought in a language system can be interpreted within a community of language users. They can share the idea and check the truth value of whatever they expressed. We may use, on the other hand, the language at the level of personal purpose like the language written in personal diary, codified language of a group. It is true that language may be classified into two ways of using; one is the public language and another is private language. The public language is one, which is applied to our ordinary discourse. It can convey meaningful ideas because it is governed by a certain fixed rule, like practices, customs of a community of language-users. Using a rule while we speak a language is a must just as we use a rule of game while we play any form of game. In Wittgenstein's philosophy of language rule following concept has been given more important role to understand the meaning of an expression in a language. Learning a language of the particular speech community is to habituate to the use of the words or sentences and rule thereof. "To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."[19]

The rule of a language plays an important role in our communication system. For instance, a certain fixed rule is needed to communicate a meaningful idea to each other just like we need a rule while we play the game of chess. A successful game is guided by rule of the game. If some one disobeys the rule of the game, i.e., wrong movement of knight, the chess match cannot be continued with the pleasure of the game. Wittgenstein in his terminology calls it the rule following a language by learning the process of naming the objects and its varied uses of meanings in different contexts. By using this game theory, we can interpret the meaning of all our expressions. Thus, the expressions in a language have a meaning after we interpret them within the rule of the language. As the language is governed by the rules of language, other people should interpret the expressed sentences within this rule.

The meaning of language is determined by various functions of its

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words that we use in communication process. The function of language can be compared with the function of tools in a toolbox. Wittgenstein said that "think of tools in a box: there is hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects."[20] The language has meaning in their function as the tools have shown the functional meaning when it is used. The language users of particular language community can understand this function. When a communication occurred between two persons they should have shared a common language rule to be able to grasp the meaning of the words or sentences they speak. Wittgenstein thinks that a rule is required while playing a language-game, so that the various meanings of the language can be fixed in the function. Suppose if one violates the rule of the game there cannot be a meaningful discourse at all. Thus, rule following is an important criterion for the determination of meaning of an expression of sensation.

The words and sentences in themselves are dead-they are mere vibrations in the air or marks on paper, and as such have no meaning,[21] if they are not to be used as means of communication amongst persons. The symbol that has been used in a sentence has become meaningful only when there is at least a process of exchanging ideas and the symbol is important in determining the meaning. A philosophical analysis, devoid of the account of other people, will itself be meaningless. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are outcome of our misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the meaning, which is actually expressed by the language. "The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."[22]

Another more important aspect of Wittgenstein's criterion of meaning is that the competency of language user has also played a vital role while we are trying to determine the meaning of a language. It is true that the meaning of the words or sentence is also determined by the competency of the language user in accordance with the situations and contexts. We see, for instance, a 'blue' car and 'blue' light in the street. The word blue is the same but it signifies different meanings according to the context of using the word. A particular game of language is used here to signify the word in different meanings. In absence of this rule one cannot

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distinguish the different meanings of the word 'blue'. Again the phrase 'the red book' may have different meaning in the mind of other people because of their political leaning. Delivering a lecture to a group of farmers about space technology is a mere senseless noise but it will be meaningful statement to the student of physics. The change in the meaning of the same statement is observed in different situations and contexts and also according to the competency of different minds.

Wittgenstein maintains that the meaningful statements are only those statements expressed in public language that are shareable and testable correctly by the language users with reference to a fixed rule. He denies the meaning of the statements that falls in private language category. A private language is not governed by the rule of language. Therefore errors cannot be checked and it is also not shareable. There are some forms of language that have been used in a private manner. Such are code language, telegraphic massage, etc. etc. These languages are not private language because they follow certain rule. However, language in the form of introspective talk, dreams or hallucinations, imaginations are under the category of private language. They are not considered as language in the true sense of Wittgenstein's term by considering their meaninglessness and due to lack of commonly shareable rule. The private language is outside the purview of language rule and it dose not abide by any rule at all.

There are always doubts on the legitimacy of private language in so far as the conveying of meaning is concerned. In a situation one may be considered in duel forms - subject and object. Considering a person as an object of knowledge from the standpoint of other person, if he says himself, 'I am in pain' or 'I have headache' then a question may be asked here, 'Is the statement meaningful'. Wittgenstein is of the opinion that such expression is meaningless. This statement falls within the category of private language. Wittgenstein rules out the putative language speaker following the rules of his own language on the ground that there is no criterion for him to check whether he is following a certain rule correctly.

Form the above discussion it is clear that meanings are not *ipso facto* in the language in itself. To know the meaning of an expression in language is to interpret it within a rule that prevails in the speech community. For interpreting an expression the primary ingredient is the existence of speaker and hearer, that is, other minds to exchange certain ideas by

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following a fixed rule of language. Language is used to communicate to each other within a certain rule just like playing the game of chess. Thus in Wittgenstein's philosophy the method of *Use theory* is more perfect than the *Picture theory* in analysis of meanings.

NOTES

1. A. J. Ayer, W. G. Kneale et. al., *Revolution in Philosophy,* London, 1957, p. 8.
2. Michael Dummett, '*Frege:Sense and Reference,*' in Philosophy Through its Past, ed. Ted Honderich London, 1984, p. 437-38.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* London, 1961, section3.1213.
4. Henery Le Ray Fince, *Wittgenstein-Later Philosophy : An Exposition of the Philosophical Investigations,* New Jersey, 1977, p. 21.
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *op.cit.* section 2.223.
6. S. N. Ganguly, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus : a preliminary,* Santiniketan, 1968, p. 2.
7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *op.cit.* section 5.524 and 2.0124.
8. *Ibid :* section 5.4711.
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebook,* p. 89 and *op.cit.* section 4.5.
10. Norman Malcolm, *Wittgenstein : a memoir,* London, 1958, p. 8.
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *op.cit.* section 1.
12. *Ibid :* section 4.121.
13. *Ibid :* section 4.1212:
14. S. N. Ganguly, *op.cit.* p. 13.
15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* Oxford, 1958, section 43.
16. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *op.cit.* section 2.
17. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *op.cit.* section 66-67.
18. Ray Monk, *Wittgenstein, the Duty of Genius,* Vintage, 1991, p. 337.
19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *op.cit.* section 13.
20. *Ibid :* section 11.
21. George Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein,* New Jersey, 1953, p. 255.
22. G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy Since 1900,* London, 1953, p. 62.

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INDIVIDUALISM IN MARX

HAROON RASHID

This paper assesses the issue of whether Marx entertains any principle of individualism for explaining social phenomena. Although Marx himself does not offer any such principle, Jon Elster[1] argues that Marxism needs a specific methodology for studying social phenomena. Elster differs from that traditional Marxist on the question of methodology. He rejects Marxist methodology as methodological collectivism[2] and employs the principle of methodological individualism as an alternative framework for Marxism. He argues that Marx himself offers this framework for analysing social phrnomena. However, I argue that Marx never holds an individualist position, rather he attempts to make a unity between individuality and collectivity which is overlooked by Elster.

Elster finds that both methodological collectivism and methodological individualism tend to go together in Marx. On the one hand, in Marx's philosophy of history, humanity appears as a collective subject[3] whose inherent striving towards full realization shapes the course of history. On the other hand, Marx's commitment to methodological individualism is seen particularly in *The German Ideology,* which rests on a strong individualist and anti-teleological approach to history. Elster takes methodological individualism as the appropriate doctrine of explaining social phenomena, but he rejects methodological collectivism by arguing that it can never be a desideratum, it is only a temporary necessity. In methodological collectivism, as he argues, individual actions are derived from the aggregate pattern. Although Elster believes that methodological collectivism and methodological individualism go together in Marx, he observes a shift from methodological collectivism to methodological individualism, which he calls "shift from near-nonsense to profound insight".[4]

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According to methodological individualism, all institutions, behavio patterns, and social processes can in principle be explained in terms individual's actions, properties, and relations. It is a form of reductioni which enjoins us to explain complex phenomena in terms of their simp components. By methodological individualism Elster means :

> ...the doctrine that all social phenomena - their structure and their change - are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals - their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions.[5]

Methodological individualism, therefore, claims that all soc phenomena - events, trends, behavioral patterns, institutions - can explained in terms of individual's properties, goals, beliefs, and actions addition, it claims that explanations in terms of individuals are superio explanations in terms of aggregates. In short, reduction is both feas and desirable. The denial of methodological individualism is methodologi collectivism. While methodological individualism is conjunctive in charac collectivism is disjunctive.

Marx, Elster believes, is committed to methodological individualis Elster sees this commitment particularly in *The German Ideology* and *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. In those writings Ma never wavers in his view that the attraction of communism is that it w make possible the full and free self-realization of the individual. Elst attempts to show that individual has both epistemological and politic aspects and that both these aspects are related to each other within th Marxist tradition. He opposes the conventional way of thinking that Marxis is inherently opposed to political individualism and, therefore, epistemological or methodological individualism. He seeks to show th Marxism is compatible with both political and methodological individualis

Elster's notion of methodological individualism suggests a kind ethical individualism. In his view, Marx's commitment to methodologic individualism leads him to the view of ethical individualism according which the goal of communism is the development of men, not of man According to ethical individualism, ethical theories should be state exclusively in terms of concepts defined at the level of the individual individual welfare, individual rights, or individual autonomy. Methodologic

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Individualism is not in itself a substantive ethical view, it only claims that individuals are morally relevant. It claims that the advancement of knowledge is not independent source of value - it has value only to the extent that it is valued by individuals. Elster, thus, imputes individualism to Marx in this normative sense. He puts it in this way :

> Marx was an individualist in this normative sense. He appreciated that class societies in general and capitalism in particular had led to enormous advances in civilization, as judged by the best achievements in art and science. Yet this process was the self-realization of man rather than of individual men, who had for the most part, lived in misery. Indeed, only by the exploitation of the many could class societies create the free time in which a few could contribute to the progress of civilization. The attraction of communism in his eyes was to allow the self-realization of each and every individual, not just a small elite.[7]

Elster's view of methodological individualism is supported by Taylor.[8] Taylor says that Marx's method as 'methodological individualism' is a central and important theme of Elster's *Making Sense of Marx.* A central aim of Elster's book is to recover Marx for methodological individualism, to show that Marx seeks to provide his explanations of macro-phenomena with micro-foundations. He submits the whole range of Marx's ideas to critical methodological scrutiny by showing what is wrong with teleological and functional explanation. He shows us that Marx not only seeks to provide causal explanations of macro-phenomena in terms of individual action, but also tries to explain human action itself in terms of the actor's beliefs and attitudes.

Taylor largely shares Elster's methodological commitments and his view that Marx also (intermittently) adheres to them or at least that they are embodied in some of his best work. But he questions as to whether this makes Marx a methodological individualist.[9] In his view, Marx practises both individualist and structuralist explanation simultaneously. Individual's actions and properties can be causes of attitudes and beliefs. Attitudes and beliefs can be moulded by other's actions. But attitudes and beliefs can also be the products of the individual's situation or position in a social structure. Taylor argues that there is no general discussion of this kind or causality in *Making Sense of Marx* and no discussion at all of the notion

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of 'structural causality.' However, he believes, Elster provides a val
account of Marx's explorations of ideologies and in particular
explanation in terms of economic social position.

Taylor thinks that it is not clear form Elster's *Making Sens*
Marx how Marx seeks to provide structural explanation of certain k
of beliefs. Elster has almost nothing to say about the methodology of
writings which best display Marx's commitment to practising both kin
explanation simultaneously, namely, *The Class Struggles in France*
the Eighteenth Brumaire. These two brilliant essays show most cl
that Marx is neither just a structuralist nor just a methodolo
individualist.[10] I think Taylor is right in identifying methodolo
individualism as the central theme of Elster's *Making Sense of M*
But his view seems to be contradictory. On the one hand, he sup
Elster's methodological individualism. On the other hand, he finds
individualist and structuralist explanation in Marx. Moreover, he doe
provide sufficient arguments for his claim that Marx is both an individ
and a structuralist.

Elster's principle of methodological individualism is also share
Wolf.[11] According to Wolf, methodological individualism is custom
grounded on the ontological claim that only individuals are real; corporat
institutions, states, societies-all else are in some way aggregate
individuals. He shares Elster's commitment to methodological individu
for the ontological reasons. The ontological reasons are more compe
and more constraining than those arising from considerations of
requirements of scientific explanations. Wolf thinks that Elster is quite r
in saying that on principle we should seek micro-foundations.

Elster is severely criticized by many of his contemporaries[12] for
commitment to methodological individualism. As Slaughter[13] argues, Else
contention that much of Marx's most important work is characterize
methodological individualism is untrue, and that his assertion results fro
misunderstanding of Marx's writings, on the individual's relation to
society. The rejection of an abstract society is central to Marx's writi
In his writings there is an analysis of a particular social formation, w
historically specific relation between individual and society. But this histor
relation is not seen in Elster's critique of Marx's political economy.

Slaughter thinks that Elster sees only 'individuals' on the one

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a hypostasized 'society' on the other. Elster cites *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* but construes it only as a plea for 'ethical individualism'. But he fails to see that Marx anticipates the rejection of methodological individualism in his early writings. This rejection is central to Marx's mature work. Elster's superficial reading of Marx asserts the individual against society. Marx proceeds to be concrete about society, that is he counter-poses to a 'postulated' abstract 'society' over and against the individual.

According to Slaughter, it is precisely an ideological illusion of sociologists that the concrete totality of classes and class struggle (in which the 'individual' lives, works, and dies) is an abstract 'society'. The sociologist concludes either that only the individuals are 'real' or that in their interrelations both individual and society are essentially moral, mental or spiritual entities. Slaughter argues that society reduced to that sort of abstraction is always a historical, and the sociology corresponding to it is one or other form of functionalism. It cannot escape from the old dichotomy of bourgeois ideology; the autonomous individual on the one hand and social determinism on the other.[14]

Neo-classical economists (like Keynes) and Modern sociologists (like Max Weber) erect an economic model on the basis of certain 'desires and beliefs' (of the individuals) which defy Marx's theoretical analysis Contrary to this model, Marx's theory of political economy shows that desires and beliefs' are changeable, and that they come into being and change not arbitrarily but as a reflection of changes in the life of a society, a life which itself must be analysis, Such analysis, in Marx's sense, shows that there are mechanisms of historical change of society which operate without first passing through the consciousness of any of the individuals involved. In Slaughter's view, Elster's theory of social structure and social change will have meaning and appeal only to those who approach it from some standpoint other than that of having accepted his critique of Marx. Hence, Elster's idea that Marx is committed to methodological individualism will appear bizarre to anyone acquainted with Marx. In Marx's view, individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests.

According to Slaughter, it requires a critical treatment of texts to

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assert that Marx's insights into society are the product of so 'methodological individualism'. But Elster nowhere provides requirement. Therefore, one is driven to the conclusion that Elster m nonsense of Marx. Elster cites Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* on the rel of individual to society. But this text is written on the eve of Marx's 'Th on Feuerbach', in which for the first time he breaks decisively f Feuerbach's philosophical anthropology, built on what Marx calls standpoint of the isolated individual in civil society'. Rejecting Heg system Feuerbach celebrates the individual, but he is left with socie an abstraction. His non-historical (anthropological) materialism fai transcend that abstraction. But in *1844 Manuscripts* Marx is in the proc of breaking free of that abstraction.

The relation of individual to society in *1844 Manuscripts* is cen to Elster's 'methodological individualism'. In Slaughter's view, it is perv for Elster to rely on an essay referring to individual without taking account that in *1844* it is precisely the concepts of historical materialis Thus he argues :

> The whole construction on methodological individualism in Marx is a house of cards. Marx does not only assert that causal factors beyond the level of individual behavior and intention are real and can be analysed; he actually worked through the analysis in *Capital,* the methodology of which is ignored by Elster. In the *Grundrisse,* Marx was quite explicit about his rejection of methodological individualism.[16]

According to Wood, methodological questions, concerned with ty of social explanation, are especially prominent in Elster's writing particularly in *Making Sense of Marx.* In Elster's view, Marx is too oft guided by 'methodological collectivism' and employing 'functio explanations' of social phenomena. He avows himself an adherent 'methodological individualism', but he spends very little time address these problems, or explaining what 'methodological individualism' me for him. Instead, his efforts are devoted to criticizing functional explanati

Functional explanation is an attempt to explain behavior by t beneficial consequences for someone or something. Elster objects to t attempt, but he does not quarrel with intentional explanations (inten consequence of agent or agents). Wood thinks that Elster connects

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objection to these sorts of explanations with methodological individualism. But it appears to be confused or misleading (for Elster) to formulate his objections to such explanations as an appeal to a principle of methodological individualism. For Elster's objection to functional explanations appeals to the actual benefits of the behavior to be explained, rather than its intended benefits or consequences. His objection seems to be the same whether the actual benefits are those of groups or of individuals. As Wood argues, Elster's methodological individualism seems to serve mainly as a (misleading) name for certain objections he has to use of functional explanations in social theory.[17] He goes on to argue that 'methodological individualism' may be Elster's title for the doctrine that teleological or functional explanations are in principle illegitimate in social theory unless they refer to the intended purposes of individuals, but he has given us no reason for accepting methodological individualism in this sense.

Elster attempts to make sense of Marx through his principle of methodological individualism. Meikle[18] criticizes this view as making nonsense of Marx. Marx conceives socialism as the fully developed form of human society considered as a real nature whose lines of potentialities are retained in its value form. But Elster, argues Meikle, considers its value form to be its natural form, and believes marked economy to be the highest development of which human society is capable. It might have been a reflex of thought in the nineteenth century, but today it is hardly possible to conceive of a more Utopian belief than that world market economy is going to last for ever. According to Meikle, by rejecting the labour theory of value Elster rejects everything in Marx. As he argues :

> The labour theory of value is at the heart of Marx's theory, and its rejection entails the rejection of everything else of importance in Marx. Elster is consistent in this, and he goes on to reject everything else.[19]

Here Meikle wants to show that Elster is consistently rejecting the theory of surplus value and exploitation by an appeal to his principle of methodological individualism. Having rejected that theory Elster goes on to reject the theory of class. Thus, there is nothing of Marx to be saved. So, Elster's object is to demolish Marx by rejecting everything of significance in him. The only major things he finds it possible to agree with Marx are the things he mistakenly attributes to him (i.e., normative ideas

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of individual rationality and morality).

In "Reply to Comments" on his principle of methodologi individualism Elster disagrees with Taylor's view that structures have caus efficacy. Beliefs and attitudes about structures as a set of relations, ha causal efficacy, but (as he says in his book) methodological individualis does not hold within intentional contexts.[20] In his view, relations of productio cannot have causal efficacy because, in a capitalist society, any give individual is affected by these relations in two ways. On the one hand capitalist relations enter among the determinants of his motivation emotions, and ultimately actions, and on the other, his behaviour is constraine by his own relations to property and to other property owing individuals

Elster finds difficulty in understanding Slaughter's objections in h espousal of methodological individualism. Concerning the role of desir and beliefs in explaining aggregate economic phenomena, Slaughter seem to argue for two conclusions, which Elster thinks, cannot both be true First, Marx does not concern himself with such entities, and then he has starting point that desires and beliefs are changeable. Elster disagrees wit the first, but agrees completely with the view that Marxist analysis show that there are mechanisms of historical change of society.

In Wood's view, methodological individualism in *Making Sense of Marx* seems to serve as a misleading name for certain objections to the use of functional explanations in social theory. Elster argues that Wood ignores his explicit statement that there is no logical connection between methodological individualism and functional explanation, since the collectivis methodology may also be wedded to a causal mode of explanation, Wood argues that as a principle of biological science methodological individualism makes no sense. Against this view, Elster contends that one cannot overstate the importance in modern biology of the principle that the structure and behaviour of organisms must be explained in terms of their fitness - enhancing effect for the individual organism rather than for the group.[21]

For Elster, good social scientists must be methodological individualists. Functional explanations without micro-foundations of a methodologically individualist sort are useless. Rational choice theory is a very useful tool for social science. These are the reigning assumptions of Elster's methodological commitments. He believes that (as does John Roemer) analytical Marxism needs to use the tools of contemporary logic

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mathematics, and sophisticated model building. Using these tools we are to search for the micro-foundations, that underlie Marxian judgments. There are large portions of Marxist thought which are not simply functional but teleological. The only way to avoid the teleological aspect of Marx's thought, Elster contends, is to espouse methodological individualism. This involves a search for micro-foundations of Marxist social theory. On the basis of this general conception of social science, Elster particularly recommends rational choice theory, which he characterizes as involving 'strategic' interactions. The demand for 'micro-foundations' cannot simply be rejected. If human agency is an irreducible aspect of social events, then no explanation of these events is tenable which does not make claims about the intentions and beliefs. Callinicos,[22] however, argues that the claim that the explanation of social events is nothing but to provide micro-foundations is false. Moreover, it does not follow that (according to Elster) the premises of rational choice theory respectively denies the structuralist and the rationality principle.[23]

In Elster's view the alternative to methodological individualism is methodological collectivism. This position, Callinicos says, leads naturally to functionalism. If Elster is right, he argues, we seem stuck with the choice between methodological individualism and functionalism. If Elster claims that the denial of methodological individualism entails methodological collectivism, then he is quite mistaken. According to methodological individualism, the structures must be explained in terms of individuals. To deny this is just to say that structures cannot be explained in terms of individuals, not to say that individuals must be explained in terms of structures. All methodological collectivists deny methodological individualism, but all those who deny methodological individualism are not *ipso facto* methodological collectivists. All that the opponent has to say is that social structures have explanatory autonomy. To say that social structures have explanatory autonomy, argues Callinicos, is to say that they cannot be eliminated from the explanation of social events, not to say that individuals and theory attributes cannot be eliminated.

In Marx's thought, social and historical circumstances play a decisive role in the development of the powers and needs of individuals. But he does not deny the role of powers in social transformation. Marx, in his third *Thesis on Feuerbach,* claims that human beings are changed by

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social circumstances, just as social circumstances are changed by human beings; individuals are in part constituted by their powers, which they exercise in changing nature and society. He also claims that community is the essential nature of each human individual. By this he wants to mean that social relations are constitutive of individuality : 'I am what I am because of my relations with other persons.' We are unique individuals, but we owe our uniqueness also to our common activities and relations with other people. Thus, individuality and community are dialectically related, one cannot be isolated from the other. Community is constituted by individuality and individuality is a part of community.

I argue that Marx neither provides any principle of methodological individualism for explaining social phenomena, nor there is any principle of methodological collectivism in his thought. Rather, in his major writings,[24] he formulates a dialectical outlook according to which there is a dialectical relationship between individuality and collectivity, and that social phenomena can be explained both in terms of individuality and collectivity. But Elster, in his *Making Sense of Marx,* gives greater emphasis on Marx's view of individuality and accordingly he employs the principle of methodological individualism to Marx. Marx's view, therefor, seems to be misrepresented by Elster. The principle of methodological individualism seems to be a characteristic of capitalist society in the sense that it gives more emphasis on the uniqueness of individuals rather than on collective interests. Marx claims that capitalist society attaches more importance to the uniqueness of individuals, while communist society to general and social. He says:

> Even if in certain social conditions, everyone were an excellent painter, that would by no means exclude the possibility of each of them being also an original painter, so that here too the difference between "human" and "unique" labour amounts to sheer nonsense... In a communist society there are no painters but only people who engage in painting among other activities.[25]

Marx speaks of a synthesis of individuality and community. Such a synthesis, he thinks, is possible under communism. Capitalism, being based on the principle of individualism, cannot be a society of this kind (harmonious society), because there is a conflict of individual interests. In Marx's thought, individualism (the basic characteristic of capitalism) is comprised of two features-mutual indifference and selfishness. Individuals are uninterested

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in, and indifferent to, their fellows. Individuals interests and activities are 'private', pursued without reference to those of others. At the same time, they pursue their own self-interests, and are concerned with others only as the means of their own private gain. Marx opposes this kind of individualism as the characteristic of capitalism, but he does not deny individual interests which allow harmony of interests.

Marx believes communism to be a harmonious society, a society in which individual interests become harmonious, in which individuals develop harmoniously. That is, individuals, under communism, will pursue the interests of others, and will no longer pursue their own 'private' interests without reference to others, But Marx does not believe that individual interests will be replaced by a general social or species interest. Nor does he believe that differences between individual interests will disappear under communism. But he might have believed that differences could be resolved in a non-antagonistic manner and without resort to coercion. He might have assumed that communism is a society where each individual has a sense of himself as social and sees his society as reflecting 'communal relations' to others under their 'communal control', where differences between individuals could be settled in fair and just ways.[26]

Marx's emphasis on individuality, in any way, does not allow any principle of individualism, rather his vision clearly shows that individuals belonging to society, are dialectically related to social life. In that sense, every individual is a social individual. In his conception of alienation, Marx emphasizes on individual life by arguing that alienated labour alienates the species life (individual being) from man. He puts it this way:

> It changes for him the life of the species into a means of individual life. First it emerges the life of the species and individual life, and secondly it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form.[27]

However, Marx treats this individual as a social individual. It becomes evident when he says that the individual is the social being and his manifestations of life are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life.[28] Marx maintains that man appropriates his comprehensive essence in a comprehensive manner, i.e., as a whole man. All the organs of his individual being (thinking, feeling, experiencing etc.) are the appropriation

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of human reality. In *Grundrisse*. Marx clearly declares :

> The more deeply we go back to history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole; in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded in the clan (Stamon); then latter in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antithesis and fusions of the clans.[29]

In his view, the human being is in the most literal sense a political animal; not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other. In Marx's words : "Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always production at a definite stage of social development-production by social individuals."[30] Production is always a particular branch of production. But, for Marx, it is not only a particular branch of production, it is always also production in general (social product). It becomes clear in the following passages :

> The person objectifies himself in production, the thing subjectifies itself in the person; in distribution, society mediates between production and consumption in the form of general, dominant determinants; in exchange the two are mediated by the chance characteristics of the individual.[31]

> Thus production, distribution, exchange and consumption form a regular syllogism; production is the generality, distibution and exchange the particularity, and consumption the singularity in which the whole is joined together.[32]

In Marx's thought, abstraction can only be made from real premises of history, not from dogmas. That is, Marxism, in its interpretation of history, begins with real individual. Individuals are real in the sense that they are living, that they are engaged in social (or material) activities. This observation is quite clear in the following passages :

> They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.[33]

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> The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.[34]

On the basis of his materialist conception of history, Marx explains the mode of production (the material conditions of life) in terms of real individuals. The mode of production must not be considered simply as the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals, rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. Their existence coincides with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce. Hence the existence of the individuals depends on the material conditions of their production.

For Marx, real (or definite) individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into definite social and political relations. These social and political relations reflect the relations of individuals, and social phenomena can be explained in terms of these kind of relations. In the words of Marx :

> The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life process of definite individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they actually are, i.e., as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.[35]

Marx's view reflects a relation between individuality and collectivity. In the capitalist society, he observes, competition not only separates individuals from one another, but also brings them together. The alienated individuals form a class and carry on a common battle against another class. On the one hand, individuals are alienated individuals as competitors; on the other, they form a common class.

According to Marx, individual's powers cannot be transformed into material powers without the community. Individuals cannot obtain their personal freedom without the community. Herein lies the relation between individuality and community. Only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions. Hence personal freedom

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becomes possible only within the community. In the state, personal freedom exists only for the individuals who develop under the conditions of the ruling class, and only insofar as they are individuals of this class. In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.[36]

Thus, the communal relation into which the individuals of a class enter, is always a community to which these individuals belong only as average individuals, only insofar as they live within the conditions of existence of their class. This is a relation in which they participate not as individuals but as members of class. On the other hand, with the community of revolutionary proletarians, it is as individuals that the individuals participate in them. For it is the association of individuals which puts the conditions of the free development of and movement of individuals under their control.

The relation between individuality and collectivity is also observed in Marx's conception of labour in *Capital*. In his interpretation on the fetishism of commodities he argues how individuals labour forms the aggregate labour of society. As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities, because they are products of the labour of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of each other. The sum total of the labour of all these private individuals forms the aggregate labour of society. The labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour of society by means of the relations directly between the products, and indirectly between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relation connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear as material relations between persons and social relations between things.[37]

This view of Marx clearly reflects a unity between individuality and collectivity. Commodities are the products of the labour of private individuals. At the same time, private individual's labour forms the collective labour of society in the act of exchange. When the individual labourers come into social contact with each other in the act of exchange, there happens to be a unity between individuality and community.

According to Marx the labour power of each individual, by its very nature, appears as a social character of their labour. He pictures a community of free individuals in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the

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community. Hence labour-power becomes social rather than individual. The unity of individuality and collectivity becomes clear in this unity of individuals :

> Everything produced by him was exclusively the result of his own personal labour, and therefore simply an object of use for himself. The total product of our community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh means of production and remains social. But another portion is consumed by the members as means of subsistence.[38]

Thus, Marx's idea of the unity of individuality and collectivity clearly shows that it does not entertain any principle of individualism. Hence, Elster's notion of methodological individualism, which entails a kind of ethical individualism, cannot be accepted as an appropriate Marxist methodology. Elster finds a tension between the relation of individuality and collectivity in Marx's thought. But Marx's idea of the unity of individuality and collectivity shows that there in no tension regarding the relation of individuality and collectivity in his thought. Although Marxism allows normative idea. it cannot be said that this idea entails any kind of ethical individualism. Such a conception is not consistent with Marx's own evaluative judgements concerning socio-economic conditions. Therefore, the appeal to ethical individualism is inconsistent with Marx's ideal of the "truly human" or "truly social" individual who will, in his view, inhabit communist society in opposition to the individualistic (self-interested) principle of the capitalist society. Marx believes that human individuals will fully embody this sort of social or collective consciousness only in communist society.

NOTES

1. Jon Elster is one of the leading figures of analytical Marxim. Analytical Marxism is a recent trend in Marxist thought. It uses analytical tools of Philosophy and social science for explaining Marxist ideas. Elster's *Making Sense of Marx* is an example of analytical Marxism.
2. Methodological collectivism is the view that in social life there exists wholes or collectivities, statements about which cannot be reduced to statements about the individual members.
3. In Elster's observation, there are two main instances of methodological collectivism in Marx. In the analysis of capitalism, "Capital" appears as a collective unity, which cannot be reduced to the several individual firms.

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In historical materialism, "Humanity" appears as collective subject, whose flowering in communism is the final goal of history.

4. Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx,* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), 1985, p. 4. In this regard Elster cites Marx's *Grundrisse.*
5. *Ibid :* p. 5.
6. Elster cites Marx's *Theories of Surplus Value* in support of his view of ethical individualism in which Marx defines communism by the self-realization of men, not of man.
7. Jon Elster, *An Introduction to Karl Marx,* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), 1986, p. 25.
8. Taylor, "Elster's Marx", *Inquiry* 29, March 1986.
9. *Ibid :* p. 4.
10. *Ibid :* pp. 5-6.
11. Robert Paul Wolf, "Methodological Individualism and Marx" Some Remarks on Elster, Game Theory, and Other Thing", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20*, December, 1990. Although Wolf thinks that Elster's *Making Sense of Marx* (despite its many virtues) is fundamentally a failure, he shares Elsters' case of methodological individualism.
12. On Elster's *Making Sense of Marx* a symposium is held in 1985, in which Allen Wood, Cliff Slaughter and Scott Meikle criticize Elster's view of methodological individualism and reject it as a method for explaining social phenomena.
13. Cliff Slaughter, "Making Sense of Elster", *Inquiry 29, 1986.*
14. *Ibid :* pp. 46-47. In support of his argument Slaughter cites Marx's *Grundrisse.*
15. That is, mode of production, social relations of production, economic structure, class struggle and their interrelations.
16. "Making Sense of Elster", p. 49.
17. Allen W. Wood, "Hostorical Materialism and Functional Explanation", *Inquiry* 29,(1986), pp. 13-14.
18. Scott Meikle, "Making Nonsense of Marx," *Inquiry* 29, 1986.
19. *Ibid :* p. 38.
20. Elster, "Reply to Comments", *Inquiry* 29, 1986 p. 67.
21. *Ibid :* p. 68.
22. Alex Collinicos, *Making History* (Cambridge : Polity Press), 1987.
23. *Ibid :* p. 83.

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24. Particularly, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, The German Ideology Capital, Grudrisse* and *The Theses on Feuerbach.*
25. Quoted from Marx, *Collected Works,* Vol. 5, in Oladipo Fashina, "Marx, Moral Criticism, and Political Choice", *The Philosophical Forum,* Vol. XIX, No. 4, Summer, 1988, p. 297.
26. David Archard, "The Marxist Ethic of Self-realization : Individuality and Community", in *Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Problems,* J. D. G. Evans (ed.), (Cambridge - Cambridge University Press), 1987, p. 31.
27. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow : Progress Publishers), 1977, p. 73.
28. *Ibid* : p. 99.
29. Marx, *Grudreisse,* Eng. Trans by Martin Nicolaus (England : Penguin Books,) 1973, p. 84.
30. *Ibid* : p. 85.
31. *Ibid* : p. 89.
32. *Ibid*
33. Marx & Engels, *The German Idealogy* (Moscow : Progress Publishers), 1976, p. 37.
34. *Ibid*
35. *Ibid* : p. 41.
36. *Ibid* : pp. 86-87.
37. Marx, *Capital I.* Eng. Trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Engels (ed), (Moscow : Progress Publishers), 1984, pp. 78-79.
38. *Ibid* : p. 83.

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TRENDS OF MONISTIC MATERIALISM IN SĀMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

PRABHAT MISRA

Sāṁkhya is the oldest system of Indian Philosophy. T.R.V.Murti, after a good deal of discussion concludes : "The Samkhaya is admitted on all hands to be the oldest system, it is even pre-Buddhistic origin, if not in its final form. This is the dominant philosophy in the epic period. That all other systems, including the Buddhistic school, have arisen as a criticism of the Sāṁamkhya and that the Sāṁkhya itself does not show the influence of other systems, is sufficient proof of its early formulation".[1]

The Sāṁkhya system was in vogue at the period of Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Besides the Śvetāśvatara, the Chhāndogys, the Katha and the Praśna also show references to the Sāṁkhya. It may be thought that in the midst of vast Upaniṣadic literature, the Sāṁkhya was not flourished among the people like other later system. Scholars cannot find out the original text of the Sāṁkhya. This fact reminds us of the Cārvāka system. Probably, the role of Sāṁkhya was not satisfactory in the Upaniṣadic atmosphere. In fact, the Sāṁkhya dualism of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is opposed to the Upaniṣadic spiritual monism. Śaṅkara, the chief Upaniṣadic philosopher has employed sixty sūtras in his Brahmasūtra - Bhāṣya to refute the Philosophy of the Sāṁkhyakāra, his *pradhānamalla.* To Rāmānuja, the Sāṁkhya is anti-vedic. This reveals that the Sāṁkhya is, or, at least was at a time non-Vedic in its philosophising. It may be remembered that the original form of the Sāṁkhya has never been brought to light. We know the lamentation of Vijñānabhikṣu in his introduction to the commentary of Sāṁkhyasūtra. To him, the original form of the Sāṁkhya was *Kālārkabhakṣitam*; what remained of it was only a fragment. To K.C.Bhattacharya, "Much of Sāṁkhya literature appears to have been

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lost, and there seems to be no continuity of tradition from ancient t upto the age of commentaters."[2] The Sāṁkhya philosophy that comes of the commentaries, is clearly with Vedantic flavour. Vijñānabhikṣu w follower of the Vedānta. Anirudha and Mahādeva, two other commenta were Śāṁkarite. Gauḍapāda, in his commentary, has reduced the Sāṁk theory of plurality of *puruṣa* to the Vedāntic theory of non-dual *pur* The contention of the Vedas and the Vedānta is esentially spiritualis Inspite of all these, the Sāṁkhya system has been treated as the C enemy to the spiritual monist. It appears that if the Sāṁkhya were basically opposed to spiritualism (positively speaking, if it was materialistic in its philosophising), it could not be told to be non-vedic, co not be the *pradhānamalla* to Śāṁkara.

The Sāṁkhya concept of *prakṛti* may be compared with *boundless,* the infinite primal material substance of Anaximander, influential early Greek Philosopher of sixth century B.C. To Anximan all the worldly things and beings are evolved out of the indefinite bound and at a time dissolved into the same. The evolution and dissolution of world in the Sāṁkhya also is centered in the *prakṛti.* The boundless featureless, formless. *prakṛti* is also featureless and formless. The *gu* - *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* are the constituents of *prakṛti*, they themselves *prakṛti,* not features of it. *Prakṛti* is also active by nature li the boundless. But in the philosophy of Anaximander, we do not find concept of consciousness like *puruṣa* of the Sāṁkhya, essential for t evolution of the world. In the Sāṁkhya, the creative process of *prak* begins with the transcendental influence of conscious *puruṣa;* by me contact (sannidhimātra) *puruṣa, prakṛti* gives rise to the evolutes for t enjoyment and liberation of the *jivatma (puruṣa)*; the evolutes natura come out of the *prakṛti,* as unintelligent milk flows from the cow for t nourishment of the calf. Here two points are to be noted. First, the conta of the intelligent inactive *puruṣa* with the unitelligent active *prakṛti* cann be naturally justified. Secondly, the analogy is illogical. In the case of analog or analogical argument, we are to observe the similarity of same feature in the two objects. But one cannot find any such similarity between t cow and *prakṛti.* My point is that in the Sāṁkhya, *prakṛti* itself is the on reality from which its evolutes flow in natural process, so far as naturalis is concerned. The concept of *puruṣa,* the relation of *puruṣa* to *prak*

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the analogy of the lame and the blind man as well as of the flow of milk from the cow-all are imaginary fabrications of the later Sāṁkhya writers under the influence of the Vedic and Vedāntic thoughts.

The problem of causality is a long-standing controversial issue between the idealists and the materialists. Some deny it; to some, its reality depends on consciousness or some spiritual force. Denial of this law is indeterminism. Materialists generally acknowledge this law and apply it to all phenomena. Satkāryavāda of the Sāṁkhya is deterministic. Like an advocate of the materialistic causation, it holds that the effect must pre-exist in its material cause.

But from the available Sāṁkhya texts. We have come to know that the evolution of active and unconscious *prakṛti* starts with the influence of inactive and conscious *puruṣa.* Then we have to say that causation in the Sāṁkhya is somehow spiritualistic or idealistic in character.

Caraka's account of the Sāṁkhya is the oldest account of the system. In it *puruṣa* is not treated as a separate category ; *prakṛti* has been recognised as the only reality. To Caraka, the category of consciousness is the *avyakta* (unmanifested) aspect of prakṛti. This consciousness is, what is known to be *puruṣa. Puruṣa* is in *prakṛti.* Pañcaśikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being '*avyakta'* (a term applied in all the Sāṁkhya texts to *prakṛti)* in the state of *puruṣa.* In such circumstances, will it be wrong if one upholds that the Sāṁkhya is an advocate of monistic materialism in its recognition of *prakṛti* as the only ultimate material reality ?

Prakṛti is said to be a constitution of the three *guṇas - sattva, rajas* and *tamas.* To a physical scientist, matter is possessed of mass and energy. May not we compare the tamas with mass, the rajas with energy? A number of important physical principles stipulate that some physical quantity is conserved, i.e. that the quantity of it remains invariant over time. Early *conservation principles* were those of matter (mass), of energy and of momentum. These became assimilated together in the relativistic principle of the conservation of momentum - energy. Will it be wrong to compare the *sattva guṇa* with such a principle of momentum - energy as an unmanifested aspect of material reality ? In Caraka's account, *puruṣa,* the consciousness, is the unmanifested aspect of *Prakṛti.* We may grant this principle of consciousness as the principle of momentum - energy. And if this be the case, we may accept *Prakṛti* as the only single material

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reality from which the world has been evolved without the help of external conscious influence of *puruṣa*, which is said to disturb equilibrium of the three *guṇas* by its mere contact (*puruṣa-sannidhim*

In fact, some vetaran scholars have rightly observed that in Sāṁkhya philosophy *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, the two opposed and independ realities cannot really come into contact. Also the Sāṁkhya cannot justifi establish the existence of *puruṣa* as a reality other than *Prakṛti*.

As Chandradhar Sharma states : "But how can the two oppo and independent entities really come into contact. Sāṁkhya realises difficulty and in order to avoid it says that there is no real contact betw *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and that only the proximity of the *puruṣa*, only fact that puruṣa is near to Prakṛti (*puruṣa -sannidhimātra*), is sufficien disturb the equilibrium of the *guṇas* and thus lead to evolution. But he Sāṁkhya falls into another difficulty. The *puruṣa* being always near *Prakṛti* (for the inactive *puruṣa* cannot move), evolution should nev stop and dissolution would become impossible. Evolution, then, would beginningless and the very conception of *Prakṛti* as the state of equilibri of the three *guṇas* would be impossible. Sāṁkhya finds itself betwe these two horns of a dilemma - either no contact and hence no evolution else no equilibrium and hence no *Prakṛti* and no dissolution. In order avoid these difficulties, Sāṁkhya now posits the theory of the semblan of a contact (*sannidhimātra*). Of course, there is no real contact (*saṁjoga*) between *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, there is the semblance of a contact and it this semblance which leads to evolution, *puruṣa* is reflected in the intelle (*buddhi*) and wrongly identifies himself with his own reflection in the buddh It is this reflection of *puruṣa* which comes into contact with *Prakṛti* an not the *puruṣa* himself. But *buddhi* or *mahat* is reganded as the firs evolute of *Prakṛti* and how can it arise before evolution to receive the reflection of the *puruṣa*? To avoid this difficulty it is said that the *puruṣ* is reflected in the *Prakṛti* itself. If so, then liberation and dissolution woul become impossible because *Prakṛti* being always there and it being the essential nature of *puruṣa* to identify himself with his *reflection in the Prakṛti*, he would never get liberation and the main purpose for which evolution starts would get defeated. Moreover, the reflection being alway there, there would be no dissolution and so no equilibrium of the *guṇas* and hence no *Prakṛti*. Again, if semblance of a contact is sufficient to disturb

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equilibrium, then evolution itself becomes a semblance of evolution, an appearance only (*vivarta*) and no real transformation (pariṇāma of Prakṛti). Thus we see that in order to defend the initial blunder of regarding *puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* as absolute and independent entities, Sāṁkhya committs blunders after blunders."[3] The Sāṁkhya recognition of *puruṣa* by a set of arguments has also been challenged by the scholars. As for example, Prof. Bijoyananda Kar after a good deal of examination of the Sāṁkhya argument for the existence of *puruṣa* comes to the conclusion : "Thus all these arguments which are advanced by the Sāṁkhya philosopher fail to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. Their failure is mainly because they have become victim to the illusions of both logic and language. While they seek to prove the actual existence of *puruṣa* they employ most of the arguments which are merely formal in character and do not yield any conclusion regarding matter of fact. Further the type of *puruṣa* that is sought to be established by means of these arguments may not be the type of *puruṣa* which is described in other places (*Karika*-18, 19 and 20)."

The Sāṁkhya theory of evolution is said to be teleological it is *pariṇāmavāda* as opposed to the *vivaratarāda* - the idealistic theory of evolution of the Advaita Vedānta. The idea of *telos,* however, has, as if, been there in the *Sāṁkhya* to justify the impossible relation between material *Prakṛti* and immaterial *puruṣa* in evolution. But we find self-contradiction in the speculation of Sāṁkhya regarding the nature of evolution, so far the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* is concerned. *Kārikā* 21[5], for example, directly speak of the purpose of *puruṣa* and also of Prakṛti. On the contrary, *Kārikā* 57[6] has exposed the naturalism in *Prakṛtipariṇāmavāda.* Naturalism presupposes the mechanistic theory of evolution. If the Sāṁkhya be accepted as the advocate of *telos* in the evolution, it may, at least, be compared with the Darwinian theory of evolution. The so-called '*struggle for existence*' and '*survival of the fittest*' in the Darwinian theory can be taken as the underlying purpose.

That the *Sāṁkhya* is naturalist in its theory of evolution has been granted. The cārvāka materialism advocates naturalism in its theory of evolution of the world from the *bhūtas* (material elements). In his explanation of the Nyāyasūtra, W. Ruben has said that the *Cārvaka* and the *Sāṁkhya* are in the same line in respect of their acceptance of naturalism.[7]

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In his commentary on the *Mahābhārata*, Nilakantha has defini contended that the *Sāṁkhya is certainly naturalistic.*[8] Śaṅkara, in *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* argues that the *Sāṁkhya* must accept svabhāva the cause;[9] Of course, the Sāṁkhyakāra himself very clearly speaks of naturalistic theory of evolution of the Prakṛti when it compares the activity of Prakṛti with the natural flow of milk from the cow towards growth of her calf etc.[10] If Sāṁkhya be a strong advocate of naturalism theory of evolution should be mechanistic, not teleological. It is like Carvaka theory or Darwinianism. Of course, in the mechanistic theor evolution, we do not find any definite solution of the problem of *miss link* between unconscious and conscious. In the Sāṁkhya, however, solution can be sought. From material *Prakṛti,* first originates *buddhi mahat. Buddhi* is material as well as spiritual. Buddhi is originally mater but the tattva (name of the entity) itself implies consciousness. In *Tattvasaṁgraha* Śāntarakṣita has nicely remarked that in the Sāṁkh the primal matter is equipped with all potencies-from itself only the vari products are evolved and the essence of all these products is in that matte So the Sāṁkhya theory of evolution though mechanical is, however, someh advanced in its contention.

Atheism exposes another materialistic trend in the Sāṁkhy According to some, at the first stage of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, it advocat theism. But in later period, it turned to an atheistic system under the influenc of Buddism. But this is a debatable question. As on the contrary, it m also be said that at the first stage it was atheistic, but at a later stage in th age of the Purāṇs and the *Mahābhārata* it became a theistic system. I the *Yuktidīpikā*, the oldest commentary of *Sāṁkhyakārikā* there som sentences from which one may infer that the Sāṁkhya accepts existen of God. But scholars have opined that according to the Yuktidīpikākāra co may accept God as a *puruṣa* or *jīva* who is particularly distinguished fro the ordinary *jīvas* for his possession of extra power. The author of th *Yūktidīpika* has also frequently said that such a God has no role in th creation of the world. In fact, the *Sāṁkhyakarikā* itself does not utter single word for God. To Gauḍapāda, God is devoid of the guṇas; the world things and beings are possessed of the guṇas; so God cannot be the ultima cause of the world. The world has come out of the material *Prak* D.P.Chattopadhyay has consistently remarked : "In the Sāṁkhya philosoph

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the guṇa meant a constituent of matter. 'Being made of the three guṇas', simply meant 'being material'. Thus the main point of the anti-theistic argument attributed by Gauḍapāda to the Sāṁkhya is that God cannot be the first cause of the world, in as much as the world is material, while God in non-material, and the causal law demands that there must be basic similarity between the cause and the effect. Instead of God, therefore, *Prakṛti* - which is itself material - can alone be the cause of the material world."[12]

To Sāṁkhya, Madhavāchārya, Vācaspati Misra, Śridharaswāmī and others there is no place for God in the Sāṁkhya philosophy.[13] Udayana has refuted five types of atheism in his *Nyāyakusumaāñjali*. One type of them is the Sāṁkhya. Vacaspati has strongly proved the atheism of the Sāṁkhya in the *Tattvakaumudi*. His argument is mainly based on the 57th Kārika. This Kārikā clearly states that no guidance of any conscious principle is necessary for the evolution of the world; the evolutes have come out of the *prakṛti* naturally. In the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, Mādhavācharya contends that no conscious guiding principle is necessary for the *parināmavāda* of Sāṁkhya. The unintelligent *prakṛti* may be motivated to serve some purpose, e.g. liberation of *puruṣa*. Both Mādhavācarya and Vācaspati have tried to establish the Sāṁkhya view that the primeval matter with its *svabhāva* i.e. the inherent law of motion has given rise to the world. There is no necessity of God.

In the Sāṁkhya, the liberation of *puruṣa* from the bondage of *prakṛti* is the *telos* behind the pariṇāma. Vivekajñāna or the knowledge of difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* leads to liberation. But a dualistic system like the Sāṁkhya cannot speak of liberation of the self (*puruṣa*). In the spiritualistic Indian tradition, *mokṣa* or liberation is the realisation of one real or that real-realisation of the self by the self. At least it may be said that liberation is the realisation of the individual self of the great self. Is this great self *puruṣa* ? Then the proofs for its existence as found in the *Sāṁkhyakārika* 17 are not to be granted. These proofs are for the existence of *jīva*, the individual self, not for the *puruṣa*. And if the existence of jīva is thus proved, the liberation would be of the Advaita type. The Sāṁkhya, with its *prakṛtiparinṇāmavāda* cannot accept the liberation of the *vivaritavādi* Advaita Vedānta.

Another point, in this connection, may be noted. To the Sāṁkhya,

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liberation is the cessation of the three kinds of suffering; it is not a positive state of bliss. However, we suppose that cessation of suffering, the negative ideal indirectly implies bliss. Bliss comes from the *sattvaguṇa* in the Sāṁkhya. The *sattvaguna* is material, it cannot be possessed by the state of liberation, which is a spiritual concept in Indian tradition. Then if we say that the cessation of suffering or the attainment of bliss is the liberation i.e. the highest end of human life, should we not think that the Sāṁkhya, the most ancient philosophy in India upholds that the attainment of material quality (bliss i.e. the fruit of the *sattvaguṇa*) is the highest end of life[14]? As in the *Ṛgvedasaṁhitā* the most ancient philosophical literature of India, prayer for the attainment of pleasure-giving material property is very common in its different hymns.

The conclusion of this paper is this. Kapila, the *ādividvān* intended to bring out a materialistic philosophy of the world even before the development of Cārvāka materialism. But in course of time in the hands of Pañcaśikha, Āsuri, Gouḍapada and even Iswarkriṣṇa it took the shape of spiritualistic dualism, which is philosophically weak and unsound. As a result the Sāṁkhya had to face attack after attack from other systems and the later thinkers on this philopophy could hardly find out any logical basis for it.

NOTES

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5. *puruṣasya darśanārthaṁ kavalyarthaṁ tathāpradhānasya pangu-andhavadubhayorapi samyogastatkṛtaḥ sargah* - Sāṁkhyakarika 21.
6. *Vatsa-vivṛddhi-nimittaṁ kshīrasya yathā pravṛttirjñasya. Puruṣa-vimokṣa-nimittaṁ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya* - Sāṁkhyakarika 57.
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10. *Sāṁkhyakārika* 57, as referred above.

11. *aśeṣaśaktiprachitāt pradhānādeva kevalāt. Karyabhedāh pravartante tarūpā eva bhāvatah. - Śāntarakṣita : Tattvasaṁgraha,* Verse 7.

12. D. P. Chattopadhyay : *Indian Atheism,* Calcutta, 1969, p. 77.

13. i) *nirīśvarasāṁkhyaśāstrapravartakapapila - matānusāriṇāṁ matamupanyastam* - Madhavācārya : *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha.*

ii) *kṣetra kṣetrajñayoh saṁyogo nirīsvarasāṁkhyānāmiva na svatantreṇa - Śridhara - tīkā of the Gītā.*

iii) *na brahmopadānaḥ citiśakteraparināmāt, neśvarādhisthitaprakṛtikṛtah, nirvyāpārasyādhiṣthātṛ - tvasambhavāt - Vācaspati : Sāṁkhyakaika - Tattvakaumndi.*

14. Sāṁkhya explanation of suffering is materialistic. Of the three kinds of suffering, *ādhyātmika* includes intra-organic psycho-physical disorders. *Ādhibhautika* suffering is due to extra - organic and natural effects caused by men, beasts, birds, thorns etc. *Ādhibhautika* suffering comes from the planets, ghosts, demons etc. This seems to be spiritual, but really not so. Superstitions, insanity and psychological disturbances may cause such suffering. No spiritual dissatisfaction comes under these three kinds of suffering; then why should the Sāṁkhya seek after the so-called spiritual liberation. It may be the liberation in the earthly life from materialistic standpoint.

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PROBLEM OF CONFIRMATION

AMIT KUMAR SEN

Hypothesis about empirical facts which are of the form of unlimited generalization as 'All ravens are black' cannot be conclusively established or verified by observational evidence available at a given time because as evidence can be available on no more than a finite number of actually observed ravens and their colours, whereas the hypothesis is about all unexamined instances of past, present and future. Hence, such generalizations are not logically implied and conclusively verified by the evidence. The evidential relationship in which a finite set of observational data can stand to a hypothesis is therefore at best that of providing a support for or confirmation of, the hypothesis. Thus confirmation means finding out a finite set of observational data which may well be 'in accord with' the hypothesis. Here the relation between a finite set of observational data and the hypothesis is purely semantical relation in the sense that it holds between a sentence in which the hypothesis is expressed on the one hand and the extra-linguistic objects constituting the evidence for it. However, in logical studies, confirmation is viewed as a relation between a body of evidence formulated in an evidence sentence 'e' and a hypothesis sentence 'h'. This is exactly what is intended by Carnap when he says that confirmation is a logical relation. The problems as regards confirmation are (a) to determine the nature of the relationship, both semantical and logical, (b) to provide criteria of confirmation and (c) to see under what conditions the proposed criteria are satisfied.

Since 1940s, philosophers of science have focused on a couple of approach towards the problems of confirmation, namely, classificatory concept and quantitative concept of confirmation. Discussion of the latter invokes mathematical theory of probability and becomes technical.

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However, discussion of the former is less technical and more philosophical. We shall confine our discussion on the classificatory concept and would seek to determine the precise relation between an evidence sentence 'e' and a hypothesis sentence 'h' so that 'h' may be said to be confirmed by 'e' and to formulate the conditions under which 'e' may be said to confirm 'h' where 'h' is about an empirical fact. My discussion will consist of two parts: namely, 1) Nicod's criterion of confirmation and Hempel's formulation of the paradox which Nicod's criterion may be said to give rise to; and 2) my proposal for the solution of the paradox.

I

In his *'Foundations of Geometry and Induction'* Jean Nicod expressed his view about confirmation as: "Consider the formula or the law: A entails B. How can a particular proposition, or more briefly, a fact, affect its probability ? If this fact consists of the presence of B in a case of A, it is favourable to the law. 'A entails B'; on the contrary, if it consists of the absence of B in a case of A it is unfarourable to this law. It is conceivable that we have here the only two direct modes in which a fact can influence particular truths or facts on the probability of universal propositions or laws would operate by means of these two elementary relations which we shall call confirmation and invalidation."[1]

Thus, Nicod's view of confirmation is that a confirmation is always of the form 'this is both an A and a B', when the hypothesis is 'All A are B'. According to Nicod observation of a thing which is both A and B is a necessary and sufficient condition for the confirmation of the hypothesis 'All A are B' and observation of a thing which is A but not B is a necessary and sufficient condition for disconfirmation of the hypothesis 'All A are B'. Thus in Nicod's view observation of a thing which is A is relevant for confirmation as well as disconfirmation of the hypothesis 'All A are B'; observation of a thing which is both A and B is relevant for confirmation and observation of a thing which is A but not B is relevant for disconfirmation of the hypothesis 'All A are B'. However, observation of things which are not A is irrelevant, as they neither confirm nor disconfirm the hypothesis 'All A are B'. Thus in Nicod's view anything would be (i) a confirming evidence if and only if it satisfies both the antecedent and the consequent of a hypothesis, (ii) a disconfirming evidence if and only if it satisfies the antecedent only but not the consequent of a hypothesis and (iii) a neutral

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evidence if and only if it does not satisfy the antecedent at all. This view of Nicod is known as the 'Principle of Limited Relevance.'

Hempel points out that the applicability of Nicod's criterion is restricted to hypotheses of only universal conditional form. It provides no standards of confirmation for existential hypotheses such as 'There exists organic life on the moon' or for the hypotheses whose formulation need both universal and existential quantifiers such as 'Every human being dies some finite number of years after his birth'. "We note, therefore, the desideratum of establishing a criterion of confirmation which is applicable to hypotheses of any form.'[2]

Hempel's second criticism is that Nicod's criterion is not a necessary condition of confirmation. Let us take two sentences :

$$S_1 (x) [\text{Raven } (x) \supset \text{Black } (x)]$$

$$S_2 (x) [\sim\text{Black } (x) \supset \sim \text{Raven } (x)]$$

i.e.; 'All Ravens are black' and 'Whatever is not black is not raven'. Let 'a', 'b' 'c' 'd' be four objects such that 'a' is a raven and black, 'b' is a raven and not black, 'c' is not a raven but black (black shoe) and 'd' is neither a raven nor black (white handkerchief). According to Nicod's criterion 'a' would confirm S_1 but neutral with respect to S_2; b would disconfirm both S_1 and S_2; c would be neutral with respect to both S_1 and S_2 and d would confirm S_2 but be neutral with respect to S_1.

Hempel points out that S_1 and S_2 are different formulations of the same hypothesis, they have same content and so they are logically equivalent. But by Nicod's criterion, either of the objects 'a' and 'd' would confirm one of the two sentences S_1 and S_2 but neutral with respect to the other. Thus in Nicod's criterion confirmation of a hypothesis depends on its formulation. However, according to Hempel it is absurd to say that what confirms a hypothesis depends on its formulation, for then it would destroy the character of the hypothesis as a law for future predictions. It is absurd to say that a hypothesis is better because confirming evidence could be found and its equivalent in different formulation is worse because that confirming evidence does not satisfy the antecedent and the consequent of that formulation. Hempel further argues that a hypothesis to which Nicod's criterion is applicable, i.e. a universal conditional can be expressed in such a form for which there cannot be any confirming instance. For

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example, an equivalent of both S_1 and S_2 is (x) [(Rx • ~ Bx) ⊃ (Rx • ~ Rx)]. Let us call it S_3 No object can satisfy both the antecedent and consequent of S_3 because the consequent is contradictory. Therefore no object can confirm S_3. However, being equivalent to S_1 and S_2, S_3, should not only have confirming evidence, but also should be confirmed by exactly the same evidence, which confirms either S_1 or S_2. However, the evidence for S_1 and S_2 would not satisfy Nicod's criterion with respect to S_3.

To make the confirmation of a hypothesis independent of the way in which the hypothesis is formulated, Hempel introduced the equivalence condition, which he thinks, an adequately defined concept of confirmation should satisfy and in the light of which Nicod's criterion has to be rejected as inadequate. The equivalence condition is: "Whatever confirms (disconfirms) one of two equivalent sentences, also confirms (disconfirms) the other."[3] In other words, if evidence confirms or disconfirms any given hypothesis then it, with equal force, confirms or disconfirms any equivalent of that hypothesis. Hempel thinks that fulfillment of this equivalent condition makes the confirmation of a hypothesis independent of the way in which it is formulated and he argues that it is a necessary condition for the adequacy of any proposed criterion of confirmation. An adequate definition of confirmation, Hempel argues, will have to do justice to the way in which empirical hypotheses function in scientific explanations and predictions. However, when hypotheses are used for the purpose of explanation and prediction, they serve as premises of deductive argument whose conclusion is a description of the event to be explained or predicted. A valid deduction being governed by the principles of formal logic will remain valid even if some or all of the premises are replaced by different but equivalent statements; and in any scientific reasoning which involves certain hypotheses, a scientist is free to use any of the equivalent formulations of the hypotheses according to his convenience for the development of his conclusions. But if we accept a definition of confirmation which does not satisfy the equivalence condition, then it is not impossible to argue in certain cases that it is a right scientific procedure to base a prediction on a given hypothesis formulated in S_1 because a good deal of evidence has been found for S_1, but it is not permissible to base a prediction (for convenience of deduction) on an equivalent formulation of S_1, say S_2, because no confirming evidence for S_2 is available. Thus, according to Hempel the equivalence condition

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has to be accepted as a necessary condition for the adequacy of any definition of confirmation.

However, according to Hempel, Nicod's criterion is not a necessary condition of confirmation, it may be considered as a sufficient condition but in that case, we have to face a paradoxical situation. Hempel argues that 'a' which is both a raven and black confirms S_1 and 'd' which is neither black nor raven confirms S_2. If we confine ourselves to universal conditional hypotheses only in one variable like S_1 and S_2, then we get instances that would confirm the given hypothesis in Nicod's criterion. Hempel then argues that since S_1 and S_2 are equivalent, 'd' is also a confirming evidence for S_1. Thus, any object, which is neither black nor a raven, can be accepted as the confirming evidence for 'All ravens are black.' Accordingly, a white handkerchief, a green leaf, a red cow etc. would be confirming evidence for 'All ravens are black'. The paradox is that a black raven and a white handkerchief can confirm the raven hypothesis independently and with equal success. In other words, any non-raven can confirm the raven hypothesis. This paradoxical consequence of the joint application of the equivalence condition and the above sufficient condition of confirmation can further be expanded: The sentence S_1 can be shown to be equivalent to $S_4 : (x)[(Rx \vee \sim Rx) \supset (\sim Rx \vee Bx)]$ i.e. 'Anything which is or is not a raven is either no raven or black'. In Nicod's criterion S_4 is confirmed by an object, say 'e' such that (i) 'e' is or is not a raven and in addition, (ii) 'e' is not a raven or is black. Hempel argues that since (i) is analytic, these conditions reduce to (ii). By virtue of the equivalence condition, we have to accept any object, which is either not a raven at all or a black raven as confirming evidence for S_1.

Hempel himself has attempted some way out of the paradox. First, he examined two modified versions of general hypothesis and rules out as unsatisfactory. Secondly, he traces the source of paradox in a misunderstanding of the term 'evidence' and formulates his own criterion of confirmation, which, he believes, would not create any such misunderstanding. In explaining his first point Hempel says that it might be argued that general hypotheses in science have existential import and one might attempt to express the latter by supplementing the universal conditional by an existential clause. Thus, the hypothesis 'All ravens are black' might be expressed as $S_1 : (x)(Rx \supset Bx) \bullet (\exists x)\, Rx$ and the hypothesis 'All non-

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black things are non-raven' might be expressed as $S_2 : (x)(\sim Bx \supset \sim R$ $\bullet (\exists x) \sim Bx$. Clearly here S_1 and S_2 are not logically equivalent and of four objects, a, b, c, and d only 'a' might be regarded as the confirm evidence for S_1 and only 'd' might be regarded as the confirming evide for S_2. In this way one might avoid the paradox of confirmation. But Hemp rejects this approach on the following grounds : (a) The representation general hypotheses by a conjunction of a universal conditional and existen sentence would make invalid a number of inferences which are genera accepted as permissible in theoretical arguments. Hempel refers to t hypothesis 'All sodium salts burn yellow' and holds that 'what ever do not burn yellow is not sodium salts' is equivalent to the former according the customary understanding and usage. Since they are equivalent, on can be inferred from the other. However, when the existential clauses a added conjuncts, the two hypotheses no longer remain equivalent as consequence of which one cannot be inferred from the other. (b) Aga Hempel points out that in empirical sciences such reformulation of a gener hypothesis by a conjunction of a universal conditional and existen sentence is not permissible for a different reason. He refers to the hypothes 'If a person after receiving an injection of a certain test substance has positive skin reaction, he has diphtheria.' In the attempted reformulatio the existential clause may be 'persons' or 'persons receiving the injectio or 'persons who after receiving the injection show a positive skin reaction A more or less arbitrary decision as regards the existential clause has t be made here. And the difficulty is that every decision would give a differe interpretation to the hypothesis. (c) Finally, Hempel said that there migh be some universal hypotheses, which have no existential import and do no imply any existential clause at all. Here he refers to the theory of astrophysics from which a universal hypothesis is deduced concerning the character o the phenomena, which would take place under certain specified extrem conditions. A hypothesis of this kind, Hempel argues, need not and, as a rule, does not entail that such extreme conditions ever were or will be realized.

Almost in the same line of approach, Hempel argued that a general hypothesis might be reformulated by supplementing the universal conditiona by the specific field of application satisfying the antecedent of the hypothesis. Thus, the hypothesis 'All ravens are black' may be considered

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
about ravens only and not about non-black thing, nor about all things. In that case, the confirming evidence of the raven hypothesis would belong to only that field of application where the object 'c' and 'd' would be eliminated as confirming evidence. Hempel again rejects this approach on the ground that general hypotheses in science never involve the statement of a field of application and the choice of the field in a symbolic formulation of a given hypothesis would again introduce a considerable measure of arbitrariness. The hypothesis 'All sodium salts burn yellow' is not confined simply to cases of sodium salts; but it has some application in tests with negative results. It may be applied to a substance of which it is not known whether it contain sodium salts nor whether it burns yellow and if the flame does not turn yellow, the hypothesis serves to establish the absence of sodium salts. Thus to confine a hypothesis to a specific field of application seems to be an ad hoc measure which fails to be justified by reference to actual scientific procedure. In fact, hypotheses in science are continuously subjected to various kinds of logical transformation without any consideration of the changes in the field of application.

In developing his second approach of finding a way out of the paradox, Hempel says that the sources of paradox, do not lie in how a general hypothesis is formulated but rather in our dependence on a misleading intuition in the matter: 'the impression of paradoxical situation is not objectively founded; it is a psychological illusion.'[4] This psychological illusion is caused, he said, by two connected mistakes. First, we suppose that the hypothesis 'All ravens are black' is about ravens only and not about anything else. Secondly, we do not consider the hypothesis in relation to the specified evidence alone but instead we tacitly introduce a comparison of the hypothesis with a body of evidence in conjunction with our 'additional information that we somehow possess.

Let us illustrate the first point. The idea that 'All ravens are black' is about ravens only is, according to Hempel a mistake because when we say that all ravens are black, we impose a restriction upon everything whatsoever; we say that nothing is both a raven and non-black. In addition, if we do so, everything whatsoever is relevant as evidence to confirm the raven hypothesis. What Hempel had in mind is that the hypotheses with which we are concerned in science are really of the form of universal conditional i.e. a proposition of the form : whatever x might be, if x is R

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then x is B. If this were so, then indeed it is abo every x; it does impose a restriction upon every whatsoever, a restriction to the effect that it is n a raven, which is not a black thing at the time. To explain Hempel's position we may Venn Diagram : Here the unshaded portion of diagram is to be considered as confirming evidence for raven hypoth because it can be disconfirmed only by the shaded portions.

The second point is illustrated by Hempel with the help of ano generalization, 'All sodium salts burn yellow.' Usually, we do not consi a piece of ice to be relevant to this hypothesis or in other words, we do no think of confirming the hypothesis by holding a piece of ice in flame beca 'we happen to know somehow' that ice does question. Thus, according Hempel, to confirm a hypothesis by an evidence we are to take into acco the evidence alone without being influenced by any 'additional informatio Then our procedure of confirmation as Hempel indicates, will be as follo We hold a piece of ice in the flame; if we see that it does not burn yell we proceed further to see whether it contains sodium salts; if we find th it does not, the hypothesis 'All sodium salts burn yellow' would confirmed; but if we find it contains sodium salt, the hypothesis would disconfirmed. Here Hempel's demand is that we are to keep our pr knowledge about the piece of ice that it contains no sodium salt in suspens for the time being. When the procedure of confirmation is in this form, idea that a piece of ice can confirm the sodium salt hypothesis is nothi paradoxical. Now if we consider the confirmation of raven hypothesis a white handkerchief in the light of above procedure, Hempel's positi becomes clear. Actually, we know somehow that a white handkerchief not a raven and we know this perhaps even before we know its colo However, if we keep that knowledge in suspension, as we must in do logic of confirmation, we see there is nothing paradoxical in saying that white handkerchief can confirm that all ravens are black. Here we proceed in this way : we pick up an object and find that it is white (non-black); then proceed to see whether it is a raven; and as we find that it is not raven (handkerchief), we conclude that the hypothesis in confirmed.

In fact, according to Hempel, the fundamental enquiry of logic of confirmation is : What role an evidence plays with a hypothesis? Or how

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evidence is related with a hypothesis? We would hardly be able to swer these questions if we take evidence together with the additional formation that we somehow possess. For, if we take the evidence together ith additional information, we do not consider the question : what role an vidence plays with a hypothesis? Rather we consider a different question: hat role an evidence and an additional information play with a hypothesis? However, the only genuine question in the logic of confirmation is whether particular evidence has any effect on a particular hypothesis.

II

Von Wright has rejected[5] Hempel's approach of solving the paradox the ground that it violates the 'probability condition' of confirmation ccording to which the confirming evidence affects the probability of a iven hypothesis. He says that if a general hypothesis is taken to be about ll things, then of no thing can it be proved that the confirmation, which it ffords, is maximally probable relative to the bulk of previous confirmation nd therefore incapable of increasing the probability of the generalization.

Von Wrignt has taken up another approach to solve the paradox by troducing the concept of the range of relevance. The generalization 'All A is B' with the range of relevance 'A' (antecedent of the generalization) s different from the generalization 'All non-B is non-A' with the range of levance 'non-B' (its antecendent). Thus, 'All ravens are black' would a generalization about 'ravens' and 'All non-black things are non-ravens' ould be a generalization about 'non-black things'. Here the range of levance is called 'natural' with emphasis on the grammatical subject. nderstood in this way the two generalizations would not be equivalent. However, if we go beyond the grammatical subject and consider the logical ubject of generalizations, we will get logical range of relevance. If the ange of relevance in the raven hypothesis is specified as 'bird', we may et the logical range of relevance and the raven hypothesis and its contrapositive would be equivalent because in the contrapositive 'non-black hings' would mean 'non-black birds'. Thus, 'All ravens are black' and its ontrapositive would not be equivalent if we consider the grammatical bject (the natural range of relevance); but they would be equivalent if e consider their logical subject (the logical range of relevance). In the rmer case, the question of confirming the raven hypothesis by white andkerchief does not arise at all; and in the latter white handkerchief is

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excluded as evidence because it is not covered by the logical range of relevance. Therefore, there is no paradox.

Now, if 'bird' is the logical range of relevance of raven hypothesis a black kite or a white swan may be taken as evidence to confirm raven hypothesis. Moreover, if it were so, one may say that the para remains as before because if a white swan can confirm 'All ravens black', then we may say that a non-black non-raven can confirm same. To this Von Wright would say that though a white swan is non-b non-raven, it could confirm the raven hypothesis because it is within logical range of relevance. Of course, he admits that confirmation of ra hypothesis by a black raven is a strong confirmation and by a white swan is a weak confirmation. However, a weak confirmation is not the same paradoxical confirmation. Thus, according to Von Wright, a non-black raven can confirm the raven hypothesis if it is within the logical range relevance.

Here the problem is how the logical range of relevance would specified. Von Wright has no definite answer to this question and we bring the charge of arbitrariness here. As all ravens are birds, the log subject of raven hypothesis namely 'birds' covers grammatical subj 'ravens' but it does not cover the grammatical subject of the contraposi of the raven hypothesis because all non-black things are not birds. In former case, the logical subject goes beyond the grammatical subject in the latter case, the grammatical subject goes beyond the logical subj In fact, Von Wright specifies the logical subject by expanding grammatical subject of the raven hypothesis and contracting grammatical subject of its contranpositive 'Birds' can be the logical subj of raven hypothesis because all ravens are birds but it cannot be the log subject of the contrapositive because not all non-black things are bir My view is that, for any two equivalent hypotheses the specification of logical subject should be in accordance with one uniform principle, f otherwise it would not be possible for us to understand the proper relati between the grammatical subject and the logical subject of the hypothes If specification of the logical subject were arbitrary, then the acceptance of the solution of the paradox based on the logical subject would be equa arbitrary.

A.J.Ayer points out[6] that the idea of confirmation, which is at wo

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Hempel's paradox, is that of going through a finite set of instances. He holds that white handkerchiefs may be said to confirm a purely summative generalization where in the list of non-black things these (white handkerchiefs) are obviously included. The generalization is progressively confirmed in the sense that the number of instances, which are found to be favourable, is an increasing proportion of the total. However, from this point of view the paradox generating propositions are not equivalent (because they are concerned with different sets of things) and so there is no paradox.

But if the total number of instances is infinite, the proportion of those found to be favourable will not increase, however many are examined, there will be an infinite number left. Thus to Ayer, the question is : how does the idea of confirmation apply to open generalization, where it is not assumed that the number of instances is finite. Ayer holds that it applies only indirectly because open generalizations' range being infinite; there can be no scope in working through the instances. Open generalizations, according to Ayer, are confirmed through the confirmation of the generalizations, which are derived from them by restricting their antecedents to a finite number of instances. Here again the case of summative generalization comes up. Therefore the generalization and its contra positive will not be equivalent and the paradox vanishes. W.V.Quine[7] had suggested that the generalization that all non-black things are non-ravens is not confirmed even by positive instances, on the ground that the property of not being a black thing is not projectible. Quine holds that an instance of a black raven is considered in favour of the generalization 'All ravens are black', and thereby indirectly, in favour of its contra positive, but an instances of a white handkerchief in not considered even indirectly, in favor of the generalization 'all ravens are black' because it is not considered in favor of its contra positive either. This is because 'being a non-black thing' is not a projectible predicate. What Quine had in mind is that 'All non-black things are non-raven' has no empirical content and so it has no instance to confirm.

Ayer remarks that Quine's concept of projectibility of predicates will not serve as a solution to Hempel's paradox, because it does not cover enough examples. "For instance, the property of being invertebrate and that of possessing kidneys are considered equally projectible; yet it would

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seem strange to set about confirming the generalization that invertebrates lack kidneys by examining animals that have them and finding that they are vertebrates."[4] But he admits that Quine's point is momentous because of its bearing on a separate problem raised by Nelson Goodman. Goodman's problem is that any set of positive instances, which confirm a generalization H, will also confirm some other generalization with which H is incompatible. We shall come to this point later.

Now, if we consider Quine's view we have to say that hypothesis and its contra positive are not equivalent on the ground that the raven hypothesis has its empirical content but its contra positive has no. However, by rules of logic the raven hypothesis and its contra positive are logically equivalent on the ground that the two hypotheses entail each other. Here is a dilemma. It is reasonable to hold that if any two hypotheses entail each other they have the same content and the instance, which confirms one, equally confirms the other. Therefore, the root of all trouble lies in the equivalence condition. In fact, any reasonable criterion of confirmation and the equivalence condition which it necessarily involves should be formulated in such a way as to impose restrictions not only on the types of predicates but also on the types of hypotheses that we may consider as projectible. It is here we need to reformulate the equivalence condition which has been rejected by philosophers like Ayer, Goodman and others. We think that the paradoxical claim of white handkerchief to confirm the raven hypothesis can be set aside by such a reformulation of the equivalence condition. However, before reformulation of the equivalence condition let us throw some light on Hempel's satisfaction criterion of confirmation.

Hempel proposes[2] a 'satisfaction' definition of confirmation using concepts definable within deductive logic. According to him, a hypothesis is confirmed by an observation report if the hypothesis is satisfied by the class of individuals mentioned in that report. Let **h** be the hypothesis that all ravens are black, which is written as : **h** : For any **x**, if **x** is a raven then **x** is black. Now suppose we perform an experiment and pick out three objects, A, B and C. Suppose the out come of our experiment is :

(1) A is a raven and it is black,
B is not a raven and it is black,
C is not a raven and it is not black.

Does the information in (1) constitute evidence for **h** ? To decide Hempel

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introduces the concept of the development of a hypothesis for a class of individuals i.e. what the hypothesis would assert if only those individuals existed. The development of **h** above for the class having three individuals A, B, C is the conjuction of :

(2) If A is a raven then it is black, and
If B is a raven then it is black, and
If C is a raven then it is black.

Hempel suggests that (i) an observation report O directly confirms a hypothesis H if O deductively entails the development of H for the class of individuals mentioned in O. (ii) Again an observation report O confirms a hypothesis H if it is deductively entailed by a class of sentences each of which is directly confirmed by O. These two claims constitute Hempel's definitions of confirmation. In the above example the observation report is given in (1) and the development of the hypothesis **h** for the class of individuals mentioned in this observation report is given in (2). As (1) deductively entails (2), by Hempel's definition, (1) confirms (directly) the hypothesis **h**. Thus, the hypothesis 'All ravens are black' is confirmed by an observation report indicating that each of the individuals observed is something other than a non-black raven. Now it will be readily seen that the equivalence between the raven hypothesis and its contra positive is satisfied, since O also independently confirms the contra positive by virtue of entailment. The contra positive may now be regarded as projectible in the sense that it applies to the class of objects as widened by the new criterion of confirming evidence.

In fact, the problem of projectibility arises because of our undue emphasis on Nicod's criterion of confirmation where we try to find out the cases where the grammatical subject and the grammatical predicate are jointly exemplified. Quine has rightly pointed out such a criterion does not work where the terms are non-projectible. If the grammatical subject is our concern, then of course, we cannot confirm the contra positive. However, in the new criterion of confirmation we have shifted from the non-projectible grammatical subject to the projectible logical subject. The logical subject in the raven hypothesis and its contra positive is 'black raven' or the class of objects mentioned in 'O'. Thus, the paradoxical claim of white handkerchief is excluded.

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Goodman[8] will not accept such a solution. According to him, a necessary condition for any evidence to confirm the hypothesis of the form 'All S is P' is that it does not satisfy the hypotheses of the form 'No S is P' or 'No S exist'. Thus according to Goodman, a black raven will confirm the raven hypothesis but a white handkerchief will not because by not being a black raven it satisfies the hypothesis 'No ravens are black'. Again, the white handkerchief will confirm the hypothesis 'Everything is either black or not a raven' because it does not satisfy the hypothesis 'Nothing is either black or not a raven'. Thus, the possibility of white handkerchief confirming the raven hypothesis is excluded.

Ayer pointed out that Goodman's procedure should not be taken as a rule that no evidence confirms a hypothesis if it satisfies its contrary. This is because Goodman himself has shown that given evidence, which confirms a hypothesis of the form 'All S is P', we can formulate a contrary hypothesis, which a equally confirmed by it. Let us refer to Goodman's example, 'All emeralds are green'. He holds that the predicate 'grue' can be meant to apply to anything which is either examined before a given time T and found to be green or not so examined and found to be blue. Then any instance of green emeralds observed before T, which exemplifies the hypothesis 'All emeralds are green' also exemplifies the incompatible hypothesis 'All emeralds are grue. The same holds of the predicate 'bleen' which applies to anything which is blue if examined before T or green if examined after T. Here the two incompatible hypotheses are 'All emeralds are blue' and 'All emeralds are bleen' and the same evidence confirms them both.

Our point against Goodman is that hypotheses having logical or mathematical truths (which are necessarily true) such as 'All squares are rectangles' cannot have any contrary hypothesis because if a hypothesis is necessarily true, i.e. cannot possibly be false, it cannot have a contrary, where hypothesis which are contraries can both be false. Therefore, his procedure cannot be taken as a rule. The main point of Goodman is that the equivalence condition has to be rejected. As we have seen, a black raven, according to Goodman confirms the raven hypothesis because it does not satisfy its contrary 'No ravens are black', but it fails to confirm the equivalent of raven hypothesis; All non-black things are non-raven' because it satisfies the contrary 'No non-black things are non-raven'. Thus

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in rejecting the equivalence condition, Goodman tried to solve Hempel's paradox by preventing white handkerchief from confirming the raven hypothesis. Since a white handkerchief by not being a black raven, satisfies the hypothesis 'No ravens are black', it fails to confirm the raven hypothesis and so there is no paradox.

To overcome the raven paradox, rejection of equivalence condition is comparatively an easy approach. However, our approach is to maintain the equivalence condition in the one hand and to defend Quine's principle of projectibility along with Nicod's criterion of confirmation. Here we have to introduce three concepts of confirmation (i) Independent confirmation (ii) Direct confirmation and (iii) Indirect confirmation. In independent confirmation, an observation sentence confirms a hypothesis by virtue of entailment relation. The observation sentence 'a' is a raven and 'a' is black' can independently confirm both the raven hypothesis and its contra positive by virtue of entailment. By direct confirmation, we mean confirmation (a) which is based on entailment relation between the observation sentence and the hypothesis; (b) which satisfies Quine's projectibility criterion and Nicod's criterion of confirmation, i.e., which does justice both to the grammatical subject and logical subject. By indirect confirmation we mean confirmation (a) which is based on entailment relation between an observation sentence and the hypothesis; and (b) which satisfies the projectibility criterion of Quine i.e.; which satisfies the logical subject only and not the grammatical subject.

Taking these three concepts we may reformulate the equivalence condition as follows : (A) what independently confirms a hypothesis also independently confirms its equivalent. (B) What directly confirms a hypothesis also indirectly confirms its equivalent. A black raven would directly confirm the raven hypothesis because the sentence embodying our observation report of a black raven would satisfy entailment condition, projectibility criterion of Quine and Nicod's criterion. Again, such an observation sentence would indirectly confirm the equivalent contra positive of the raven hypothesis because here it satisfies the other conditions except Nicod's.

Against Goodman's point that black ravens cannot be considered as a confirming evidence for the contra positive of the raven hypothesis because they do not disconfirm the contrary, we may say now that

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disconfirmation of the contrary would arise only in cases of direct confirmation and not in the cases of indirect confirmation. When black ravens confirm the contrapositive of the raven hypothesis, they confirm only indirectly and so the question of desconfirmation of the contrary does not arise.

NOTES

1. J.Nicod - *Foundations of Geometry and Induction.* (Trans. By P. P. Wiener) p. 219.
2. C. G. Hempel - Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. (In '*The Concept of Evidence*' ed. by P. Achinstein.) p. 19.
3. *Ibid* : p. 20.
4. *Ibid* : p. 26.
5. Von Wright - 'Paradox of Confirmation' (incorp. in *Aspects of Inductive Logic* ed. by Hintikka and Suppes p. 216).
6. A. J. Ayer - Probability and Evidence.
7. W. V. O. Quine - Ontological Relativity.
8. N. Goodman - *Fact, Fiction and Forecast.*

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MORAL RATIONALITY : GAUTHIER AND RAWLS

LIPI SAXENA

The present paper is an attempt to analyse and examine David Gauthier's argument for his claim that any individual who reasons from non-moral premises to a moral judgement would accept on his choices the constraints of morality. In the course of my argument, I also reflect upon John Rawls's attempt to derive moral principles from the so-called value neutral 'original position' with the help of what he calls the 'veil of ignorance'.

Moral rationality concerns broadly with the question of giving reasons in justification of moral judgement. Reason is a faculty which is possessed by man and it distinguishes man from other animals. Reason occupies the fundamental role in logic, mathematics and the behavioral sciences. With a view to accepting or rejecting any scientific theory, good reasons and strong evidence have to be given in its support. There is no place for emotion and sentiments in so far as scientific enquiry is concerned. David Gauthier, John Rawls and other like minded thinkers argue that reason has applicability in morals also such that moral judgement is justifiable and thus rational.

I will first discuss Rawls's argument. According to Rawls, morality requires one to act rationally. He deduces a theory of morality from premises to which every rational individual would agree if they act only in their self-interest. He uses the theory of rational choice to derive the moral principles, his two principles of justice from a situation in which the choice of the principles should not be influenced by social and natural contingencies that would make some men recipient of special advantages. "They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association"[1]. The two principles of justice are

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(A) "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar system of liberty for others."[2] (The Equality Principle)

(B) "Social and economic inequalities are to be so arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."[3] (The Difference Principle)

Rawls argues that the principles of justice are the objects of rational choice. Any person would make this choice if he were called upon to select the basic principles of his society from behind a veil of ignorance concealing any knowledge of his own identity. The assumption is that one's sense of justice is likely to be influenced by one's social position and other specific contingencies of historical circumstances. Rawls, therefore attempts to find a position where such contingencies are non-existent. He calls this position the original position. It includes four main elements. These are :

a) The parties have a rational motivation. Each party has a desire to gain as large a share of primary goods as possible since primary goods are useful whatever one's plan of life may be.

b) The parties in the original position are subject to a veil of ignorance. The idea is that the parties are deprived of certain information. They do not know certain kinds of facts, for examples, their place in society, their class position or social status, their fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their intelligence, strength and the like.

c) The formal constraints of the concept of right. The rationale behind this constraint is that they must be satisfied if the principles of justice which the parties choose are to fulfill their role.

d) The best of the competing principles of justice from which the parties are to choose.

The veil of ignorance is required to ensure that "no one knows his situation in society, nor his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage."[4] Situated behind the veil of ignorance, the rationally self-interested parties would agree on the above said principles of justice which are unfair to none. The principles of justice

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are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair. For this reason, Rawls calls his theory of justice as 'Justice as fairness.' A just society, according to Rawls, is one whose basic structure conforms to the two principles of 'justice as fairness'. Thus, moral rationality for Rawls consists in accepting and adhering to the principles of justice as agreed upon by the contracting parties.


David Gauthier's project is to offer a better account of rationality in morals. Gauthier maintains that rationality requires that we comply with the dictates of morality; reasonability demands that we follow the moral principles. Unlike Rawls, Gauthier needs no veil of ignorance on the people who are parties to the agreement. His theory of morals by agreement is based on rational negotiations among determinate individuals distinguished by their capacities, situations and concerns of which they are fully aware of.

David Gauthier points out that in a world in which the conditions of perfect competition hold, the unconstrained pursuit of self-interest leads to "Pareto optimal results",[5] i.e.' the results such that no-one can be made better off except by making someone else worse off. He argues that in such a world, there are no moral constraints on action. A perfectly competitive free enterprise system guarantees the attainment of Pareto optimality. A world of perfectly competitive market would be on his account, "a morally free zone, a zone within which the constraints of morality would have no place"[6]. The features of a perfectly competitive market can be understood from the diagram given on p. 346 :

1) There is free entry and exit of firms. This means that there is freedom of movement.
2) The number of players in the market is unrestricted. There are large number of transactions, that is, buyers and sellers, so that individually no one can influence the price sought by the free play of forces of demand and supply.
3) There is private ownership of all products and factors of production.
4) There is absence of "externalities"[7]; we are not affected by the actions of others.
5) There is free market activity and mutual unconcern. No one is subject to any form of compulsion or limitation. No one is able to

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exploit the other person. Every person chooses for himself / herself what to produce, what to exchange, and what to consume.

6) There is no branded product. There are homogeneous, that is identical and standardized products.

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7) All individuals in the market behave as price-takers. This is due to the fact that there are enough producers of the goods in question to prevent any producer from setting the prices of goods.

8) All producers sell commodities that are identical with respect to physical characteristics, location, and time of availability.

9) There is cut throat-competition. The market is morally a free zone.

In our world, however, the conditions of perfect competition do not hold. "Were the world such a market, morals would be unnecessary."[8] In particular, the world is full of externalities; we are affected by the actions of others. Suppose for an example that some producers in the locality in the course of expanding their output, cause so much more pollution that it leads to pollution control legislation which in turn increases the cost of disposing waste materials for all other producers in the locality. The role of morality, then, is to constrain the pursuit of self - interest, although such constraints on conduct must be rational and impartial. Gauthier attempts to "validate the conception of morality as a set of rational, impartial constraints on the pursuit of individual interest."[9]

Gauthier maintains that moral theory is essentially the theory of optimizing constraints on utility maximization. He defends the traditional conception of morality by showing that the principles of justice that prescribe duties overriding advantage or the principle that constrain the pursuit of self-interest can be rationally justified. He underscores the need that our concern is to validate the conception of morality as a set of rational, impartial constraints on the pursuit of individual interest. On his view, moral principles are a proper subset of rational principles for choice. "Gauthier's claim is that in certain situations involving interaction with others, an individual acts rationally only in so far as he constrains the pursuit of his own interest or advantage to conform to principles expressing the impartiality characteristic of morality."[10] Thus, he writes : "To choose rationally, one must choose morally."[11] The constraints of rationality should not be violated. Acting by observing the constraints of rationality is to have morals by agreement.

Gauthier defends an instrumental conception of practical rationality according to which a choice is rational if and only if relative to the agent's beliefs, it is the most effective means for achieving the agent's goal. "Reason has a practical role related to but transcending individual interest, so that principles of action that prescribe duties overriding advantage may be

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rationally justified."[12] Gauthier uses rationality as a tool of bargaining to the pursuit of self-interest and to act morally. Rationality requires one to act morally. If we have accepted an agreement, then we must honour it for that is our self-interest as constrained by the conditions of the agreement. Gauthier combines both rationality and agreement. On his view, rational agreement can be reconstructed as a two-step process. In the first step, an initial bargaining position is determined. In the second step, an option is chosen on the basis of the initial bargaining position. Gauthier's argument is that "reason has a practical role related to but transcending individual interest, so that principles of action that prescribe duties overriding advantage may be rationally justified."[13] His enquiry leads us to a rational basis of morality, not of absolute standards, but of agreed constraints. He maintains that moral principles are "objects of fully voluntary *ex ante* agreement among rational persons."[14] Such an agreement is hypothetical but the parties to the agreement are real, determinate individuals. These individuals are distinguished by their capacities, situations and concerns.

There are two main claims in Gauthier's argument. The *first* is that the policy of constrained maximization is the most advantageous policy to adopt. Constrained maximization means maximizing our own utility subject to the constraint that we keep rational agreements with others who are disposed to keep rational agreements. In fact, constrained maximization links the idea of morals by agreement to actual practice. The *second* claim is that the rational permissibility of a choice is determined by whether it conforms to a policy that it would be rational to adopt. Gauthier constructs a theory of morality whose prescriptions are accepted and acted upon by any fully rational person.

Gauthier develops his theory of morals as a part of the theory of rational choice. His argument for this is that the rational principles on the basis of which we make choices, or take decisions amongst possible actions, include some that constrain the interests of the actor in an impartial way. These principles are essentially moral principles. Gauthier's theory of rational choice is an example of a normative theory. He argues that "morality can be generated as a rational constraint from the non-moral premises of rational choice."[15]

Gauthier uses the theory of rational choice to derive moral principles form a *morally neutral* choice situation. The theory of rational choice

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gets value as a subjective and relative measure. Rational choice is well defined for parametric environments; morality enters in defining it for strategic environments. The problem of rational choice is to choose a certain option from the available options and this option should be chosen in a way that is rationally acceptable to all the individuals who are parties to the agreement.

Gauthier does not inject moral premises into his conception of rationality; he derives moral principles from a theory of rational choice in which each individual pursues his or her own interest. On his view, moral considerations themselves are the result of non-moral considerations. Thus, he constructs his theory of morals on the basis of exclusively non-moral premises of rationality. His theory of rational choice asserts that moral principles can be derived from rationality. That is why he says that 'to choose rationally, one must choose morally.'

But are the considerations really non-moral. It seems to me that they are not. They may appear to be non-moral superficially. But an in-depth analysis shows that what has been termed by Gauthier as the non-moral premises of rational choice are in fact moral. Let us see how. For this we have to examine Gauthier's concept of the initial bargaining position.

Gauthier analyses the initial bargaining position by taking an example of the society of masters and slaves. The masters engage in costly coercion in order to force the slaves to do their work. The effects of coercion are suffered by the slaves. In such a situation, there is mutually advantageous bargain into which both can enter. The coercive component of the bargain can be eliminated. If this is agreed upon, then the situation will be somewhat like this. The masters will eliminate coercion and the slaves will serve their masters voluntarily. Gauthier writes : "What we need is a bargain with our slaves - we will free them, dismantling all the coercive apparatus that slavery involves, and in return they will voluntarily be our servants."[16] As a result, the costs which are incurred by the master on coercion will be eliminated which means that the masters will now be in a better off position. Also, the slaves will be free of the costs of being coerced which again means that the slaves will be in a better off position. But once coercion has been eliminated as a result of the agreement, the slaves will find it no longer rational to comply with the agreement, that they will serve their masters freely. This shows that although the agreement reached is Pareto

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improving, it is fundamentally excluded. To avoid this kind of situation Gauthier excludes coercion and threat point from the initial bargaining position. He indemnifies the initial bargaining position with what Robert Nozick calls a modification of the Lockean proviso.[17]

The premises cannot be said to be absolutely non moral. Why ? Because when Gauthier rejects the outcome of non-cooperative interaction which is marred by force and fraud as the initial bargaining position, he appears to invoke illicitly, a moral standard.

If Gauthier claims that certain features have to be excluded from the concept of initial bargaining position, that means these features are morally irrelevant for him. And to judge features as morally relevant or morally irrelevant is still to judge them morally. So, the premises are not really non-moral but moral in disguise.

The same is true in Rawls' theory too. Let us see how ? In Rawls' theory, the veil of ignorance plays a special role, a significant role. It is set up to screen off the morally irrelevant features like one's status, class position, intelligence, strength and so on. But again to judge features as morally relevant or irrelevant is still to judge them morally. The principle of relevance requires substance. It cannot be vacuous of content. It has to be a substantive principle. But substantive of what ? Well, it has to be substantive of certain values that we hold dear. This makes his initial situation morally loaded.

Rawls derives his principles of justice from a morally loaded choice situation. This is implicit in his requirement that the veil of ignorance is to be so set up as to screen out morally irrelevant features of the contracting parties. If this is so, it shows that the discussion of what is morally relevant and what is morally irrelevant has been reached prior to setting up the veil of ignorance. In his derivation of the two principles of justice, thus Rawls moves from some unverbalised moral premises to the two explicit moral principles. This is contrary to his claim that the veil of ignorance through which he derives his principles of justice is morally innocent. Thus, it follows that even Rawls is not able to derive moral principles from purely factual premises. Factual premises are already infused with a sense of value so as to give rise to purely moral conclusions / moral judgements.

If I am right in my thinking, then it follows that inspite of their counter

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aims, both Gauthier and Rawls seem to be moving from value loaded factual premises to value judgements. However, this fact does not underrate their theories in any way. Their theories still remain very important viewpoints within the liberal contractarian tradition as developed in the twentieth century philosophy.

NOTES

[* I am deeply indebted to Prof. Vibha Chaturvedi for her kind encouragement on pneparing this article.]

1. John Rawls, *A theory of Justice,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass 1971, p. 11.
2. *Ibid :* p. 60.
3. *Ibid :* p. 83.
4. *Ibid :* p. 139.
5. Pareto optimality / Pareto efficiency is a term which was coined by the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. A social state is said to be Pareto efficient when there is no feasible alternative to it in which at least one individual is better off while no individual is worse off. For a detailed discussion Pareto optimality / efficiency, see Edward Craig (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Routledge, London, 1998, p. 228.
6. David Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement,* Claredon Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 4.
7. An externality is something which is external to the firm. These are services and disservices rendered free without compensation by one producer to another. Externalities are of two types : (i) Good externality : For example, when a railway line is constructed between two stations, all firms across the railway line can get transport advantage in moving their cargo. (ii) Bad externality : for example, the dirt and filth discharged by the cluster of jhuggis in front of the posh residential areas which leads to pollution therby affecting the health of the people. Also it leads to depreciation in the value of the place.
8. David Gauthier, *op. cit.,* p.13.
9. *Ibid :* p. 6.
10. *Ibid :* p. 4.
11. *Ibid :* p. 4.
12. *Ibid :* p. 2.
13. *Ibid :* p. 2.

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14. *Ibid* : p. 9.
15. *Ibid* : p. 4.
16. *Ibid* : p. 190.
17. The term 'Lockean Proviso' comes from Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, Stat adn Utopia,* New York, 1974, who discusses it on pp. 175-82. The provi is stated in John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government,* London, 169 Second Treatise, Ch. V. paras 27, 33.

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THE CONNECTIONIST APPROACH TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE

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In spite of its short history, Cognitive Science has undergone radical changes with the emergence of connectionist paradigm as an alternative to the traditional symbolic approach. The connectionist approach is pregnant with various possibilities that some of its interpretations suggest a radical change in our overall conceptual framework. This paper is an attempt to provide an account of connectionism with special emphasis on its philosophical implication.

Classical Cognitive Science

Computer revolution is one of the factors that led to the emergence of Cognitive Science as a separate field of study. In a computer, algorithmic activity takes place over data structures and this provides a way to look at mind. It is possible to look into mind as consisting of representations and mental activity as computation over these representations. The assumption of representation as well as computation forms the central hypothesis of cognitive science[1]. This is called the computational representational understanding of mind (CRUM)

The research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) takes place through the attempts to model cognition. In order to model something, one has to have knowledge of the structure of what is modeled. Thus the study of the fundamentals of cognition and the research in AI go hand in hand. The two inquiries may be called complementary in that the computer metaphor has been of great use in the study of mind and the AI research cannot but look into the findings on natural cognition[2]. Otherwise, the very claim of being able to simulate cognition would become untenable.

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Though the representational as well as computational assumptions are dominant in cognitive science, the question concerning their precise nature has generated several controversies[3]. To say that there is computation over representation is not sufficient for a description of mind as it leaves the question of their exact constitution open. There has been a tradition of architecturally neutral research in which the question of what is at the implementational level is not addressed. But this is not satisfactory from the standpoint of the attempt to have a comprehensive theory of cognition. Also, AI researchers work on a specified architecture. The difference in the computer architecture gives rise to different conception of mind.

The first three decades of cognitive science were dominated by the symbolic conception of mind and this is called the classical cognitive science. Cognition is treated to be a matter of computation over representations, which are symbolic. This is in accordance with the notion of a physical symbol system. A system that can manipulate symbols and yet realizable in a physical universe is called a physical symbol system[4]. Since a symbol is one that can be interpreted to be standing for some thing other than the symbol, the number crunching machines may be considered to be manipulating symbols. The hypothesis emerging from this is that humans also use similar symbols and this symbolic manipulation is sufficient for intelligence. In the symbolic approach, the semantics of representation is transparent in the sense of having a one to one correspondence between the representation and the things that are represented. This approach may be called top-down, as it is oblivious to the implementational level or the fundamental level at which things are got implemented. The symbolic level alone is treated to be sufficient to account for congestion. Jerry Fodor's Language of Thought (LoT) hypothesis is an example of the symbolic conception of cognition. According to it, there is a mental language, which is innate, in which all mental activity takes place and this language is supposed to be encoded in the units of brain. The natural languages are based on this mental language. They may be even treated to be translation of the mental language. Capacities such as systematicity of expressions are well explained by this model. The language of thought is compositional and, therefore, it is systematic. But the very transparency of its semantics is also a source of its weakness. Apparently, meaning is holistic and context dependent. A one to one correspondence between a symbol and its meaning

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cannot account for these characteristics. Also, it lacks biological plausibility. There is nothing found in brain research which even remotely resembles a language of thought.

The aim of GOFAI was to build intelligent machines by means of making suitable programs. So it is the software that is considered to be the key to intelligence. Whatever may be the ultimate architecture, it counts little for the purpose of making the machine as intelligent as humans. But this project has not been able to go too far. No wonder, a new wave of AI research has arisen in the 1980s, which is called the neural network model or Parallel Distributed Processing. This is also called the connectionist approach.

The main motif of this new paradigm of research is that the better way to simulate human cognition is to build the hardware of the machine as brain-like as possible. This is how the notion of neural network comes into being. The extant knowledge of the brain suggests that it consists of millions of neurons which are interconnected. It is this network that is supposed to explain all aspects of cognition.

The origin of the connectionist model

The neural net developed by McCulloch and Pitts in the 1940s (M-P neural net) is considered to be a precursor of modern connectionist device[5]. It consists of several finite state automations. A finite state automation (FSA) is a device with input, output and internal states which govern the input-output relation by means of a transition function and an output function. The transition function determines the next internal state based on the input received. The output function determines what the output will be given the current input. In a M-P neural net the FSAs are linked in such a manner that the output of one becomes the input of the other. This interlinking is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a connectionist network. But compared to the modern connectionist devices, the pattern of connectivity of M-P neural nets is both simple and stable. Connectivity is simply based on the excitatory-inhibitory relation of the cells to one another. Also, the pattern of connectivity does not change over time. So there can hardly be an accommodation of learning in it.

The study conducted by Hebb on the properties of assemblies of cells has played an important role in the origin of connectionist modeling[6].

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The study gives rise to the Hebb's rule of learning. It is about the connectivity of various units. The rule states that the weight of the link form node *i* to node *j* is strengthened if *i* repeatedly participates in the firing of *j*. In connectionist networks, learning is explained by the change in weight among units. Hence the importance of Hebb's rule in connectionism.

Modern connectionism

Connectionism emerged in cognitive science as an important trend only in the 1980s. McClelland and Rumelhart's studies are considered to be the pioneering work in this regard[7]. They think of connectionist modeling after noticing that any ordinary human activity requires simultaneous consideration of various information[8]. This multiple level of constraints cannot be tackled sequentially as it would need enormous amount of time. But humans are able to do many things, which require simultaneous consideration of many factors quickly. This cannot be achieved unless the processing of information is done parallelly. Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) models capture this notion. Thus what gives additional credibility to the computational modeling in PDP research is that it is based on the knowledge regarding the brain processes. As has been stated earlier, connectionist networks are modeled on the brain. Though the information on the working of the brain is far away from being comprehensive, there is plenty of information regarding its basic working mechanism.

The brain consists of billions of interconnected neurons. Their main function is information transfer, which happens both intracellularly and intercellularly. There are three main structural elements to neurons. They are axon, dendrite and synapse. In axon what takes place mainly in intracellular information transfer. Dendrite is the place where information is received by the neurons form other neurons. Synapse is the connecting point of neurons where information form one neurons is transferred to another neuron. As the inter neuron information transfer constitutes the central mechanism of brain functioning, the changes in the properties of synapse is the way in which the plasticity of nervous system operates.

A connectionist network has various interconnected units. It is not the case that it has each and every element of a neuron. But it shares with it the basic mechanism of interconnected units. The information on how the brain process gives rise to various cognitive functions is far from comprehensive. Hence in connectionist networks an attempt is made to

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simulate cognition on its own. The assumption is that this may help to extrapolate information regarding the brain mechanism[9]. It is pointed out that there are five assumptions about computation in brain on which connectionist models are based[10]. They are : (1) Neurons integrate information. Though there are different types of neurons, all of them do the task of integrating information by means of accepting impulses through dendrites and if the input exceeds the threshold, it fires and information is sent to other neurons via axon. Connectionist models also consist of a number of units and do the work of passing information on the pattern of activity through input output mechanism. (2) Neurons pass information about the level of their input. The output level of a neuron is directly proportional to its input level. This is the case with connectionist units also. (3) Brain structure is layered. For any type of activity to take place, for instance vision, there are multiple layers in which the processing takes place and the final result is due to integration of all these levels. In a connectionist model, normally, there are the layers of input, hidden and output. (4) The influence of one neuron on another is dependent on the strength of connection between them. In connectionist network, the weight of the connection determines the level of information transfer. (5) Learning is achieved by changing the strength of connection between neurons. It is supposed that learning in human brain is due to change in synaptic strength. In connectionist models of learning, the change in connection weight results in learning the appropriate output.

The activities in a connectionist model follow some mathematical equations. A typical model consists of some input units, which receive data from the environment, and some output units, which give the result of the activity of the network to the environment. This input output relation is mediated by hidden units. As each unit is interconnected to one another, one unit activates another and this results in the final output. It is this activity that can be explained mathematically.

When a stimulus is applied to a network, some of its input units are activated. It is this pattern of activity that stimulates other units. The activity level of a unit is represented by the symbol a and the subscript of it shows which unit is activated. So a_j means unit j is activated. Suppose unit j influences unit i by passing information to it. The influence exerted is proportional to the weight of the connection between the two units which

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is represented by the latter w. It will have two subscripts. The first one represents the unit which receives influence and the second one represents the unit that sends it. If the weight is small the influence exerted will be negligible. The input from unit j to unit i is the product of the activity of unit j and the weight of the connection between them. That is,

$$\text{Input}_{ij} = a_j w_{ij}$$

The total input to unit i is the result of the sum of input from all units which send input to it.

$$\text{Net input} = \Sigma_j \, a_j w_{ij}$$

The relation between the net input to a unit and the activity level it produces is called the activation function. The simplest activation function is a linear relation between the net input and the activity level. But real neurons have a threshold level, which is to be crossed by the net input without which there will not be any activity in the neurons.

The most distinguishing aspect of a connectionist network is learning by weight change. If the response of an output unit is incorrect, then the connection among various units may be modified to correct that mistake. When this action is repeated, the network learns the correct output according to several learning rules.

There are eight important aspects to a PDP model[11]. They are: a set of processing units, a state of activation, an output function for each unit, a pattern of connectivity among units, a propagation rule for propagating patterns of activity through the network, an activation rule which explains the combination of the input to a unit and the current state of it, a learning rule which explains learning as the modification of pattern of connectivity and finally an environment in which the network operates.

In a PDP model, all the members of the set of processing units share equal status in the sense of not having any executive unit, which oversees the activity of other units. Models differ in treating the units regarding their representational capacity. In local representation, each unit represents a meaningful entity whereas in distributed models, meaning resides in pattern as a whole.

Since the network is the essence of a connectionist modeling, in order to know the status of a representation one has to look into the activation among units. Different models have different assumptions about the

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activation value of units. Anyway, processing in a system is the evolution of pattern of activity over the set of units.

In order to explain the underactivity among units, the output function of each unit is to be taken into consideration. The output of a unit is determined by its input as well as the degree of activation. The activation of a unit has to exceed a threshold value without which it cannot affect other units, i.e., emits output. It is the pattern of connectivity that determines the knowledge encoded in a system as well as its various processes. Each unit is connected to many other units and so the overall input to a unit is the sum of various inputs. The input may be excitatory or inhibitory and the sum is to be determined after canceling the inhibitory ones. Thus a matrix can be used to describe the connectivity to a unit which determines what that unit represents.

The rule of propagation is to determine the input to a unit. It is determined by combining the output of all the units connected to it and the pattern of connectivity. The activation rule combines the net input to a unit with its current state so as to have a new level of activation for that unit. The output of that unit is based on this new level of activation.

Learning rule is another important requirement for a connectionist network. It is modification of the pattern of connectivity that constitutes learning. The modification may be by forming totally new connections or by losing the existing ones or by strengthening or lessening the already existing connections. It is pointed out that almost all learning rules may be considered to be simply variants of the Hebb rule[12]. To put it simply, the rule is that the weight of the connection between two units is modified by the input-output transaction between them.

The representation of the environment in which the model exists is also needed for the proper functioning of a model. In PDP model the environment is represented as the time varying stochastic function over the space of input pattern. That means, at any point of time, it is supposed that there is some probability that any input pattern impinges on the input units.

Apart from these, PDP models have to satisfy the constraints based on the extant knowledge regarding the neural process and our intuitions on the psychological operation[13]. So the hardware in which PDP models are

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implemented have to be as brain like as possible. This is a constraint because the tasks in which simulation of human action is the goal, the overall speed had to be limited so as to be in tune with the speed of neurons[14]. Speed of neurons is considerably less than that of the computer. The operation of neuron is reckoned in terms of milliseconds whereas that of a computer is in terms of nanoseconds.

A learning model

As knowledge itself is stored as connection weights, learning in a neural network is a matter of modification of connection weights. This has interesting implications on the nativist theory of knowledge acquisition. Since it is the language acquisition that has got the most famous nativist explanation due to the poverty of stimulus argument of Noam Chomsky, a language learning model is considered here.

In the rationalist conception, learning is simply a matter of rule following, which is by and large, innate. It is called the 'explicit rule formulation tradition'[15]. For instance, consider models of reading aloud. This is obviously something learned in the sense of appearing at a particular stage in ontogenetic development. It is the ability to match letter strings to an oral vocabulary. In the case of English vocabulary, pronunciation is more difficult as sometimes it does not allow fully generalized behavior. For instance, AVE in SAVE and HAVE are pronounced differently. So in traditional models there are both general pronunciation rules and specific ones to capture deviations and these are programmed into it. It is pointed out that traditional models give primacy to words and consequently to a set of general rules of pronunciation[16].

Connectionist models do not share these assumptions. Since the whole of information is distributed, there is no place for a specific lexicon in it. Knowledge in a connectionist network is nothing but the weight of the connections among individual units. Hence there is no sense in speaking of encapsulated modules. What is required for reading aloud is the mapping from one domain to another domain. This can be had as a matter of changing the connection weights through training.

Seidenberg and McClelland presented a model, which is capable of pronoucing all monosyllabic words in English language[17]. It makes use of the backpropagation algorithm which is used for correcting the output and

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thereby training the network. The model consists of four hundred input units, which map into four hundred and sixty output units. The mapping is through two hundred hidden units[18]. The letter presented to the model activate the input units. The units in turn activate other units according to the equations explained in a previous section[19]. This eventually results in the output. If there is an error in the output, it is corrected by modifying the appropriate weight. Repeated modification results in the learning of correct pronunciation. What achieves this remarkable ability without any explicit rules of the traditional type is the fact that the response to any input is a function of the network's entire experience. This explains how learning occurs as a result of training.

It is not the case that this model has been able to have all the abilities associated with pronunciation that a typical adult speaker has. For instance, the model faces difficulty in distinguishing words from non-words. The total linguistic knowledge that an adult has is lacking in it. Hence such defects are not unexpected. The significance of the models is that it opens a new vista, which undermines the assumption that without the help of explicit rules no language learning is possible.

Representation and hybrid models

The notion of representation plays a key role in the study of mind because it is what is supposed to distinguish cognitive systems from other system. That means, a system becomes cognitive when it represents other states. As has been noted in the beginning, the assumptions of computation and representation form basic framework of cognitive science. For the classical cognitive science, the notion of representation has its roots in the natural language meaning. The common sensical notion of meaning is that words refer to things and thereby they acquire meaning. An isomorphic word-world relation is implicitly accepted here. The Language of Thought (LoT) hypothesis is that thought takes place in a mental language and it is physically realised in the brain. Propositional attitudes are computational relations to mental representations and these mental representations form a symbol system. Mental processes are considered to be causal processes over the explicit tokening of symbols. These processes are sensitive to the syntactic properties of the architecture.

What distinguishes connectionism is its neutrality towards various ontological positions. As McLaughlin points out, it can be interpreted both

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for and against folk psychology[20]. Eliminativists such as the Churchlands build up their position based on neural networks whereas Horgan and Tienson see connectionist models to be a way for vindicating folk psychology. But it is to be noticed that even the hard core Eliminativists do not eliminate folk psychological categories fully[21]. There is the acceptance of unavoidable use of them in our day to day life. The beginning of any study of cognition is based on our common sensical commitments. Hence the predominant view of connectionism is that it has the property of representation. Rumelhert and McClelland says "PDPs are explicitly concerned with the problem of internal representation.[22]" Moreover, Newell's view that manipulation of symbols is central to intelligence has not yet been over thrown. To symbolize is to represent. All this makes it essential to have a look at the connectionist treatment of representation.

With regard to the treatment of representation, a sharp distinction between connectionist and symbolic approaches can be observed. This is the case if the networks are treated either as eliminating representation or as representing in a different way.

LoT hypothesis accepts the notion of explicit representation and inner code. As Andy Clark points out these things are unclear[23]. Even though explicit representation is useful to explain systematicity and productivity, the very notion is far away from biological plausibility. There is little possibility of finding out any thing similar to inner codes in brain research. But Connectionist networks are directly modeled on the actual human brain.

There are two types of representation in a connectionist network, local and distributed[24]. In the former, each unit is assigned a pattern whereas in the latter, knowledge about a pattern is distributed among several units. It is distributed representation that has got more attention in connectionist research. A pattern associator is a common type of distributed mode. Consider one in which the input is in the form of visual content and output is its olfactory properties. Let us say that A units are activated by vision and B units are activated by olfactory system. The pattern of connection is such that whenever a visual stimulus is given, the smell of it is given as the output. Here the representation of visual stimulus and its color are said to be distributed because the input output relation is determined by the pattern of activation and the various connection strengths. There is nothing more

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to knowledge and represention than these inter connections.

These connectionist claims are widely disputed. Of them, the most famous one is that of Jerry Fodor and Pylyshyn[25]. The crux of their argument is that since connectionist representations do not have constituent parts, it cannot explain systematicity, productivity etc. which are characteristics of human cognition. Systematicity is exemplified in the fact that a man who can represent the proposition 'John loves Mary' can also represent the proposition 'Mary loves John'. This is because 'John', 'loves' and 'Mary' are constituent parts of both propositions. The meaning of the whole proposition is a function of these parts. Productivity of new propositions can also be explained by compositionality. Since connectionist networks do not have such constituent parts, they cannot explain these phenomena which are central to human cognition.

It may be argued that nodes of a network are constituent parts. But Fodor and Pylyshyn point out that this is hardly acceptable because the relation between nodes is only causal, not syntactic or semantic. Hence nodes cannot be treated to be compositional parts. Thus they reach the conclusion that connectionist networks are not at the cognitive level. They can at most be considered to be mere implementation of the cognitive faculties.

As far as available research results show, connectionist networks are good at tasks such as pattern recognition which humans share with most of the other animals. But when it comes to the matter of modeling capacities such as systematic reasoning which are supposed to be unique to humans, these models work poorly. With regard to human brain it is obvious that, normally, it is much worse that even a simple calculator in arithmetic. But when it comes to a task such as vision, no super computer has been able to have even a poor modeling of human ability.

There is an explanation given to this nature of human brain in evolutionary theory. The basic purpose of the brain is to help the organism in its survival. So the brain is more adept at what are more important for the survival of the organism. A computer being designed does not have such constraints[26]. Evolutionary theory provides a new twist to cognitive modeling[27]. Evolutionary changes do not take place in a vacuum. Newly emergent faculties co-exist with the older ones. The change is not only gradual but also incremental. So it may be the case that connectionists,

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while speaking of their modeling being based on neuronal connections overlook many other aspects of brain, which are there due to various evolutionary changes.

Whereas connectionist models have the positive features of inherent learning capability, generalization capability, content addressability, fault and noise tolerance, tolerance towards information over load etc. which are all central for human cognition, they have the limitations of small range of problem domains, poor explanation capabilities, poor serial processing difficulties with structured representation and lack of compositionality[28]. The limitations are due to the fact that, since its working is parallel, it cannot capture high cognitive processes, which require serial attention.

This leads to the notion of hybrid modeling. Since tasks such as logical reasoning are supposed to have appeared late in the evolutionary process, it may be the case that the connectionist networks cannot capture them because they are based on the early stage of human brain. It is pointed out that the neural basis of connectionist network is mainly neo cortex[29]. The basic structure is still there, but it might have achieved some properties, which explain the tasks requiring symbol manipulation.

Hybrid models try to capture both tasks such as pattern recognition and those requiring symbol manipulation. One of the main inspirations for hybrid modeling is the evolutionary theory in which incremental growth is supposed to occur. The newly developed capacities do not replace the old ones, but co-exist with them. Hence it would not be appropriate to focus on only one level. The basic rationale for research on hybrid systems is that right tool be given to do the right job.

An expert system, which solves high school physics problems developed by Lambert, is a hybrid system[30]. The system gradually moves from goal driven processing to data driven processing. This shift tantamount to the shift from the novice to the expert. When there is a transition from implicit automatised skills to explicit formalized cultural knowledge, the system may be said to be able to manipulating symbols and, therefore, hybrid.

Smolensky has the notion of subsymbolic paradigm to explain the hybrid nature of some systems[31]. He argues that symbolic paradigm overlooks the neural level. It is at the coarse level only so what is at the

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fine-grained level is not at all considered. As has been pointed out in a previous paragraph, evolution takes place incrementally and, therefore, overlooking the primitive levels will be at the expense of comprehensiveness. A similar defect can be observed in ordinary connectionist networks also due to which they are poor at some tasks.

In the subsymbolic paradigm that Smolensky articulates, there is an intermediate level between neural structures and symbol structures called the sub conceptual level. His thesis is that connectionist networks are essentially at the sub conceptual level. The method of Smolensky is to abstract from neural structures so as to formalize cognition. He argues that the relation between symbolic paradigm and that of subsymbolic is similar to that of Newtonian mechanics and Quantum mechanics. In both cases, the former provides only an approximate description of the phenomena concerned whereas the latter give a more accurate on.

Unlike symbolic models, subsymbolic ones have two layers, which are of equal importance, Smolensky considers this to be an important difference that leads to a more holistic treatment of cognition. The level of individual units is that of implementation and the level of pattern of activation contains the semantically interpretable entities. This is a sharp deviation from the symbolic ones. There are two kinds of variables : an activation level for each of the units and a connection strength for each of the links. The rules that govern the activity of these are differential equations. He contends that the difference between parallel and serial computation can be explained by the time that is needed for processing. Significant changes in the activation level takes place only in the order of about 100 milliseconds. So the processing that takes place with less than this time can be treated to be parallel. For processing like problem solving, the time needed is in the order of seconds. This can be called serial. Thus the same network accommodates both parallel and serial processing. There is no inherent incompatibility between symbolic and connectionist paradigms. The former may be viewed as a special case of the former.

In subsymbolic, the whole process is continuous in contrast with the discrete nature of symbolic modeling. Thus the constraints operating in subsymbolic networks are soft in the sense of not being the strict logical rules whereas symbolic models are said to be having hard constraints. The constraints are in the form of excitatory-inhibitory connections among the

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units.

Smolensky tries to explain characteristics such as systematicity in his scheme. As mental representations are activity vectors over units compositionality is to be explained in terms of vector operations. He makes use of the idea of tensor product representation and superposition representation to do the job. In the former vector addition derives complex vectors out of component vectors whereas in the latter vector multiplication does the job. Smolensky cautions that all this is to be understood in the context of cognitive systems being considered as dynamical systems. So the linear treatment of symbolic approach cannot be expected here.

Thus the crux of Smolensky's position is that mental or symbolic entities are only high-level structures of connectionist systems. So the connectionist network is not mere implementation but the real place where cognition takes place. Without it, no adequate account of cognition can be had.

Even the hybrid models are not satisfactory to Jerry Fodor. In a paper written by Fodor and Brian McLaughlin, it is argued that such models are also incapable of being called cognitive[32]. Or, the connectionist can be called implementational only. The argument continues to have its basic premise that systematicity and productivity are fundamental to cognitive capacity. Connectionist models whose representation is distributed can hardly explain them. Structure sensitivity is what makes sysematicity possible. In Smolensky's account the constituents do not play a causal role. Whenever the complex one is tokened, the constituents are not necessarily tokened. And he does not give any account of how to explain systematicity without the constituents being causally related. The phenomena of systematicity that we have cannot be explained by the talk of vector operations, which are at a much lower level. So there is nothing more in the account than mere implementation. The claims of revision are too unsupported to be accepted.

Conclusion

While dealing with modeling, one should always bear in mind that it is not replication. This helps to avoid over ambition. Yet modeling is of immense use especially when what is modeled is an area of complexity where there are no easy routes to understand the phenomena. It is with

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this in mind that we have to approach the attempts of cognitive modeling.

There is the issue whether simulation can ever be equivalent to the phenomena being simulated. The simulation of a nuclear test is not equivalent to a nuclear test. But it helps to know many properties of testing without carrying out the actual one. Why should the relation be something more in the case of cognition ? Of course, there is a difference in these two examples. When nuclear test is simulated, a one to one correspondence can be had between the actual testing and the simulation because both are designed by humans. But human cognition is something that happens naturally and the structure of it is not completely known. This makes modelling a difficult thing. The fundamental difference between the two precludes the possibility of ever having complete equivalence between the two. Just like no machine performs all that is done by human body, no computer may be able to do all that is done by the human brain. But this does not diminish the importance of modeling cognition. After all, a machine is also part of nature in the sense of being produced by 'natural' beings. So there cannot be any fundamental cleavage between the two. It will be better to approach cognitive modeling with these in mind.

The main philosophical issue that arises with regard to the acceptability of connectionism is its implications for the truth of folk psychology. As has been stated earlier, it is interpreted both for and against folk psychology. It is obvious that any study on cognition begins with some folk psychological commitments. But it is possible to go beyond the initial commitments. The apparent incompatibility between connectionism and folk psychology can be posed as a challenge to connectionism only if the truth of folk psychology is presupposed. Hence Josep Corbi's charcterisation of Ramsey and Stitch's argument concerning the incompatibility of neural network and folk psychology as a challenge to the former is not right[33]. Nowhere Ramsey and Stitch say that folk psychological account is to be preferred[34]. They only point out the need for a radical change in our outlook if PDF models can account for human cognitive capacities.

This issue of folk psychology versus connectionism can be solved only by looking at the elements of holism and modularity in them. With its distributed nature of representation, connectionist networks are holistic. At the same time, the activation patterns can be interpreted as having the nature of modularity. Folk psychology is obviously committed to entities

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like beliefs, desires etc. How far holism is implicit in it is not clear. Folk psychology is not a matured theory and, therefore, what it contains is not easy to explain.

Another issue that connectionism raises is with regard to nativism. If the network is able to learn by itself then the force of Chomsky's Poverty of Stimulus argument seems to be diminished. The argument is that the stimulus that a child gets is too poor to learn a language and, therefore, the child has the language capacity innate. But the networks do not work without the help of any language specific algorithms[35]. Since Chomsky's conclusion is that there is an innate language module and since the networks so far built are with language specific algorithms, there is no sudden threat to nativist conclusions.

The problem concerning the fundamental nature of cognitive architecture also awaits further research. There is a lot of clumsiness in the current literature concerning this[36]. For instance, Rumelhart and McClelland speak of the relation between connectionism and classicism in two contradictory ways[37]. One is as the relation between quatum mechanics and Newtonian mechanics. In the former, relation between the two is only implementational whereas in the latter, replacement take place. Moreover, the analogy between connectionism and quantum mechanics itself is dubious. This is so in Smolensky's argument also. Neurons are at the classical level. So what is modeled on neurons cannot be considered to be analogous to a treatment at quantum level. A future discovery concerning the quantum aspects of neuronal activity may undermine the present euphoria concerning the ultimate nature of connectionist network.

NOTES

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1. Paul Thagard. [1996]. *Mind : An Introduction to Cognitive Science*, MIT. p. 10.
2. Here the distinction between building an engineering design in order to have better computational power and the attempt to simulate actual human cognition so as to shed light on the fundamentals of cognition are to be distinguished.

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Barbara Von Eccardt. [1993] *What is Cognitive Science ?* MIT.

3. Allen Newell. [1980] 'Physical Symbol System'. *Cognitive Science*, 4, 135-183. Now we have to say it as the contribution of classical AI.

4. Brbara Von Eccardt. *op.cit.* p. 125.

5. Feldman and Shastri. 'Connectionism'. in *vol.1 of Nature Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science* pp. 680-687.

6. Rumelhart and McCllelland. [1986]. *Parallel Distributed Processing : Explorations in the microstructure of Cognition.* Vol 1 and 2. MIT press.

7. Rumelhart McCllelland. *Ibid :* vol. 1. p. 3.

8. Of course, this is hardly a substitute for direct brain studies.

9. Peter McLeod, Kim Plunkett and Edmund T. Rolls. [1998]. *An Introduction to Connectionist Modeling of Cognitive Processes.* OUP. p. 11.

10. Rumelhart and McClelland. *op.cit.* p. 146.

11. *Ibid :* p. 53.

12. *Ibid :* p. 75.

13. This is relevant when it is taken as simulation human cognition, not when the aim is at building better precessing machine.

14. Hubert Dreyfus. [1997]. *What Computers Still Can't Do.* MIT.

15. McCLeod, Plunkett and Rolls. *op.cit.* p. 178.

16. Rumelhart and McClelland. *op.cit.* p. 32.

17. Hidden does not mean that they do not have input or output. But all that happens inside the network whereas other units are related to the environment form which input is received and to which output is given.

18. See the section Modern Connectionism.

19. Brian McLaughlin [1993]. The connectionism / classicism battle. *Philosophical Studies* 71:163-100.

20. Robert N Mclauey. ed. *Churchlands and Their Critics.* Blackwell. p. 298.

21. Rumelhart and McClelland. *op.cit.* p. 121.

22. Andy Clark. [1992]. 'The presence of a symbol' *Connection Science* vol 4 No. 2 & 3 pp. 193-205.

23. Rumelhart and McClelland. *op.cit.* p. 32.

24. Fodor and Pylyshyn. [1998] 'Connectionism and cognitive architecture' *Cognition*, 28, pp. 3-71.

25. This may be used as an argument against design.

26. Matthias Gutknenekt. [1992]. 'The post modern mind : the hybrid models of cognition'. *Connection Science* vol 4 No. 2 & 3 p. 339-361.

27.

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28. *Ibid*
29. *Ibid*
30. *Ibid*
31. Paul Smolensky [1989]. 'Connectionist modelling : neural computation/ mental connections' *Neural connection, Mental Computation* ed. By Nandel *etal*, p. 49-69, MIT.
32. Fodor and McLaughlin B. [1990] 'Connectionism and problem of systematicity : why Smolensky's solution does not work' *Cognition*, 35 pp. 183-204.
33. Josep Corbi. [1993] 'Classicism and Connectionist Models : Levels of description' *Synthese* 95:141-168. This does not underestimate the contribution of Corbi in pointing out the holistic nature of both connectionism and folk theories of mind.
34. Ramsey and Stitch. [1991] 'Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology' in *The Future of Folk Psychology,* pp. 93-120. CUP.
35. Stephen Stitch and William Ramsey. [1990] 'Connectionism and three levels of nativism'. *Synthese. 82. p. 177-205.*
36. This may support Von Eccardt's characterisation of cognitive science as an immature science, see *op.cit,* p. 27.
37. This is pointed out by McLaughlin. *op.cit.*

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RORTY'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY AS EPISTEMOLOGY

K. SRINIVAS

I

Epistemology as an important branch of philosophical enterprise dominated the scene for centuries together. Traditionally it is believed that epistemology and metaphysics are two important branches that no other branch can ever replace or supercede them. In the history of philosophy we come across a number instances where philosophy was either identified with epistemology or with metaphysics. But, Rorty attempts to demolish this myth in his characteristic style. His vehement and scathing attack on modern philosophy, especially on the contemporary analytic philosophy, in his celebrated work *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) has attracted the attention of many a philosopher. In fact, those who share the view of Rorty are of the opinion that much of the modern philosophy that evolved out of the seventeenth century notions of knowledge and mind, has become stale, insipid, and out of place in the "conversation of mankind". Rorty echoes the same even in his lecture on "Analytic Philosophy and Transformative Philosophy" (1999) that he delivered nearly after two decades of the publication of his major work mentioned above. He was very vocal in advocating the view that the self-image exhibited by most of the analytical philosophers is an act of self-deception and a grand illusion. The important issues with which the contemporary analytical philosophers occupied are the problem of mind-body, justification of the claims to knowledge, meaning and reference. Taking the clue from later Wittgenstein, although Rorty owes his allegiance to Pragmatism advocated by William James and John Dewey, he holds that these problems cannot be solved, but can be deconstructed. However Wittgenstein's later work intended to

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dissolve these problems. There is a marked difference between these approaches. Dissolution of a problem does not require it to be looked at from a different perspective or a point of view. It is totally dropped or abandoned from philosophers' consideration for it does not serve the purpose for which it was introduced. The problem of meaning is one such problem that Wittgenstein dissolved in his later work. On the contrary, deconstruction involves a re-look at a problem from a different perspective. In other words, deconstruction is a kind of internal conceptual critique in which the critic implicitly and provisionally adheres to the position criticized. Therefore, the method of deconstruction is not identical with the method of dissolution. Rorty advocates his philosophical therapy called "deconstruction" with a view to overcoming the tradition.[1] He believes that to practice a therapy of this kind is to dive deep into the very structures of the language-games in which they are embedded, and also to see how these language-games by themselves are the results of a series of historical accidents, opinions and confusions.

According to Rorty, system building in philosophy is an unwarranted obsession that dominated the philosophical scenario ever since the time of Descartes. The system builders are of the opinion that any system of epistemology is a gradual and continuous process that rests on certain firm foundations that are highly indubitable. The Western classical tradition, starting from Descartes to Kant, is a testimony to this fact. Of course, early Wittgenstein too subscribed to this view. The anti-foundationalist stance taken by Rorty views that instead of system building based on certain predetermined and supposedly indubitable foundations, philosophers must try to build their respective world-views by taking man, society, ethnic community as a whole into consideration. In addition to this, the most important aspect to be considered is human solidarity.[2] The philosophers who proceed in this direction are more therapeutic and edifying rather than being constructive and systematic. The influence of Pragmatism on Rorty is evident from his approach to the problems of philosophy. He shares the views of the great pragmatists against Kant, Husserl, Russell, and C.I. Lewis for their attempt to convert philosophy into a foundational discipline. Rorty's admiration for Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey is the result of their efforts to make philosophy more therapeutic and edifying.[3] Kant assumed, holds Rorty, that philosophy can provide us with all-

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embracing ahistorical context in which every species of discourse could be assigned its proper place and rank, and epistemology could discover it. The best of example is his "categorical imperative". Kant felt that his "categorical imperative" would serve as a universal moral maxim and has universal application to humankind irrespective of any historical context. Both James and Dewey reacted sharply against this Kantian assumption. Such a reaction is also found in the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger. But, both of them, opines Rorty, committed a flaw by going against the community that takes the natural scientist as its moral hero. Unlike Nietzsche and Heidegger, James and Dewey suggested to us to give up the notion of "grounding" our culture, our moral lives, our politics, and our religious beliefs upon "philosophical bases". Also, they held that one should give up the Cartesian quest for certainty, which is nothing but a symptom of mild neurosis.

Like later Wittgenstein, Rorty is an anti-essentialist. According to him, one of the characteristic features of pragmatism is that it is simply anti-essentialism applied to notions like "truth", "knowledge", "language", "morality", and similar objects of philosophical theorizing. There are no essences anywhere in this area. Also, there is no wholesale epistemological way to direct or criticize or underwrite the course of inquiry. The vocabulary of isomorphism, picturing, mapping, and the notions of being true to objects (representationalism) are out of place in defining what is truth. On the contrary, maintains Rorty, it is the vocabulary of practice rather than the theory, and of action rather than contemplation that provides us with a clue to why and whether our present view of the world is the one we should hold. This is precisely the edifying character of philosophy.

Epistemological tradition looked for the essence of science and tried to reduce rationality to rule. For instance, Plato thought of moral philosophy as discovering the essence of "goodness". Both Kant and Mill tried to reduce moral choice to rule. Rorty reminds us that the tradition viewed man as having the capacity to resolve his dilemma by consulting his memory of the idea of good or allowing himself to be constrained by the disciplines of the day and by the ahistorical and non-human nature of reality itself. The view that rationality consists in being constrained by rule is a myth, according to Rorty. In this regard he sounds like a true later Wittgensteinian. According to this Platonic myth, there is no need for conversation or

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deliberation, or possible descriptions of the situation. One can acquire true belief by confronting an object and responding to it as programmed. The tradition takes two forms. They are: (1) the original Platonic strategy of postulating novel objects for propositions to correspond to, and (2) the Kantian strategy of finding principles that are intended to define the very essence of knowledge or representation or morality or rationality. The urge to find ahistorical vocabulary and practices is common to nineteenth century idealists and contemporary scientific realists, to Russell and Husserl. But for pragmatists, the pattern of all inquiry, scientific as well as moral, is deliberation concerning the relative abstractions of the various concrete alternatives. Even Nietzsche and Heidegger went against the traditional approaches to philosophy. For them the life of reason is the life of Socratic art of conversation.

One of the setbacks of the tradition, claims Rorty, is to think that the metaphors of vision, correspondence, mapping, picturing, and representation that are applied to small routine assertions would also be applied to large and debatable ones. This basic misconception generates the notion where there are no objects to correspond to, we have no hope of rationality, but only taste, passion, and will. Of course, the pragmatists attacked the traditional distinctions made between reason and desire, reason and appetite, reason and will by repudiating the notion of truth as accuracy of representation. Once we get rid of this model of vision, we see that the Platonic idea of the life of reason as an impossibility. It is good enough for the pragmatists if one can live the life of Socratic conversation and deliberation in conformity to the social norms within the bounds of what Kuhn called "normal science". Therefore, the second characteristic feature of pragmatism is that there is no epistemological difference between the truth about what "ought" to be and the truth about what it "is". But what appealed to Rorty is that characteristic feature of pragmatism that legislates that there are no other constraints of inquiry besides conversational ones.

To Rorty, to accept the contingency of starting points is to accept our inheritance from and our conversational with fellow-humans as our only source of guidance.One must identify oneself with his/her own community. Everyone should see this community as ours rather than nature's, shaped rather than found. We must be loyal to our fellow-inquirers,

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but not to non-human constrains. In this paper an attempt has been made to examine the views of Rorty as regards the rise and fall of epistemology ever since the time of René Descartes.

II

In order to proceed with his project, namely, critique of philosophy as an epistemological enterprise, Rorty develops a historical reconstruction of modern philosophy, which is the context from which analytical philosophy emerges. He is clear about the source of the trouble that can be traced back to Plato, but limits himself to the founders of modern philosophy like Descartes, Locke, and Kant. The "ideal type" of philosophy as envisaged by these founders of modern philosophy is foundational in respect to the rest of the culture since it is the assemblage of claims to knowledge. The function of philosophy is to adjudicate such claims to knowledge. Philosophy, according to these modern philosophers, can do so because it understands the foundations of knowledge. In this context to know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind. In other words, to understand the possibility and the nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. Thus the chief concern of philosophy is to be a general theory of representation. As a general theory it divides culture into areas that represent reality well, those which represent it less-well, and those which do not represent it at all.[4] Rorty feels that these conceptions about philosophy have a long, complicated and devious history. For instance, we owe the notion "theory of knowledge" to those processes that are primarily mind-dependent. Such a view is embedded in the philosophy of Locke. Similarly, the notion of "mind" as a separate entity in which processes occur is attributed to Descartes. The notion of philosophy as the tribunal of pure reason is the outcome of the critical philosophy of Kant. But, this Kantian notion presupposes both the Lockean notion of mental processes and the Cartesian notion of mental substances.[5] These notions, holds Rorty, were not great discoveries, but only the invention of distinctions and problems blended with metaphors that captured the imagination of philosophers for normal course of philosophizing. These fabrications really set the tone for a systematic and linear way of thinking in the enterprise called modern philosophy.

What is fascinating about Rorty's analysis is his distinctive understanding of how the history of philosophy is developed. First of all,

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he rejects the view that there are perennial problems of philosophy that arise as soon as we begin to reflect. Our philosophic ancestors thought that they were dealing with basic problems of human life. Rorty makes a caricature of this self-congratulatory understanding of the history of philosophy. His understanding of history of philosophy accommodates all sorts of historical accidents, a new set of metaphors, distinctions, and problems. These moments in history remain as mere contingencies as there is nothing permanent and sacrosanct in the course of the historical development. This is evident from the collapse of the Scholastic tradition that was considered to be a paradigm at one time. In nutshell, at the advent of new historical contingencies a new philosophical paradigm comes into existence. Not only that, it nudes out the earlier paradigm into oblivion. Similar fate may be met by contemporary analytical philosophy too for it is not an exception to this rule. In fact, Rorty claims that the history of modern philosophy is nothing but the history of rise and fall of the prized discipline called epistemology.

III

Rorty begins his examination of epistemology by probing into its origins and the way in which it thrived upon a central confusion that has plagued the theory of knowledge ever since the distinction between the causal conditions for the genesis of knowledge (context of the discovery of knowledge) and the justification of knowledge is made. He maintains that philosophy as epistemology became well fixed by the end of the nineteenth century. Or more than hundred years it seemed that the first task of philosophy is to resolve epistemological issues before any progress can be made with other problems and areas in philosophy. As aptly claimed by Rorty, the historical reconstruction of epistemology is basically Kantian in its perspective. Kant held that concepts and percepts together produce knowledge.[6] Such a view distinguishes epistemology from psychology. According to Rorty, the "rational reconstruction" of our knowledge consists in the distinction between what is "given" and what is "added' by he mind.[7] Although analytical philosophers did not approve of this distinction, a significant move to refute this distinction was first made by Wilfred Sellars and W.V. Quine. The crucial premise of their argument in their respective critiques is that we understand knowledge only when we understand the social justification of belief. Thus we do not have any

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reason to view knowledge as an accurate representation of something or the other. Of course, the consequence of their argument is not to advocate or advance a better way of doing epistemology, or even to see that epistemology is replaced by a "legitimate" scientific inquiry, but to put an end to epistemology tout court. The aim of both Sellars and Quine is to lead us to a "holistic" view of knowledge. This is what is characterized as "epistemological behaviourism" by Rorty. But what does he mean by "epistemological behaviourism" or "holism"? According to him, explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by former is the essence of "epistemological behaviourism". Rorty inherits this view from Dewey and later Wittgenstein. This sort of behaviourism is a species of holism, which is bereft of idealistic or metaphysical presuppositions.[8] To advocate "epistemological behaviourism", warns Rorty, is not to advocate a new subtle epistemological position, but to abandon epistemology as an independent and isolated enterprise. A holistic approach to knowledge is not a matter of anti-foundationalist polemic, but a distrust in the whole epistemological enterprise.

However, the charge against epistemological behaviourism and holism is that they abandon objectivity, truth, and the growth of knowledge. Rorty dismisses this charge by holding that: " to say that truth and knowledge can only be judged by the standards of the inquirers of our own day is not to say that human knowledge is less noble or important or more "cut off from the world" than we had thought. It is merely to say that nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, and there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence."[9]

Rorty attacks those philosophers who envisage that epistemology can be salvaged by reformulating the relevant issues in logically perfect philosophy of language or empirical psychology. Against such a conception Rorty argues that neither of them helps us in resolving the epistemological problems. In fact, it is only a desperate attempt to save analytic philosophy. As a matter of fact, Rorty's critique of analytic tradition is seen as a critique by an "insider". His primary objective is to target any form of systematic philosophy that shares the conviction that there are real foundations that philosophy must discover and that philosophy as a discipline

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can transcend history and adumbrate a permanent neutral matrix for assessing all forms of inquiry and all types of knowledge. It is to say that the rails in the form of epistemological foundations are already laid down in advance. Hence all that one has to do is to make the train run on this track built in advance.

Prima facie, it appears that Rorty is simply engaged in a destructive critique, a form of critique (*vitaṇḍa*) advocated by the Indian dialecticians like Nāgārjuna and Srīharṣa, with a view to lead us towards the philosophical dead-ends such as "historicism", "skepticism", "relativism", and nihilism". But it is not the case with Rorty. He employs the method of deconstruction in order to project a new perspective as against the old. His reinterpretation of the doctrines of historicism, skepticism, relativism, and nihilism vindicates this point. If historicism is meant that history is the foundational discipline that the explanations that philosophers seek can only be found in the study of history or that there are laws of history that enable us to predict the future course of events, then Rorty is certainly not a historicist. On the contrary, he argues that there is no foundational discipline at all. Given Rorty's insistence on historical accidents, contingencies, and options, history as a predictive discipline has to forgo its importance. But, if historicism is understood in its healthy historical sense, we get to know how the philosophical language-games arise, get entrenched, and pass away. Rorty is right in assessing the role of history, for we are living in a world of flux as held by Heraclitus. Once this realization dawns on us, the belief that there are perennial philosophical problems gets unfixed. Rorty claims that he is a historicist of this kind.

Similarly, Rorty attacks skepticism, especially the kind of skepticism advocated in the philosophical doctrines that insists on the view that we can never really know anything beyond the "veil of ideas". Therefore, all our claims to knowledge are mere contingent assertions about reality, as they can never be justified. Skepticism in its extreme form, holds Rorty, does not lead us anywhere.Wittgenstein in his posthumous work *On Certainty* (1969) ridicules such a variety of skepticism. Like later Wittgenstein, Rorty maintains that skepticism must provide adequate grounds for suspecting the very foundations of history, foundations of knowledge, language or philosophy. Such a form of skepticism serves as a permanent neutral framework for evaluating all claims to knowledge.

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Proceeding further, Rorty tries to point out the inconsistencies in the stand taken by relativists and nihilists. If relativism is understood as a doctrine according to which there is no truth, objectivity, and standards for judging better and worse arguments or moral positions, then Rorty does not subscribe to such a form of relativism. According to him, relativism as "epistemological behaviourism" enables us to justify our claims to knowledge or truth by appealing to those social practices that have been hammered out in the course of human history. These are the forms of inquiry within which we distinguish truth from falsity, and objectivity from idiosyncrasy. He is in favour of such a form of relativism.

Turning his attention to nihilism, Rorty argues that nihilism as a thesis claims that whether it is knowledge or morals, anything is just as good or as true as anything else. Thus it fails to distinguish good from bad, and truth from falsity. On the contrary, Rorty is of the opinion that nihilism is that which liberates us from the illusion that there is something to which we can always appeal. There is nothing, argues Rorty, that has universal assent. Every moral decision is voluntary, and there is no binding on moral agents to accept a particular moral will. In fact, nihilism provides individuals with moral freedom and independent decision-making.

Now the questions arise : What is the function of philosophy? And what type of self-understanding of philosophy does emerge if we give up these various "self-deceptions" that expose the barrenness of philosophy? Rorty tries to workout his way through the familiar distinctions that one comes across in the history of philosophy. They are the distinctions between spirit and nature, commensurability and incommensurability, normal and abnormal discourse, familiarity and unfamiliarity, epistemology and hermeneutics, systematic and edifying philosophy, and philosophy as an inquiry and philosophy as conversation.

Rorty opines that commensurability is normally understood as an effort "to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be searched what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to construct an ideal situation, in which all residual disagreements will be seen to be "non-cognitive" or merely verbal, or else merely temporary-capable of being resolved by doing something further."[10] Rorty's intention here is to show that the modern philosophy shaped by the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian

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tradition in its British and Continental forms is obsessed with the search for commensuration. Such a quest for commensuration is the characteristic trait of epistemology. But, philosophy, which identifies itself with epistemology, has a tendency to block the road by putting itself forward as the final commensurating vocabulary for all possible rational discourse. This is the reason why the edifying philosophers suspect the very idea of "universal commensuration". The distinction between "what is commensurable" and "what is not commensurable" is found in the recent debates in the philosophy of science. Rorty laments that it is unfortunate that this distinction is generalized and is made to apply to all domains of discourse, whether they be science, philosophy, poetry, or literary criticism.

As regards hermeneutics, Rorty claims that it is not a name of the new method or discipline, or an alternative way of arriving at commensuration, but a struggle against the assumption that all contributions to culture are commensurable. Rorty admits that he was greatly influenced by Gadamer's work *Truth and Method* (1960). A hermeneutic philosopher, maintains Rorty, is one who believes in Socratic life of conversation, whereas an epistemology centred philosopher believes in the foundationalism [1] for the former, to be rational is to be an interlocutor, whereas for the latter, to be rational is to be in inquiry. To a hermeneutic interlocutor, "*societas*" (civility) is very important whereas to an epistemologist thinking in terms of "*universitas*" (universal) is very essential.

Rorty sees the history of philosophy as consisting of periods of "normal discourse" where there is an agreement about problems, procedures, and the "correct" way of finding solutions. It is followed by periods of abnormal discourse in which strange and new ways of speaking and writing appear. Rorty radicalizes Kuhn's distinction of "normal" and "abnormal" discourse because he sees this as a feature of all discourse and culture. Epistemology, he holds, thrives during the periods of "normal" discourse, because these are the times when there is agreement. This gives legitimacy to philosophy as if all discourse might be commensurable and philosophy might be able to clarify the rules of commensuration. But there is always a danger of confusing that the domain in which such stability has been achieved is the measure of all other domains. By introducing such bland distinctions as the "normal" and the "abnormal" or the "familiar"

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and the "unfamiliar", Rorty deliberately makes us aware of how "relative" these distinctions are to the changing scene of culture.

Although Rorty is critical of the "Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian" tradition, he has been contrasting it with, both implicitly and explicitly, another attitude towards philosophy. He speaks of those great figures who, without being part of any "tradition", resemble each other in their distrust of the notion that man's essence is to be a knower of essence. According to Rorty, Goethe, Kierkegaard, Santayana, William James, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, and the later Heidegger are the figures of this sort. These philosophers have unequivocally expressed that the present century's triumph of reason, the latest vocabulary borrowed from the latest scientific achievements may not express privileged representations of essences, but can only describe the world in another way.[12] Rorty calls these philosophers "edifying philosophers". What is common to all of them is that they use every possible means to voice their skepticism about the entire "project of commensuration". They believe in loose ends for their sense of wonder, for otherwise philosophy as a discipline cannot survive.

Rorty suggests a new metaphor of understanding philosophy and the role that it can play in culture-philosophy as conversation rather than philosophy as an epistemological inquiry. This is the issue between the Socratic lovers of conversation and tyrantic lovers of self-deceptive rhetoric. To Rorty, the issue is whether it is possible to be pragmatists without betraying Socrates. But, contrary to pragmatic model, the anti-pragmatist believes that conversation only makes sense if something like Platonic theory of recollection is right. In Plato we come across the natural starting points of thought somewhere within us, and will recognize the vocabulary in which they are best formulated once we hear it. Enlightenment hoped to find such a vocabulary only if it could be reduced to the search for "objective, verifiable, and clearly communicable truth". However, claims Rorty, the real issue is over the question whether loyalty to fellow human beings presupposes that there is something permanent and ahistorical that explains why we should continue to converse in the manner of Socrates. A proper justification is needed for, otherwise Socratic way of conversation does not make any sense.

The hope that one can formulate the right conceptions of reason, of science, of knowledge, and of morality, which express their essences drove

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Kant to make philosophy more formal, systematic, rigourous and professional. Pragmatists tell us that this is a vain attempt. O their view the Socratic virtues such as willingness to talk, to listen to others, to weigh consequences of our actions upon others are simply moral virtues. They can neither be inculcated nor forfeited by theoretical research into essence. According to pragmatists, whose line Rorty is toeing, our moral duty is to continue with the project of conversation. It has no metaphysical or epistemological guarantee of success. We are not conversing because we have a goal, but because Socratic art of conversing is an activity that has its own end. Therefore, can we substitute the notion of "conversation" with that of "reason"? To answer this question, Rorty attempts to deconstruct the very notion of "reason" as used in the Platonic and the Kantian traditions. The term "reason" in these traditions is interlocked with the notions of "truth as correspondence", of "knowledge as discovery of essence", of "morality as obedience to principle".

Rorty says that it is difficult to predict or speculate what is going to happen next in philosophy, but tells us, " the only point on which I would insist is that philosophers' moral concern should be with continuing conversation of the West, rather than with insisting upon a place for the traditional problems of modern philosophy within that conversation."[13] Thus it is clear from his statement that the moral of his work is to suggest and to advocate a need for a turn in the role that philosophy plays in this conversation of humankind.

IV

To conclude, Rorty's project is an attempt to find a non-absolutist position[14] that is beyond relativism, and to propose a new way of understanding philosophy and its legitimate function that recognizes our historical and human limitations. His views echo those of later Wittgenstein when Rorty tells us that the deep problems in philosophy are not really deep. By getting into the deeper roots of the history of philosophy, he finds that the philosophical enterprise has gone stale due to existing pretensions, illusions, and self-deceptions. Philosophers' obsession for these pretensions, illusions, and self-deceptions makes them captive. One such obsession, holds Rorty, is the Kantian distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic". Unless one is freed from these obsessions, one fails to realize the real purport of philosophy. He suggests us to free ourselves from the illusion

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that philosophers stand as neutral third party to claims of knowledge by appealing to historically accepted standards of rationality and objectivity. He feels that the history of philosophy, like the history of culture, is a series of contingencies, accidents, of the rise and fall of various language-games, and forms of life. Following the footsteps of later Wittgenstein, Rorty wants us "to say the true and right are matters of social practice"[15] and that "objectivity should be seen as conformity to norms of justification we find about us."[16] Like later Wittgenstein, Rorty claims that philosophy is a therapy, which can liberate us from stale metaphors and fundamental misconceptions about what philosophy can achieve. To put it in the words of Rorty: "What the patient needs is not a list of his mistakes and confusions but rather an understanding of how he came to make these mistakes and confusions..."[17]

Rorty, in a way, identifies philosophy with hermeneutics by pleading for Socratic life of conversation, instead of Platonic life of inquiry. He replaces philosophy as epistemology, which is often viewed as systematic, with philosophy as hermeneutics, which is viewed as edifying. As mark of admiration to Rorty's attempt, Putnam writes: "I am grateful to Rorty all the same, for his work has the merit of addressing profound questions head-on."[18] At this point one would like to react to Rorty's approach to philosophy by asking the question: Can one ignore the Platonic spirit of inquiry? Philosophy basically represents the philosophies of life, which are rooted in human experiences. Of course, Rorty does not ignore this fact. His "epistemological behavourism" takes into consideration the social factors of human life for justification of all forms of human knowledge. But his only objection is that in the name of inquiry we look for some foundations or essential structures against which we weigh and test our theories. Such an approach to philosophy, as aptly remarked by Rorty, leads to philosophical dogmatism that makes one pedantic and promotes obscurantist tendencies. Therefore, there is no scope for creativity, novelty, and discursive reasoning. All that Rorty aims at showing is that there are no permanent structures handed down to the posterity against which we test our theories. If philosophy deals with human experiences, then it is from these experiences (forms of life) one should erect structures that pave the way for multiple interpretations. The edifying philosophers like later Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey approached philosophy with a

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view to showing that philosophy is open to every possible interpretation. Following the footsteps of these philosophers, Rorty claims that philosophy as a spirit of inquiry has lost its charm. It is interpretation in the form of conversation that is gaining importance. Rorty is right in saying so. Anything that is handed down to the posterity in the form of philosophical legacy is unacceptable for its *bona fides* are often questioned. To free ourselves from the bondage of legacy, what is required is new ways of thinking against the old, and new forms of administration to make our philosophical enterprise more meaningful and pragmatic.

NOTES

1. The expression "tradition" in Rorty's work refers to those aspects of philosophy that he regarded as foundational as opposed to edifying.
2. Richard Rorty : *Objectivism, Relativism and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 21-45.
3. ————————, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 2nd edition, p.5.
4. *Ibid.*, p.3.
5. *Ibid.*, pp.3-4.
6. *Ibid.*, p.168.
7. *Ibid.*, p.169.
8. *Ibid.*, p.174.
9. *Ibid.*, pp.178-9.
10. *Ibid.*, p.326.
11. Foundationalism views that knowledge, and epistemic justification are non-inferential and foundational. In this sense there is something called foundational knowledge.
12. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p. 367.
13. *Ibid.*, p.394.
14. The non-absolutist position of Rorty aims at deconstruction of the traditionalist and foundationalist approaches to philosophy.
15. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p.179.
16. *Ibid.*, p.186.

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Ibid., p.33.

Cf. Paul K. Moser and Arnold Vander Nat (ed.)., *Human Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 359.

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HAS ARMSTRONG DISCOVERED ANYTHING ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS?

G. P. RAMCHANDRA

In spite of the recent revival of interest in consciousness, philosophers are not discovering anything new about consciousness. Various kinds of propositions can be found in their writings. Firstly, they recommend new uses of words, thinking they are discovering facts about consciousness. This is the confusion between grammatical and material propositions that is central to Wittgenstein's philosophy and it shows that although Wittgenstein is out of fashion, his philosophy is as relevant as ever. Secondly, they make incoherent or false claims about consciousness. D. M. Armstrong's theory of consciousness as set forth in his article 'What is Consciousness ?' exemplifies both kinds of confusion.[1] The present paper argues that Armstrong makes pointless linguistic stipulations and that his discussion of 'introspective consciousness', the core of his article, is incoherent. Thirdly, they speculate recklessly about brain states, forgetting that brain states are only preconditions for consciousness. This sort of speculation is not the focus of this particular paper of Armstrong's and therefore not of the present paper either.

The notion of consciousness, Armstrong says, is notoriously obscure. But one thesis about it can be confidently rejected; the Cartesian doctrine that consciousness is the essence of mentality. Consciousness is the cream on the cake of mentality, a special and sophisticated development of mentality. If we regard deep sleep as a state of total unconsciousness, we are perfectly happy to concede that a person in this state of total unconsciousness has a mind and we freely allow that the mind is in various states, although, by hypothesis, the mind is not active; no mental processes

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occur within it We do not deny knowledge and beliefs about the Middle Ages to a historian of the Middle Ages just because he is sound asleep. We make statements like 'He has been depressed all this week'. A totally unconscious person does not lack knowledge and beliefs. He may also be credited with memories and skills, likes and dislikes, attitudes and emotions, desires and purposes, and traits of character and temperament.

How are we to conceive of the states we attribute to the unconscious person ? Consider two persons, A and B, unconscious at the same time, where it is true of A that he believes that p but false of B. Must there not be differences between A and B at that time to constitute this difference in the belief-states ? What else in the world could act as a truth-maker (the ground in the world) for the different conditional statements that are true of A and B ? There must be a ground in the world and this requires that that the beliefs etc. are stored in the person when he is asleep. A materialist account would require that it be physically encoded in the brain while a dualist account would require that it be stored immaterially. These beliefs etc. are causally quiescent; they do not produce mental effects in a person who is sleeping, and this may be so even when his mind is functioning.

Armstrong goes on to assert the existence of different kinds of consciousness. If there is mental activity of any kind, there is consciousness. He calls this 'minimal consciousness'. A single faint sensation would be a case of 'minimal consciousness'. Someone may wake up knowing the solution to a mathematical problem that he did not know when he went to sleep. This means that there must have been mental activity or minimal consciousness during his sleep. The mental activity must have been sophisticated, since a mathematical problem was solved, but there was minimal consciousness (in the sense that there is always one pint of water in two pints of water). Someone who is dreaming is again minimally conscious. Minimal consciousness is different from perceptual consciousness. If the person who is dreaming wakes up, he is perceptually conscious i.e. he perceives his environment and his bodily state. Perceptual consciousness entails minimal consciousness but minimal consciousness does not entail perceptual consciousness.

A third kind of consciousness is introspective consciousness. It is possible to have minimal and perceptual consciousness without having

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introspective consciousness. Consider the following :

> After driving for long period of time, particularly at night, it is possible to 'come to' and realize that for some time past one has been driving without being aware of what one has been doing.. It is natural to describe what went on before one came to by saying that during that time one lacked consciousness. Yet it seems clear that, in the two senses of the word that we have so far isolated, consciousness was present. There was mental activity, and as part of that mental activity, there was perception. That is to say, there was minimal consciousness and perceptual sophistication of the activities successfully undertaken during the period of 'unconsciousness'.
>
> A purpose was successfully advanced during that time : that of driving a car along a road. This purpose demanded that various complex sub-routines be carried out, and carried out at appropriate points (for instance, perhaps the brake or the clutch was used). Were not these acts purposeful ? Above all, how is it possible to drive a car for kilometers along a road if one cannot perceive that road ?... So it seems that minimal consciousness and perceptual consciousness are present. But something else is lacking : consciousness in the most interesting sense of the word.. What is it that the truck driver lacks ? I think it is an additional form of perception, or, a little more cautiously, it is something resembles perception. But unlike sense-perception, it is not directed towards our current environment and / or our current bodily state. It is perception of the mental. Such 'inner' perception is traditionally called introspection, or introspective awareness. We may therefore call this third sort of consciousness 'introspective' consciousness. It entails minimal consciousness. If perceptual consciousness is restricted to sense-perception, the introspective consciousness does not entail perceptual consciousness.
>
> Introspective awareness, then, is a perception-like awareness of current states and activities in our own mind... since introspection is itself a mental activity, it too may become the object of introspective awareness.
>
> Sense-perception is not total awareness of the current states and activities of our environment and body. In the same way, introspective awareness is not a total awareness of the current states and activities of our mind. At any time there will be states

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> and activities of our minds of which we are not introspectively aware. These states and activities may be said to be unconscious mental states in one good sense of the word 'unconscious'.[2]

Armstrong goes on to distinguish between reflex introspective awareness, which is the normal condition (but which the driver lacks), in which we merely observe our mental states, and introspection proper, in which we scrutinize them.

Finally, Armostrong claims that introspective consciousness makes us aware of our mental states and activities as those of single entity, the self, that it makes possible the integration of states and activities that is needed for sophisticated ends and that introspective consciousness, which the driver lacks, is essential or nearly essential for event-memory.

The idea that consciousness is obscure is already confused. Do we not use the word with perfect competence in our everyday lives ? Consciousness is synonymous with awareness. In what sense is there a mystery about awareness ? Take for example seeing, which is a species of consciousness. This can be explained in terms of light rays stimulating neural processes and so on. When matter reaches a certain degree and kind of complexity, consciousness results. There is no explanatory gap between mind and matter, only the illusion of a gap. Of course we shall probably find out more about these processes but that only means that we shall find out more about the preconditions for consciousness. A philosopher who feels there is an explanatory gap now will - or should - continue to feel that there is one even when we have discovered everything there is to know about the brain. The higher forms of consciousness require the appropriate training as well. One should not make the opposite mistake of thinking that matter can fully explain mind. Understanding a Chinese sentence for example requires a prior education in Chinese. Again there is no mystery. This knowledge is not stored in the brain in any form. The comparison with the computer is irrelevant. The computer is a machine designed by engineers to store symbols, something only a language user can do, while the brain is an organ.

To say that consciousness is a special and sophisticated development of mentality is only a grammatical move. Armstrong is confused about the nature of his work. He thinks he is uncovering facts about consciousness, that he is refuting Descartes, when he is actually laying down senseless

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linguistic rules - senseless because no use has been shown for the rules. It is true that the fact that a person is asleep does not prevent us from saying of him that he has knowledge, beliefs, likes and dislikes, and so on. The criterion for saying this is his behavior when awake. But these are dispositions. Should we call them mental states ? English usage has no rules here nor does it need any for practical purposes. Wittgenstein points out that while dispositions are states, their grammar is quite different from that of *mental* states. One does not speak of understanding a word continuously while one speaks of having a pain continuously.[3] Like Descartes, he reserves 'mentality' for conscious states. One might decide to call them mental states because only they are attributes of minds, although this would mean assimilating terms whose grammar is desecrate; 'mental states' would be a second concept here. It is a question of a terminological decision only and one that would be gratuitous because it is being taken in the absence of any practical purpose. Since Armstrong decides to call them mental states, he can talk of people having minds that are in various states in their sleep. Since he has drawn the boundary of 'mentality' in this way, he can say that consciousness is not the essence of mentality. Someone who prefers not to call them mental states can still say that consciousness is the essence of mentality. Armstrong and he would not be in disagreement about any fact. What research could confirm or disconfirm either position ? But Armstrong clearly thinks that it is a question of a factual disagreement, that consciousness is *really* not the essence of mentality, that consciousness is *really* a sophisticated development of mentality, that Descartes is *wrong* to say that consciousness is the essence of mentality.

Why does Armstrong resort to states of deep sleep when he wishes to construct nonconscious mental states ? Beliefs, knowledge, memories etc. are not concepts of experience. All he needs to do is to point this out and decide to call them mental states. He would then have his gratuitous syntactical structure of a mentality that is non conscious.

One cannot infer storage, whether material or immaterial, from what someone is inclined to say. Computers require storage but not conscious creatures like human beings.

Armstrong's discussion of the different kinds of consciousness combines pointless linguistic stipulations and resulting tautologies with weird

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and incoherent assertions about consciousness. Any example of mental activity (as opposed to dispositions like knowledge) would by definition be an example of 'minimal consciousness'. So a faint sensation, dreaming, perceiving one's environment without being aware of it, doing mathematics while one is asleep, driving a truck at night without being aware of it, and being aware of perceiving one's environment, of doing mathematics and driving a truck are all cases of minimal consciousness. Armstrong's dicta that perceptual consciousness entails minimal consciousness but minimal consciousness does not entail perceptual consciousness and that introspective consciousness entails minimal consciousness then follow out of mere grammatical necessity. This is no more illuminating than saying that red is a colour but a colour need not be red. Equally, it follows that introspective consciousness does not entail perceptual consciousness. This is as illuminating as saying that when I scratch, I need not be scratching my arm. But while these are moves within everyday grammar, Armstrong's moves take place within a self-created grammar.

There is no rule of usage to the effect that we are conscious when we dream; none is needed in everyday life. We may however lay down our own gratuitious rule. Since Armstrong has defined mental activity as minimal consciousness, and since it is a grammatical truth that dreaming is a mental activity, it becomes true by this definition that we are conscious when we dream. But we could very well decide not to call dreaming a state of consciousness, on account of its illusory character. It is after all also a grammatical truth that what we are conscious of is actually there, and not imagined. There would be a conflict of criteria whichever decision we take. And again no empirical disagreement is involved.

Armstrong talks of minimal consciousness *and* perceptual consciousness as if it was a question of two independent states. This is to single out a category with a member of a category. There is only one state, perceptual consciousness; minimal consciousness is the genus to which it belongs.

The discussion of unconscious consciousness and introspective consciousness (or awareness of mental states) is intended to be the centrepiece of the paper, but it does not even make sense. Armstrong agrees that consciousness was present in the truck driver case but he maintains that the driver lacks introspective consciousness or 'a perception-

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like awareness of current states and activities in our own mind'.[4] That is why he suddenly realizes that he has been driving without being aware of it. However, to see a red traffic light and stop (the kind of thing the driver was doing) is to be conscious; this is what we mean by 'being conscious'. It is also to be in a mental state; this is what we mean by being in a mental state. 'Conscious states' and 'mental states' are equivalent terms. Armstrong does of course identify dispositions elsewhere in the paper as mental states which are not conscious but in the driving example he is referring to experiences, which are conscious. What is the need for a further act of introspective awareness, which 'lights up' the mental states and activities, as it were ? These are already 'lit'; they are 'self-luminous'. 'Awareness of current states and activities in our own mind' is equivalent to 'consciousness of our current conscious states and activities', which is incoherent. To see a red traffic light, to perceive its redness, is the kind of thing we mean by 'being conscious' and to assert that one can perceive the redness of a red traffic light without being conscious of it entails that one can be unconsciously conscious, which is incoherent also. What is the truck driver unconscious of ? Of the redness of the traffic light ? But he has seen it, and it is incoherent to say he is unconscious of what he has seen. He may of course, after seeing the red traffic light, have applied the brake mechanically, without noting or being conscious of the action. Here we would say the action was not conscious. While perceptions are necessarily conscious, bodily actions need not be; only noted bodily actions, which have the same grammatical status as perceptions, are necessarily conscious. We are not conscious of many of the minor bodily actions we make. But this would not be a major discovery. What Armstrong has in mind is being unaware of mental states and activities, of being conscious of applying the brake without being conscious of it but the idea is incoherent; applying the brake cannot be simultaneously conscious and unconscious. Armstrong's reply might be that although the redness of the traffic light and the process of applying the brake were perceived, the *state* of perceiving the redness of the traffic light and the process of applying the brake was not conscious. The answer to this is that the state is just the perceiving of the redness and the process; it is not a second thing. The phrase 'awareness of current states and activities in our own mind', as employed by Armstrong, is a phrase which, to borrow an expression of

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W.E.Kennick's, 'has application to nothing, expresses a linguistic absurdity'.[5] One can of course think of everyday uses for an expression like 'awareness of one's mental state'. For example, someone might be aware that he was feeling jittery and for that reason hoped that his job interview would be postponed. One could say his 'awareness of his mental state' caused him to hope his job interview would be postponed. But here 'awareness' means knowledge, not 'experiencing of experience', which is what Armstrong's phrase amounts to. 'Consciousness' can also mean 'experience' and a statement like 'I experienced a terrible mental state yesterday' makes perfectly good sense but this is equivalent to 'I was in a terrible mental state yesterday'; the mental state is the experience, and not a second thing.

It is conceivable, although ridiculous, that someone might 'do mathematics' in his sleep or 'drive' a car at night without being aware of it but inverted commas would be necessary, since the vocabulary associated with personhood would no longer apply. Some inner computer might conceivably take over and direct the person's sophisticated 'activities'. The 'driver' would 'stop' at the red traffic light but he would not observe the redness of the traffic light; instead, the inner computer would respond to it and direct his 'actions'. The driver would 'change' gear, 'use' the clutch and brake, 'swerve' and so no, but he would not 'do' this for reasons; he would 'do' it mechanically, controlled by the computer. He would function like a cruise missile and not 'behave' as a person. This could be called 'driving a car without being aware of it', but it would be a robotic condition, and not a state of consciousness. And since he would not be behaving as a person, 'driving', 'stopping', 'changing' and 'using' would all be used in new ways and would therefore be new concepts.

Is it correct to say, as Armstrong does, that one realizes 'that for some time past one has been driving without being aware of what one has been doing'?[6] Surely all one has a right to say is that although one knows that one must have been driving for some time past, one does not remember it. Lapse of memory is an everyday occurrence with many people. It may just be a psychological fact that truck drivers, who perform the same routines over and over again mechanically, are particularly liable to forget what they were doing. Earlier in the paper, Armstrong mentions the case of someone who wakes up knowing the solution to a mathematical problem

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that he did not know when he fell asleep. He thinks this is a case of intellectual activity without introspective consciousness. Why cannot the solution be explained in terms of the mathematician's previous struggles with the problem ?

Certain conscious states seem to be states of limited or impaired consciousness. The expressions 'sleepwalking' and 'trance' probably cover different kinds of phenomena. Some people in this condition seem to be totally unaware of their surroundings. Theirs would seem to be a condition akin to dreaming but involving physical activity as well. However others said to be is these states are often conscious of some things at least. For example, the sleepwalker described by William Seager who drove to another town and stabbed his mother-in-law and so on. However he was unaware of other things - for example, that pulling a knife by the blade is dangerous, for he cut himself doing this.[7] This would be a condition of impaired consciousness. It is possible again to be fully conscious and afterwards forget completely what one has done when in that state. This is what we call amnesia. What Armstrong has in mind however is a state of full consciousness of which the person concerned is unaware while in that state, so that there is nothing to forget. The idea is incoherent.

Armstrong has not given us any outward criteria for distinguishing between a driver who is aware of his mental states and one who is not. The 'driver' who is not aware of his mental states is capable of 'doing' many things - 'stopping' at a red traffic light, 'swerving' to avoid an approaching car, but not to such an extent that he goes off the road and so on. In that case, he has surely not lost the capacity for 'speech'. If asked if he saw the red light, the inner computer would presumably cause the 'reply' 'Yes, I did' to be emitted. One wonders what 'reply' the computer would cause to be emitted if the driver were asked 'Are you aware of your mental states ?'

Contrary to what Armstorng says, his introspective awareness is not the traditional meaning of 'introspection'. Traditionally, introspection is an intellectual assessing of our behaviour and attitudes, not an awareness of mental states as they happen that is separate from the states.

Armstrong distinguishes between reflex introspective consciousness, in which one is merely aware of one's mental states, which is the normal human condition but which the truck driver lacks, and introspection proper,

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in which one carefully scrutinizes one's mental states. All this is confusion. There is no such thing as reflex introspective consciousness, because it means consciousness of conscious states, which is incoherent, and therefore there is no such thing as introspection proper, which is supposed to be a more attentive kind of consciousness of conscious states. Quite apart from the incoherence of 'consciousness of consciousness', the idea of scrutinizing a mental state has to be called in question. One can scrutinize a collection of letters and this is to be in a mental state or conscious state, but the notion of scrutinizing this state itself is an illusion. How does on scrutinize it ?

What Armstrong says about introspective consciousness and the self, integration and event-memory is obscure. This much is clear. Our mental states and activities enter our lives and activities as the states and activities of a single being. What else could they be ? There is no need to learn this and no need to integrate activities that are manifestly those of a single person. To argue that the driving example shows that introspective consciousness is essential or nearly essential for event - memory presupposes that what the driver lacked was introspective consciousness.

Armstrong has thus added nothing to our knowledge of consciousness while his discussion of introspective consciousness does not even make sense. Yet certain contemporary philosophers seem to be comfortable with the incoherent, with the idea of a mental state making conscious states conscious, for the idea has acquired popularity, although in slightly different forms and under different name such as David Rosenthal's Higher Order Thoughts and Norton Nelkin's apperceptive consciousness.[8]

NOTES

1. D. M. Armstrong, 'What is Consciousness ?' in D. M. Armstrong, *The Nature of Mind,* The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1981, pp. 55-67.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.
3. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972, Part I, p. 59, footnotes (a) and (b).
4. Armstrong, *op.cit.*, p.61.

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W. E. Kennick, 'Philosophy as Grammar and the Reality of Universals', in Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowiz (ed.) *Ludwig Wittgensten : Philosophy and Language,* George Allen and Unwin, London, 1972, p. 144.

Armstrong, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

William Seager, *Theores of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment* Routledge, London and New Yourk, 1999, pp. 33-34.

For a discussion of Norton Nelkin's thesis of apperceptive consciousness, see G. P. Ramachandra, 'Has Nelkin Discovered Anything About Consciousness', in C.Kanzian, J. Quitterer and Edmund Runggaldial (ed.) *Persons, An Interdisciplinary Approach,* Papers of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, 2002, pp. 194-195.

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LOCKE AND WITTGENSTEIN ON BARE OSTENSIVE DEFINITION

AMINUL HAQUE

In this paper we propose to reflect on two rival views concerning bare ostensive definition. One view is held by Locke and Mill according to which a bare ostensive definition is possible. Russell and Ayer, too, appear to share such a view. Another view is held by the Wittgensteinians according to which a bare ostensive definition is not possible.

I

We begin with Locke's theory of language. Language, according to Locke, has two uses. As man is a social being, so the first purpose of language is a social one, that is 'the communicating of our thoughts to others'. Besides this, he recognises another possible use of language, namely, 'the recording of our thoughts' for our private use.[1] This latter use of Locke's language is important for our present purpose.

In case of the recording of our thoughts for our private use, Locke says that a word is used as an arbitrarily chosen, conventional sign. We may choose whatever word or whatever sign pleases us best.[2] Words are made into signs by the arbitrary choices of men. They are all arbitrary in the sense that words have no natural connection with what they signify. In support of this, Locke brings forward one argument : if there were a natural connection between words and what they signify "then there would be but one language amongst all men".[3] The fact that languages are many proves their arbitrary character.

Now, what does a word or a sign signify ? It is usually supposed that words signify things. But Locke denies this. The words, according to him, are to be used as signs of ideas in the mind of the speaker, As Locke

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says : "Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the *ideas in the mind of him that uses them*... nor can anyone apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath".[4] He says that we often 'suppose' our words both to be signs of the ideas in the mind of others, and also to stand for 'the reality of things'. But we must not be misled by this 'secret reference' of words, since these suppositions, Locke seems to think, are extraneous to the meaning of words. He goes on to remark that "it is perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we have in our own minds".[5]

A noteworthy feature of Locke's discussion of the names of simple ideas is the account of 'definition' contained in it.[6] Locke makes it clear that definition is of words. To define is 'to show the meaning of one word by several other non synonymous terms'. It is 'to declare the signification of a word', and to declare the signification of a word is, however, merely to state what idea the word signifies. As Locke himself puts it : "The meaning of words, being only the *ideas* they are made to stand for by him that uses them, the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is defined, when by other words the *idea* it is made a sign of and annexed to in the mind of the speaker is, as it were, represented or set before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions".[7] It follows from Locke's view of definition that not all words are definable. Only the words which stand for complex ideas are definable in terms of words that stand for simple ideas contained in them. But the words which stand for simple ideas and which are the foundation of language in so far as they provide the basic links between language and its objects, themselves cannot be defined. "The names of simple *ideas* are not capable of any definitions; the names of all complex *ideas* are".[8] The only way of knowing what the words, in such cases, mean is to have the simple ideas they stand for.

But how is the connection between the name and the thing named established ? Locke's view seems to claim that whenever a person has a simple idea S, he can fix his attention on it and give it a name 'S'. He thus establishes a connection between the name and the thing named. In other words, he constructs a concept S of an *idea* by means of associating a word 'S' with the occurrence of the *idea* S. The word 'S' hitherto

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indefinable, but he gives it a stipulative definition by mental ostensive. This is an ostensive definition, not the ordinary sort, but a private or inner ostensive definition. Instead of pointing out physically to the thing named, he points to the *idea* mentally or inwardly. The private or inner ostensive definition is such that one concentrates one's attention inwardly on the *idea* S when one says the word 'S' to oneself. Locke thus claims to have, in this procedure, a private understanding of a word. In this theory, the idea-specifying words acquire meaning, can be taught and used, by such private or inner ostensive definition.

II

But can words acquire meaning by bare ostensive definition ? Can we give an object a name without knowing or implying anything whatever about the characteristics of the object ? There is, however, an inclination among the philosophers to think that we can give an object a name without knowing or implying anything whatever about the properties of the object. The name would have denotation without connotation. Such a view is clearly expressed in Locke and Mill. According to Locke, there is nothing essential to an individual. The essential attributes of a thing, he says, logically follow from a general term's being true of it, but not from its being given a proper name; the proper names connote nothing.[9] Mill also holds that all proper names serve as names in this way. According to him, whenever the names given to objects have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in their denotation, but in their connotation; the proper names are the only names of objects which have no connotation. "A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object".[10]

The views of Locke and Mill are certainly intended to hold only for proper names, and not for general names. But yet they, however, provide a picture of how the bare ostensive definition of a general word can be conceived. They, however, help us to see how the bare ostensive definition can provide a general word with a direct reference to the object itself, how one can perform in one's mind the act of connecting the word with the object without knowing or implying anything whatever about the characteristics of the object.

This way of conceiving the ostensive definition can be made possible

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by applying Russell's distinction between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description,'[11] Russell holds that 'knowing the meaning of a word' consists in 'standing in a direct cognitive relation to the thing that the word means'. This 'direct cognitive relation' is called 'acquaintance' and 'awareness'. For him, only a man's sensedata and some psychical states of his own can fall within his direct awareness; all other particular entities are known only by description.

The distinction between the two kinds of knowledge is that 'knowledge by acquaintance' is 'logically independent of knowledge of truths', whereas 'knowledge by description' always involves 'some knowledge of truths'. Russell illustrates the distinction thus[12] : The particular shade of colour which I see may have so many things said about it and I may make statements such that it is brown, it is rather dark, and so on. All such statements, according to him, make me know 'truths *about* the colour', but they do not make me know 'the colour itself' any better that I did before. "So far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it, and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible".[13] Now it appears that what is said here about colour, Russell would also have said the same about all other sense-data and psychical states. This implies that ostensive definition will enable one to know the object itself, even without having any previous knowledge about it.

The feasibility of a bare ostensive definition can also be seen by reference to Ayer's 'meaning rules'.[14] Ayer's 'meaning rules' are indeed very close to 'naming rules'. He holds that from the ascription of a given predicate to a thing it does not logically follow that there are in fact any other members of the class of things in question. If I say "This is green", my justification for calling it green may consist in the fact that it resembles one set of objects rather than another, but this does not mean that in calling it green I am saying that it resembles any other objects. The meaning of a word consists just in its reference and there is nothing logically wrong with the idea that a description should be applicable to one thing only. So Ayer's suggestion is that one can describe something "not by relating it to anything else, but by indicating that a certain word applies to it in virtue of a meaning rule of the language".[15] Meaning rules are those rules of a

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language that correlate signs in the language with actual situations, and ultimately these rules will be learned ostensively. "Thus it is a meaning rule of English that anyone who observes something green will be describing it correctly if he says that it is green; or that anyone who feels pain will be describing what he feels correctly if he says that he feels pain".[16] This means that one can learn the application of the words not through their definitions in terms of other expressions, but through a simple correlation between the words and their applications. And one can teach the rules for their use ostensively in the sense that it will be enough for him just to point to the thing in question while uttering a word.

III

Locke's conception of language, so far as it is used for 'the recording of our own thoughts' for our private use, is an exceptionally good example of the notion which philosophers in general, and Wittgenstein in particular, have in mind when they talk about a private language. As Hacker also observes, Locke's theory of language is of an 'ideal type' to which Wittgenstein's imaginary private language approximates very closely.[17] The question whether there could be a private language has become the subject of voluminous discussion ever since Wittgenstein's remarks on the topic were published in his *Philosophical Investigations.* The problem of private language has been formulated, by supporters as well as by critics generally, as the problem of definition of names. The supporters think that the words of a private language acquire meaning by bare ostensive definition through an essentially private process. But Wittgenstein attacks the very idea of giving oneself a bare ostensive definition. He is of the opinion that acquaintance with the object for which a word stands is not the same thing as knowledge of the word's meaning.

The question is : What makes a sound a word, and what makes it the word for a certain object ? Wittgenstenin's point is that the sign 'S', as used by the supporters of private ostensive definition theory, cannot be transformed into the name of an object merely by concentrating one's attention on it and saying a few words to oneself. If a man, for example, utters a certain sound when a cow appears, the sound might refer to anything or nothing. What is necessary for a sound to be a word for cow is that it should have a fixed place in 'language-games'. That is, it should play a part in certain modes of nonlinguistic human behavior - in calling,

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fetching, counting cows, drawing pictures of cows, distinguishing cows from other things and pictures of cows from pictures of other things. If the sound does not play a part in activities of this sort, it cannot be a word for cow. The kind of the way that the word 'cow' refers is the kind of language-game to which it belongs. Hence what is necessary for a sign to be a word is that it should play a part in certain modes of nonlinguistic behaviour, and what makes a word refer to something is the fact that one has already mastered those modes of nonlinguistic behaviour which lie in the background. If a person does not know how to master the nonlinguistic activities, he cannot know the linguistic ones either. The nonlinguistic activities are basic and the linguistic ones are parasitic upon them.[18] Such a connection between the speaking of a language and the nonlinguistic activities is what Wittgenstein means to bring out by the coinage 'language-game', and what he considers to be more important.

Thus naming or forming a new concept, according to Wittgenstein presupposes 'a great deal of stage-setting' or a variety of complex conditions in terms of which a word is intelligibly used in a sentence. But in the case of private ostensive difinition there is *ex hypothesi* no 'stage-setting' to presuppose, there is no 'grammar' to show 'the post where the new word is stationed'. So naming or forming a concept, in the private ostensive definition theory, makes no sense; the background conditions it has are not adequate for its purpose. Wittgenstein's view, however, concerns both private ostensive definition as well as public ostensive definition.

On the contrary, no appeal to any working of the 'mechanism of mind' can solve the problem of how names and the things named are related. As Wittgenstein says "Naming appears as a *queer* connexion of a word with an object. - And you really get such a queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring out *the* relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word 'this' innumerable times. For philosophical problems arise when language *goes on holiday.* And *here* we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a baptism of an object".[19]

IV

As we have seen, there are two rival views about the possibility of a bare ostensive definition. What may be noted now is that the two views concerning bare ostensive definition are based on two radically different

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notions about the relation of language and the world. And it may be said, on this ground, that neither of the views should claim to refute or settle the issue of the other. But each view may deserve consideration in its own theory of language.

The relation between language and the world as conceived by Wittgenstein is such that we cannot know the world independently of having learned a language, but that language itself is a tool for knowing the world. The world, according to him, does not appear to us as a cluster of particulars as supposed by the traditional empiricists, but language itself is a means of 'dividing up' the world into facts or objects or events. For this reason, language and the world are so intimately bound up with one another that neither can be understood in isolation from the other. It is true that this notion of the relation between language and the world cannot allow a bare ostensive definition to be a possible procedure for establishing the meaning of a word.

Ostensive definition, on Wittgenstein's view, is a possible procedure for establishing or conveying the meaning of a word only for people already in possession of a language, or of the concept of the object in question. "The ostensive definition explains the use - the meaning - of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear."[20] When one points to the king in chess and says, "This is the king", then "this does not tell him the use of this piece - unless he already knows the rules of the game up to this last point : the shape of the king."[21] The learner of a new language (i. e., a foreign language) is in a position to follow an ostensive difinition, since he is already acquainted with a range of syntactical categories. But the learner of an initial language is not in such a position.[22]

Locke, on the contrary, conceives of a different kind of relation between language and the world. According to him, the world appears to us as a cluster of particulars which are isolated, distinct and discrete, and we know them through our ideas independently of having learned any language. In the process of learning a language, the first stage is to stock our memory which is 'the storehouse of our ideas'. This is done by means of 'attention and repetition' which help much to fix any ideas in the memory. It is then the business of the memory "to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has present occasion for".[23] Once the store of ideas is established in the memories by repeated sensations, Locke says, we give

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ideas some arbitrary labels as names just to identify or distinguish them. That is to say, ideas come first, and names later; the ideas must be present before they are labelled. As Locke says : "In the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the idea before one gave it the name".[24] It would, then, be a logical possibility that a human creature with a mind well-stocked with ideas should have failed, for some reason, to assign any marks to them. He would be occupied with thoughts and observations, but devoid on language. He would have many concepts but no words with which to express them. Locke thus conceives of language as standing in a purely *external* relation to thinking or the world. In fact, on this notion of the relation between language and the world, a bare ostensive defintion as a possible procedure for establishing the meaning of a world does not seem to be inconceivable.

On Locke's notion of the relation between language and the world, there seems to have no difficulty also in the supposition that the learner of an initial language can be in a position to follow an ostensive definition. The linguistic capacities or the mastery of a word's general use, on this view, are necessarily an external, adventitious aspect of the formation or acquisition of concepts. A concept is fundamentally a recognitional capacity here; so the depreciation of linguistic performances is an essential part of the view. Hence it is not inconceivable, on the bare ostensive definition theory, that one can learn the meaning of name for objects simply by acquaintance with the names' bearers.

The classical theories of language made a fundamental distinction between semantics and syntax of a language. Words are regarded as the 'units' of meaning; they mean extra-linguistic entities by being related to them by semantical rules. Sentences, then, are constructed out of words in accordance with syntactical rules. In such theories, it could be asked significantly if *words* could be defined only by bare ostension. Wittgenstein's main contention is that this divorce between semantics and syntax is untenable. In his later theory of language, the 'unit' of meaning is not the word, but a sentence which requires for its formation syntactical rules. The meaning of words is derived from the meaning of sentences in which they can (possibly) occur. And the *meaning* of sentences is due to the *roles* they play in a language-game. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, the idea that meaning has something to do with 'use' brings out the suggestion that

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language should be thought of as something that is essentially a human institution. When we talk of something, our words do not refer to it. But the reference takes place only within a convention, by the way the words enter in discourse, by their connections with what people say and do or with what Wittgenstein calls a 'form of life'.[25] Indeed, such a theory of the relation between language and the world cannot allow a bare ostensive definition to be a possible procedure for establishing the meaning of a word.

NOTES

1. J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* ed. A.C.Fraser, Vol. I (New York : Dover Publications, 1959). Bk.III, Ch.9, Sec. 2.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.,* Bk. III, Ch. 2, Sec. 1.
4. *Ibid.,* Bk. III, Ch. 2, Sec. 2.
5. *Ibid.,* Bk. III, Ch. 2, Sec. 5.
6. R. I. Aaron, *John Locke* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 211.
7. J. Locke, *op.cit.,* Bk. III, Ch. 4, Sec. 5.
8. *Ibid.,* Bk. III, Ch. 4, Sec. 4.
9. *Ibid.,* Bk. III, Ch. 6, Sec. 4.
10. J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic* (London : Longmans, 1949), Bk. I, Ch. 2, Sec. 5.
11. B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 25 ff.
12. *Ibid.,* p. 25.
13. *Ibid.*
14. A. J. Ayer, "Basic Propositions", in *Philosophical Essays* (London : Macmillan, 1959), pp. 105-124.
15. *Ibid.,* pp. 119-120.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 120.
17. P.M.S.Hacker, *Insight and Illusion* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 224.
18. G. Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (New Delhi : Prentice - Hall,

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1985), p. 240.

19. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1968), Sec. 38.
20. *Ibid.*, Sec. 30.
21. *Ibid.*, Sec. 31.
22. A. Kenny, *Wittgenstein* (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 157-158; P.M.S. Hacker, *op.cit.*, p. 235.
23. J. Locke, *op.cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. 10, Sec. 8.
24. *Ibid.*, Bk. III, Ch. 5, Sec. 15.
25. L. Wittgenstein, *op.cit.*, Sec. 23.

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BOOK-REVIEW - I

Chaturvedi, Vibha : *Wittgenstein's Fideism; Belief, Reason and Practice*, :Om Publications. New Delhi, 2002, pp.170+xvi, Price Rs.400/-.

Vibha Chaturvedi's book *Willgenstein's Fideism; Belief, Reason and Practice* is the first book by an Indian Wittgensteinian in the field of fideistic criticism of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion. One can rightly expect it to be a lucid book in which arguments systematically present aphoristic thoughts of Wittgenstein because of author's experience and competence.

It has been more in vogue these days in Europe and America to write about Wittgenstein's views on religious belief as compared to his philosophy of mind and language. Rather, it's more pertinent to say that much work is being done in the field which is actually the field of the convergence of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and philosophy of religion. Such a research is a natural corollary of Wittgenstein's later views about religion which are different from his earlier views - at least from the point of view of expressibility of religious beliefs. The 'earlier' and 'later' nomenclatures in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion like the general notion of 'Earlier Wittgenstein' and 'Later Wittgenstein' could be debatable. Nonetheless, there is a view which maintains that Wittgenstein of the *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief* (hereafter *LC*) is different from the Wittgenstein of the *Lecture on Ethics* which maintains that if a book could be written on Ethics, ipso-facto on religion, then that book with single stroke would destroy all the books in the world. It seems correct to hold that Wittgenstein till 1929, that is till his *Lecture on Ethics,* kept on holding his views of *Notebooks 1914-16* and *Tractatus* that religious beliefs and experiences are inexpressible. He held the inexpressibility thesis on the ground that a word

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like a spoon can hold only that much sugar which is its size. For Earlier Wittgenstein, Ethice and Religion belong to the realm of showable and therefore any attempt to write about them would result into nothing but nonsense. Thus, for Earlier Wittgenstein religious propositions alongwith ethical propositions are nonsensical expressions. It is to be noted that this nonsensicality is not any kind of disqualification but the essence of these expressions. As different from his earlier view Later Wittgenstein does not maintain that religious expressions are meaningless. Now for him these expressions are meaningful in their own form of life and language game.

It's on this background that Fideism-thesis plays its role. It should be clear beforehand that it's not a thesis propounded by Wittgenstein, but it has been alleged to be a Wittgensteinian theses - it's a critique of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion on the ground that it is based on fallacious ground. That is to say, 'Wittgenstein's Fideism' does not mean that Wittgenstein gave fideistic thesis. Rather, it means that critics of Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion maintain that Wittgenstein commits fideistic mistakes.

Kai Nelson, the leading exponent of such criticism of Wittgenstein, in his books *Contemporary Critiques of Religion* and *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion,* and the article 'Wittgensteinian Fideism' has criticised Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion on the ground that it commits relativistic errors.

The book under review is divided into 4 chapters and each of them is divided into sub-topics. 'Wittgenstein Fideism' is the last sub-topic of the last chapter. Thus, the entire book is a prelude or preparation to the explanation of the alleged Wittgensteinian Fideism.

Chapter one is divided into two parts : (i) Problem of Justification, and (ii) Problem of Meaning. Where 'justification' is about first order treatment of religious belief, 'meaning' is meta-linguistic in the sense that it discusses cognitivity of religious language. Under the problem of justification this chapter discusses proofs for the existence of God : Ontological, Teleological, Cosmological, Mystical Experience and Revelation. Here, one can see that Moral Argument of Kant has not been mentioned. Although, reason for that might have been that it is controversial to treat moral argument as a proof for the existence of God, as some regard it solely a suggestion and not a proof. However, here author shows

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that each claim of God's existence or justification of belief in the Ultimate Reality is ridden with problems. Although, problems described here are general criticisms raised throughout the history of philosophy of religion against the traditional proofs for the existence of God, the purpose of such description, one can conjecture, is to build up the background for fideism.

Under the sub-topic 'Problem of Meaning' two debates have been elaborated : (1) debate about meaning of predicates ascribed to God, and (2) debate about cognitive meaningfulness of religious expressions. (1) Although the words which are used in ordinary discourse are also used in religious discourse, they accrue different meaning in different discourses. For example, God's love for human being is different from parents' love for their children. (2) The debate about the cognitive meaningfulness of religious expressions has been centred round the verifiability and falsifiability theses. The controversy whether or not religious expressions are verifiable and falsifiable has been continued unabated. This issue is significant for fideistic thesis. Even if one agrees with logical positivists and Antony Flew in endorsing the view that religious expressions, which are neither verifiable nor falsifiable and therefor, are devoid of cognitive meaning, one would be supporting then Braithwaitean view about their distinctness. Thus, in any case, whether religious expressions are regarded as similar to ordinary expressions and thus there is no room for fideistic thesis, or whether Braithwaitaean 'distinctness' is regarded as tenable, hence creating its scope, their distinctness can be appreciated. This issue has been thoroughly discussed in this chapter.

The second chapter 'Meaning, Language - Game and Forms of Life' has a twinfold purpose. On the one hand it discusses the role of Language Game and Forms of Life in determining meaning of any expression in general and on the other hand it explains the implication of such determinacy of meaning in the field of religious expressions. Wittgensteinians like Hepburn, Hudson, Rush Rhees, Phillips, Malcolm, etc. have interpreted these concepts of *Philosophical Investigations* for understanding cognitive meaningfulness of religious expressions and dispelling such views about Wittgenstein which treat Wittgenstein (at least the Earlier Wittgenstein) holding positivistic standpoint in religious matters and therefore establishing some kind of continuity between the religious thoughts of *Notebooks 1914-16* and *Tractactus* on the one hand, and

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LC on the other. In order to obtain similar result Chaturvedi beings about *Philosophical Investigations* conceptions such as 'Philosophy as description', 'Meaning as Use', 'Language Game' and 'Form of Life'. One can notice that Chaturvedi has explained these concepts as they appear in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language and as some Wittgensteins comment on them. Here, these concepts have not been employed in the field of Philosophy of Religion as above described Wittgensteinians have done. One can wonder as to how this chapter is related to Wittgenstein's Fideism. But without being desperate and elapsing into the harsh criticism of the author one can take this chapter as a background, as a clarification of those concepts which are alleged to assist Wittgensteinian Fideism. One cannot but agree with the author (p.ix) that the criterion for employing Language Game as well as Form of Life is not clear in *Philosophical Investigations*. However, here let me add that indeterminacy is inherent in the nature of these concepts; it would be simplistic to say as to where the function of a linguistic element ends and that of the other element begins to play its role - it is like gleaning origin and impact of a particular cultural notion. Thus, author's viewpoint is vindicated though it cannot be taken as a critique of Wittgenstein.

Whereas second chapter discusses Wittgenstein's notions of Language Game and Form of Life in general, the third chapter 'Belief, Rationality and Dogma' explains Wittgenstein's views on religious belief and religious language. Here, Wittgensteinian distinctness of religious belief has been elaborated. Its premise, "according to Wittgenstein, a religious belief does not require any supporting evidence, rather the question of evidence is just not relevant in this context" (p. 70) forms the basis of its thesis (p. 75) that "Wittgenstein maintains that in religious discourse, 'believing' cannot be contrasted with 'knowing' nor does the question of evidence or reasons has any relevance for firmness of a belief." In order to establish this thesis the uniqueness of evidence for the support of religious belief and the abridgement of the cleavage between 'knowing' and 'believing' in case of faith, as different from ordinary belief, has also been elaborated in the chapter. Next, the differences between religious and scientific beliefs on the ground of forecast about something and the role of empirical evidence have been explained, and the notion of 'reasonable' in the context of religion has been discussed.

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In an important section of this chapter Wittgenstein's distinction between a religious belief and a superstitious belief has been analysed. This distinction had been the crux of a recent discussion published in *JICPR* in which I have participated with Prof. Suresh Chandra (See *JICPR*, Vol. XIX No. 1, January - March 2002) on the issue whether 'fear' according to Wittgenstein is the basis of religious or superstitious belief. I have elaborated this further in my own book *Wittgenstein ke Darshan Ki Ruprekha (Outlines of Wittgenstein's Philosophy,* New Bhartiya Book Corporation, New Delhi 2004) Chaturvedi's reflection is from a different perspective. For her, Wittgenstein holds that 'a religious belief which is being justified on empirical grounds, would be superstition' (p. 81) In this context it's difficult to agree with her account of Wittgenstein's views on miracle and religious experience (p. 82). For example, Wittgenstein does not regard religious experience, as author also holds, as the evidence on the basis of which a believer propounds his belief. Therefore, these experiences do not work as scientific evidence. However, these experiences do play their role in shaping one's new life style. In *Lecture on Ethics,* Wittgenstein admits this as 'ethical experience'. Thus, for me Wittgenstein does not keep ambivalent attitude on religious experience (p. 82) but regards it highly valuable. The shaping up on one's faith by these experiences is different from the way one formulates one's view in any other matter on the basis of certain ordinary or scientific beliefs. In this chapter, hereafter, the dogma of 'survival after death' and Wittgenstein's remark 'non - believer does not contradict a believer' has been elaborated chiefly form the perspective of *LC*. The views of Wittgensteinians such as Barrett and Malcolm have been discussed in connection with reason, faith and dogma.

The last chapter 'Insights and Limitations' once again brings out the issue of the first chapter, i.e., justification and meaning of religious belief and experiences. But unlike first chapter here the treatment is entirely Wittgensteinian. 'Wittgensteinian Fideism' has been discussed in the last portion of this chapter. The fideistic critique is a relativistic allegation, the crux of which is that the Wittgensteinian thesis that "only those who participate in the religious form of life can properly understand religious discourse" (p. 144) fails to draw any criterion for distinction between a religious belief and a superstitious belief. Chaturvedi admits, "Wittgenstein's

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observations are sometimes used to support the conclusion that religious discourse is autonomous and self-sufficient." (p. 145) Here, views of Wittgensteinians such as Huges, Malcolm, Winch, and Phillips have been analysed as supporting Wittgenstein's thesis 'religion as a distinct form of life'. However, countervailing Fideism she contends that Wittgenstein does talk of relatednes of Language-Games and therefore it is wrong to interpret him treating religious belief as esoteric.

At the first glance, only a portion of this book may appear to be directly dealing with fideistic criticism of the application of Later Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy of language such as Language Game and Form of Life to explain the nature of religious belief. But a deeper reflection shows that in fact its arguments from chapter one till the end are well-knit and present a cohesive and holistic perspective of an issue in Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion which has been favourite of many a Wittgensteinian scholar.

Kali Charan Pandey

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BOOK-REVIEW - II

Sweet, William (ed) ***God and Argument - Dieu et l 'Argumentation Philosophique'*** (Actexpress) : Ottawa, Les Presses de L 'Universite D' Ottawa, 1999, pp. x + 275

That "God's existence and His nature" has been the theme of a serious philosophical concern in the Western academic circles of present times is well attested by the book under review which is an anthology - a collection of essays specially written for the purpose of this book, with a very fine and lucid introduction by the editor, Professor William Sweet. Though the religious belief in God is universal and ubiquitous, its philosophic scrutiny and justification has attracted theologians and philosophers of the West ever since Greek antiquity. (In India, the situation is different. Though the belief prevailed almost from Vedic times and continues to play its influence in the most intriguing ways on Indian society it has not been subjected to any serious philosophic inquiry by any one except perhaps the lone instance of Udayānacārya of Naiyāyika tradition who belonged presumably to 10th century AD.) The work moves on a metaphilosophical and metalogical level. It's a move which Hegal would have happily described as selfconsciousness itself becoming self-conscious because the Absolute is essentially subject and hence, the moral order of the world. Sweet, in his Introduction, speaks about God as object of philosophical argument, but draws attention to such questions as What *is* the object of religious belief ? Is it what people often call 'God' or 'the Gods' ? Is it possible to talk coherently about or prove or disprove the existence of God or gods ? Are argument and evidence relevant to religious belief, and if they are, how ? It is these old questions which have engaged the philosophical brains of late but the responses to them are varied and give

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rise to further philosophising. From the responses to these questions one can disceron several different trends : ***Classical natural theology*** or philosophy of religion following Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas; ***Classical 'athealogy'*** which agrees that God can be discussed but denies that anything about God - including God's existence - can be proved; (Hume, Feuerbach and Freud, Anthony Flew, J.L.Mackie and Kai Nielsen are known exponents of this view.) ***Fideism,*** which holds that the divine cannot be argued for or even discussed and therefore one must ***believe;*** arising out of these positions by way of implications, there may be those who would like to undertake a sort of ***phenomenology of belief in God*** or a study of a ***logic of religious discourse*** or work on how believers should understand their beliefs within a specific theological tradition and so on and so forth. It is possible for a few to think that even though there cannot be anything like a demonstrative proof for God's existence and nature, ***God may be the legitimate object of abductive or inductive arguments*** in which case one may claim that it is reasonable (but not rational in the strict sense of the term) to believe in the existence of God. In the second section of the Introduction, Sweet raises epistemological issues such as: on what basis can we say that utterances like 'God exists', God is love, etc. have menaing and that they are true ? Can such utterances be rational or reasonable ? Would argument and proof be relevant or appropriate here and how could they show that these beliefs are true or reasonable ? Sweet is aware that while the issue of God as an object of philosophical argument is epistemological, it is not obviously, ***just*** an epistemelogical one. God is a metaphysical object and therefore, the proper concern of a metaphysical proof. How do we respond to the issue arising out of God's status as a metaphysical object ? Consider such questions: In what sense can one speak of God's knowledge, goodness or even existence itself ? Can God be considered as the Creater of Humans and the rest of the world ? Is the relation of creation a continuing one or only a metaphysical issue that arises and demands philosophers' concern. Needless to say that Sweet also raises several logical issues concerning the relation of God to argument. What is an argument and what is it that we are doing and what do we hope to achieve when we engage in argument ? Sweet is right in raising these questions because God's existence and nature is not merely a matter of argument. What we need is a sound argument - an

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argument that is valid and having true premisses. As Sweet observes : "The kind of arguments that might be appropriate in talking about God is far from obvious, and though some kind of arguments appear to be preferred to others, they must take care to ensure that one's preference is more than a question begging one, and that it is genuinely suited to the subject matter." (p.5) To make God the theme of philosophic argumentation is to confront oneself with a wide range of problems. Following Sweet, one can see that one of the aims of his anthology is "to suggest that it is possible to make some headway in resolving these problems and issues, and that careful reflection will allow one to suggest that some of the perspectives and positions on God and argument are more plausibe than others." (p. 6) The Collection draws on, and brings readers into contact with, philosophers of variety of pursuasions and commitments. It is designed to fall into three parts: first part comprising 5 essays reflecting on 'Conditions for God and Argument'; second part having 6 essays essaying to resituate arguments about God; and the third part reconsidering arguments concerning God's existence in 4 essays included in it. In a brief write up such as this, it is difficult to cover contents of all the 15 essays but I shall highlight a few points made by their authors and which I consider to be of some significance in the context of God and Argument.

In his Essay, 'God and Argument : Strong and Weak Theories of Existence', James Bradley offers five types of considerations what he calls his theses by way of reflections on the Philosophical treatment of existence and its implications for the nature and status of the concept of God. The ***first*** thesis claims that to be able to appeal to God as an explanatory concept in contemporary metaphysics and theology, one will have to defend a strong theory of existence as against the weak theory of existence which is subscribed to by philosophers like Kant, Frege, Quine and most others who are empiricists, naturalists and pragmatists. Speculative metaphysicians, however, hold that existence is much more than that which can be captured merely with the help of existential quantifier. As Bradley puts it, "against Frege and his followers the primitivity of propositional function is denied", by speculative metaphysician and "along with that the assimilation of the 'is' of existence to the 'is' of instantiation." (p. 18)... To the quantificational analysis, speculative metaphysics puts the strong question of existence 'Why is there that which answers a description?' or

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'Why is there that which satisfies the propositional function ?' (p. 18) Bradley removes certain misunderstandings about the strong theory referring to Aquinas and Leibnitz and finally settles on the view that "On strong theory, active existence is prior to existential quantification and is the fundamental condition which makes existential quantification possible." (p. 20) Surely Bradley tries to argue for the intelligibility of the strong question but does not say how one can answer that question satisfactorily with the limited cognitive resources that we as finite beings have. Bradley's point is however not that we can grasp 'existence' in a strong sense required by those who talk of God's existence. Though we do not deny the *prima facie* intelligibility of the strong question, "the question itself may still be relatively indeterminate." (p. 21) Bradley's ***second*** thesis is that "the concept of God has mainly been developed with reference to the activity of actualization understood as a causal or productive activity of some kind; that is, in terms of what can be called a theory of philosophical cause, or, more specifically, of meta-cause." (p. 21) A metacause is defined by Bradley as "a causal or productive principle which is held to transcend or to be prior to any of its operations, states, instances or effects and is complete and timelessly present as such." (p. 21) Recognizing three types of metacause the emanative, the eminent and the immanent - Bradley recounts their development in the history of Western philosophy and turns to his ***third*** thesis which results from the second by way of implication. The third thesis is that "the reason for the development of immanent cause and for the difficulties which it brings to a head in the concept of God as cause result from the development in the speculative tradition of the theory of relationality." (p. 22) Bradley draws our attention to an important historical transformation in which "relations take precedence ever both substance and subject and constitute the context in which any unity is defined" (p. 23) In the ***fourth*** thesis Bradley shows how Relational analysis has led to the abandonment of the notions of substance, subject and meta-cause in respect of God and development of what Bradley refers to as 'serial analysis' in the modern speculative metaphysics of Bergson, Heidegger and Whitehead, though in three different forms. This insight is all important and worthy of further careful reflection and analysis, because it spells consequentially Bradley's ***fifth*** thesis concerning relation of God and Argument. He thinks that relation is a matter of redefinition of the

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concept of God in some other terms than those of philosophical meta-cause. "Where infinity is serial infinity there is no need for the grounding activity of a philosophical meta-cause of any kind." (p. 24) Strong theorists of existence have replaced the concept of God as meta-cause by the concept of God as object of love (originally, an Aristotelian conception). It has been replaced by God as the concealment of Being in its finite self-actualization. Bradley notes that the latter is ambiguous but does not comment upon God as love redeemer. Mere observation that "in the context of speculative metaphysics of series, the doctrine of God, and in particular the doctrine of creation, is undergoing significant reassessment" won't help philosophers of religion much unless that reassessment is supported by philosophical arguments deflating the claims of Darwin's theory of Evolution.

In his "On Being Certain About the Existence of God." James Ross agrees with the impossibility of developing a demonstrative argument or 'rational proof' for God's existence and draws our attention to other sorts of arguments which are pursuasive enough to produce rational certainty or a sort of conviction which a theologian is looking for. Philosophical argument about God is essentially 'practical', not theoretical or scientific. Sweet, the Editor of the Collection of these Essays, also seems to agree with James Ross in opining that "what often gives us rational certainty is not argument or demonstration, but our feelings about, or trusts we have in others, in institutions and in 'communities of those who know.' (p. 7) But then this raises a very vital issue as to whether James Ross has made any progress beyond Kant's position and whether our all metaphysics will be determined by our pragmatic concerns ? If the philosophical authenticity requires that no belief can be asserted to be true unless there is logical justification for it, why should we allow unfair pragmatic exploitation in the name of religion and God ? Ross has included the name of Gautam the Buddha in the list of wise ones from whom many people find out about God by taking them seriously. (p. 34) This is a serious mistake since Buddha cannot be said even by remotest stretch of imagination, to be a believer in God and His Efficacy for worldly and beyond worldly happiness for man. Gautam Buddha is an atheist and in his system God has no place, nor any role to play. Ross' emphasis is on practical wisdom as a guide for life but we should not forget that there isn't anything like ***the*** universal wisdom as

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such in this world.

Louis Perron's Essay-" Pour une Reinterpretation Phenomenologique de la Question de L' Existence de Dieu' is one of the three Essays that find place in the anthology and whose text is in French. The anthology is thus bi-lingual. For those who know only English, they may have to face some difficulty in going through and grasping their contents. Perron's essay is to be read with special reference to the context of Jean Ladriere's phenomenological moorings. Prof. Sweet has summarised for us in his Introduction (p. 8) Ladrire's existentially inspired ontological phenomenology. It is difficult to see how God can be an object of experience - such an experience being of a mystical character. How can we be sure that two phenomenologists have focussed on the same 'being' as a horizon allowing for arguments - hermeneutical meditations - concerning the existence of God ? How can we be sure that they have reached the same God Principle understood as a condition of the possibility of being ? Even if both the phenomenologists are Christian how can they be certain that they have reached the same God principle.

William Desmond lodges a complaint that "we do an injustice to the proofs if we abstract them from the ontological context in which they are formulated." (p. 66) "We have to acknowledge a complex interplay of ways and ethos", he continues and maintains that "the result is not only a task for rethinking the ways, it is also a task for more adequate metaphysical reflection on the ontological character of ethos." (p. 66) The notion of ontogical ethos introduced by Desmond appears to me to be philosophically opaque but it is interesting to peruse Desmond's reaction to Kant's refutation of Ontological argument in its Cartesian version. He thinks that Anselm's presentation with the then ontological ethos - prayers and meditation, etc. - could be defended so as to remove a major Kantian obstacle in dealing with Thomas Aquinas's Ways. Thus a room for 'God and Argument' can be made. Desmond's approach has a far-reaching implication which he himself states in the following words :

> "Metaphysics is not just the philosophical discipline that examines and evaluates arguments for their rational cogency; not just the philosophical interpretation of the ethos as reconfigured in the light of the fundamental notions of a particular era, or people, or a particular way of life; metaphysics, at its most deep, requires

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philosophical mindfulness of the primal ethos of being." (p. 80)

But this itself has a serious implication for academic philosophers : Don't touch religion at all or else reconcile your reason with dogma.

The last Essay in the First part of this collection is an acute criticism by a self-announced militant atheist - D. Goldstick - of Alwin Plantinga's long Essay, "Reason and Belief in God". (see : Alvin Plantinga's, "Reason and Belief in God", in ***Faith and Rationality*** (ed.) Alwin Plantinga and Nicholas Walterstorff, (Notre Dame, 1983 pp. 16-93). Goldstick's Essay - "Alwin Plantinga's Slip" imputes to Plantinga a slip in claiming that, notwithstanding the earlier writings of Plantinga, in the Essay mentioned, "not everything he says in his essay is fully consistent with the views he expresses in this essay." (p. 85) D. Goldstick's criticism of Plantinga can be well appreciated if it can be shown that Plantinga's notion of Reformed epistemology was so formulated as to beg the whole question of God's existence and nature but Goldstick detects a graver slip of inconsistency in the Plantinga's position.

The second part of the Collection which resituates arguments about God contains a group of six papers written by Leslie Armour, Lawrence Dewan, Peter Harris, Bernard Vanaty, o.p., J.L.A.West and the editor himself-William Sweet, Armour, in his Essay - "Anselm's Proof and Some Problems of Meaning and Reference" - lends a new dimension of inquiry to Anselm's argument by placing on it a new interpretation as to how meaning and reference or 'having an idea of a being' occurs. The essay is so scholarly that after going through it one begins to get the feel that ontological argument as put forth by Anselm (and not by Descartes and Kant) isn't one that can be made to go away easily. Lawrence Dewan in his Essay : St. Thomas and the Existence of God : Owen vs. Gilson, and Beyond "brings out the salient features of the debate over St. Thomas' Cosmological Argument presented in ***Summa Theologiae.*** The dispute seems to be however on the point as to whether all the five ways of Aquinas can be or cannot be reduced to just one way, i.e. Cosmological argument. Again a scholarly exercise involving hermeneutic differences shedding different lights on Aquinas' arguments which certainly depend for their cogency on his analysis of 'being'. So far as God's existence is concerned, St. Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways of Knowing the Existence of God have occupied central position in the Modern Philosophy of Religion.

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Naturally they have been the object of variant interpretations giving rise to several disputes. Dewan's paper concentrates on only one such dispute but adds substantially to Aquinas scholarship. "The Argument from Contingency 'Then and Now' by Peter Harris is again on one of the arguments - the Five Ways of St. Thomas Aquinas - Argument from Contingency. It examines the significance of the argument and raises the question as to whether the argument depends in a sense upon the theological doctrine of creation. It further proceeds to reflect on how the medieval thinkers understood contingency by juxtaposing it with Heidegger's understanding of contingency as gleaned from his ***The Principle of Reason.*** The continuing Aquinas scholarship is an evidences of the view that though as demonstrative arguments the Five Ways of Aquinas are essentially primary and provisional their significance can be fully grasped in St. Thomas' further discussions about the unity and simplicity of God. Aquinas' treatment of the issue in his Five Ways suggests that it is not faith that's in need of justification from reason but what is important is to throw light on the relevance of reason to the faith in God. The purpose of the arguments is to throw light on the kind of being the God is. To see the world as contingent needing a reason is to see it as a consequence of looking at it as a creation of Almighty. That would be, as William Sweet puts it, serve as a rational confirmation of what we already know in another way.... the arguments should be then evaluated. (p. 10-11). Of course this raises the question : While it makes perfect sense to speak of a particular thing or situation as suffering from contingency, what sense can one make of 'the contingency of world or universe as such'? Granting that everything that exists in this Universe is contingent, would it follow that the whole universe or world is contingent ? In the next Essay of the II Group, "Le Dieu indemonstrable et indubitable de Kant' (which is in French), Bernard Vinaty maintains that although Kant's argument in his *Critique of Pure Reason* against the demonstrability of God's existence is sound and effectively indisputable, Kant held God's existence to be indubitably certain and that Kant accorded God the status of postulate in founding a rigourous display in human life of an autonomous will (-the practical reason-) on a rational basis, Surely, Vinaty is justified in saying so on the basis of Kant's line of thinking in the second ***Critique,*** which, according to some scholars, is quite central to the entire project of Kant. Kant him-self also believed that

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he had written the ***Critique of Pure Reason*** in order to make room for ***faith.*** There are scholars, however, who have trenchantly criticised Kant's normative but formally rigoros deontological moral theory as presented in the ***Critique of Practical Reason.*** Even Coleridge, the English Peet Philosopher criticised Kant for not noticing the explicit contradiction between the two ***Critiques*** of his. Can that which is indemonstrable and unjustifiable be made a postulate of our moral life ? This apart, as observed by Prof. Sweet in his Introduction, "Vinaty leaves unaddressed the question of whether Kant's objections to the cosmological, teleological and ontological proofs - objections frequently considered decisive - are in fact conclusive." J.L.A. West in his Essay : "Kant's Attack on the Cosological Argument" thinks that Aquinas' version of the Third Way - Cosmological Argument - can be defended against Kant's attack without begging the question. West's main objection is that all the objections which Kant raises are rooted in Kant's transcendental idealism which one need not agree with. Prof. Sweet has therefore thought it proper to deal in his Essay : "Evidentialism at its Origins and Anglo-American Philosophy of Religion" with the epistemological issue in the context of epistemology that is both evidentialist and foundationalist. Sweet argues that, "If we examine the work of some of the early exponents of evidentialism, we will see that the standards of proof in religious belief are much less rigid or extreme than now claimed ..... and the principal objections, therefore, to argument reproving religious belief are unwarranted..... it does not follow that evidentialism is in fact the sole or best approach to understanding religious belief or for arguing whether it is reasonable to believe. "Sweet's paper raises several issues concerning methodological aspects as to how one goes about confirming the truth of religious beliefs and needs a separate review to assess its merits. In the light of the standards of rationality set up by science and mathematics, it is difficult to see how one can have even comparatively reasonable standards for the acceptance of religious beliefs.

Even if some of the arguments, as shown in Part II, can be given fairer treatment, the question as to whether any argument can ultimately succeed in proving the existence of God still remains with us. It is this question that leads the Editor to include as many as four essays that deal with argument from design (teleological argument) and the argument from

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miracle, in the part III. Denis Hurtbuse works out a potentially plausible teleological argument for God's existence on the basis of Whitehead's ***Science and the Modern World*** (1925) and ***Religion in the Making*** (1929).Whitehead is a 'Process' philosopher as is wellknown and should not in fact need the metaphysical principle of God to account for order or design in the universe. But how can one explain order and existence of the standards of value in the world, if not by reference to some such universal principle as God ? Denis Hertebuse however argues that Whitehead's line of thinking as a 'process-philosopher' can hardly ever inspire mono-theists to look for the designer who can be idetified with God of religion. We may also note here that Denis Hertebuse does not take into account appropriateness of the language of purpose or telos. While it makes perfect sense to speak of the purpose of individual objects, actions, as also human societies and institutioas, one cannot meaningfully speak of the purpose for which Universe exists or even God exists. One becomes aware of this especially when one goes through John Haldane's "Theism and Science" Of the two hypotheses, order infused with divine purpose and scientific mechanistic eliminitative materialism, the latter has proved its fairly high probative value while the former one gives a surrealistic painting of Universe. If there are any 'gaps' in the scientific conception of the world at present - especially the gap between non-living and the living, the gap can be bridged by further scientific inquiry and research. Developments in the field of cognitive science are a pointer in this direction. This can explain why Robert Larmer's Essay "Mracles as Evidence for God" is not likely to be impressive enough. It is no wonder that "the argument that miracles help to establish the truth of theism in general and that Christianity in particular has fallen on hard times in acadmic circles". (p. 253) Nevertheless, Larmer's essay is thought-provoking in that he suggests that the argument from miracle can be seen as a form of teleological argument. But prospects of his own argument are not at all improved by tying it down with the teleological form of argument for the existence of God. Kant was very much impressed by teleology but had to give it up in the end in view of its relatively less evidential value. In the last Essay : "The Design Connection", Elizabeth Trott even makes a stronger claim that" an analysis of the concept of design will provide grounds to refute any connection between this idea and arguments for the existence

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of God." (p. 265) Keeping in view the title of this book, she declares that she would offer an explanation of that concept which will make a deductive argument from design to God unlikely. Referring to the two theories of John Leslie and Daniel Dennett she arrives at and favours 'design' as a possible model of analysis and the definitive explanation of actual states of affairs as we know them. Trott makes several observations to make an all important point for her position that "whether as a practice or as a tool for interpretation, designing is a human phenomenon associated with human agenda". (p. 267) More importantly, she analyses a paper by Cyril Stanley Smith - "Structural Hierarchy in Science, Art and History" to illustrate the point that "the description of order and change in the physical world provides a working model for the human world, as well" (p. 269). She then asserts that "Design then is a window on the world, not presupposition of its existence." (p. 270) She refers to the work of scientist like Roger Jones and spells out at length the role of 'metaphor' in science only to dispel the notion that God could be intimately associated with the world as a priorly designed and ordered structure. If science is a human enterprise to introduce order in chaos through metaphors of space, time, matter and cause etc. and if that is all that is humanly possible for us, the design connection with God can be very slender. If at all as Trott puts it..." If life on earth is but an event in a sea of chaos and not a cosmic force that will change the universe, then the ideal of God is just an event, a window of design, one option among many." (p. 273-74). She ends on a rather pessimistic note that "chance still covers a lot of turf and the decline towards chaos seems undeterred by the theories and interruptions of the law." (p. 274)

Critical perusal of these essays makes reading into the traditional proofs for the existence of God and His nature interesting. As observed by James Ross, demonstrating the existence of God is quite different and difficult matter at the present stage of history of philosophy than it was at some other times." (p. 27) The problem has been tackled by different authers from a variety of approaches and perspectives. For Indian readers it will be quite a revelation to see how in contrast to our schools of thought, except perhaps Nyāya, the concept of God is capable of inviting larger debates in the Western philosophy of Religion, even in present times.

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